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Risk management and efficiency are very crucial for the survival of every organization. 
“Indeed, better risk management may be the only truly necessary element of success in 
banking” (Alan Greenspan) and “the obvious rule of efficiency is you don’t want to spend 
more time organizing than it’s worth” (Daniel Levitin). In microfinance, risk management 
and efficiency are important for the achievement of both the financial and social objectives 
of microfinance institutions, which aim primarily to provide financial services to the 
unbanked populations in the world. Giving uncollaterized loans to vulnerable borrowers is 
risky yet that is what microfinance institutions do. In this dissertation, I examine what could 
be a good business model in microfinance as far as general institutional sustainability is 
concerned.  
 
The dissertation comprises four empirical studies. The first study investigates whether 
geographic diversification is beneficial to the microfinance institution (MFI) from the 
perspective of risk management. The relationship between geographic diversification and 
risk has been the focus of much attention in the mainstream banking industry but not in the 
microfinance industry, even though observers recommend that MFIs diversify 
geographically. Using data from institutional rating reports, I found that geographic 
diversification is not beneficial to MFIs in terms of risk reduction.  
 
The second study is related to the first one. In this study, I broadened the scope of 
diversification to include revenue. Revenue diversification is about having other sources 
of revenue aside from interest revenue, which is the main source of income in banking. 
Using the same dataset, I found that, unlike geographic diversification, revenue 
diversification is beneficial for the sustainability of MFIs.  
 
The third study similarly investigates the institutional outcomes of providing nonfinancial 
services to poor people alongside the core financial services. Again, the research question 
is whether it is beneficial to the MFI to provide these “extra” services (e.g., vocational skill 
training, health services, literacy training). The general finding from the same dataset used 




the financial performance of MFIs. However, the results show that the combined approach 
may improve the asset quality as well as the social performance of MFIs. 
 
The final study concerns the link between efficiency and risk in microfinance. In general, 
loan default rates are lower in the global microfinance industry than in regular banking. On 
the other hand, cost efficiency is lower in microfinance than in banking. Thus, MFIs seem 
to be successful in asset quality but not in operational efficiency. This study therefore 
examines a possible tradeoff between efficiency and risk. The results suggest a nonlinear 
(U-shaped) relationship between cost efficiency and credit risk in MFIs, a finding that is 
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Overview of the Dissertation: 


















1. Introduction  
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as a solution to problems faced by state-initiated 
credit programs (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 1999). Since then, microfinance 
has been applauded by many observers worldwide for achieving its main objective of 
financial inclusion (Biosca, Lenton, & Mosley, 2014; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2009) and the resulting positive impact on development (Hermes, 2014; 
Lopatta & Tchikov, 2016). However, more knowledge is needed on how to advance the 
frontiers of microfinance as far as its double bottom-line objectives are concerned. In 
this regard, this dissertation examines how the credit risk of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) can be managed. High defaults of microcredit can jeopardize the microfinance 
industry. For instance, the high number of loan defaults between 1996 and 2000 in the 
Bolivian microfinance industry affected not only the industry but the economy as a 
whole (Vogelgesang, 2003).  
 Similarly, since the sustainability of the industry depends, in part, on the operational 
efficiency of MFIs, this dissertation also explores the cost efficiency of MFIs. 
Microfinance is a high-cost business (Gonzalez, 2007; Hardy, Holden, & Prokopenko, 
2003); hence, studying the efficiency of MFIs is warranted. Overall, the operational 
efficiency of the microfinance industry is in poor condition. In Mersland and Strøm 
(2009) study, operating costs in the industry were about 31 percent of the loan portfolio, 
which is 20 times more than the norm in efficient banking markets like the Nordic ones 
(Berg, Førsund, Hjalmarsson, & Suominen, 1993). This dissertation examines the 
relationship between loan defaults and cost efficiency of MFIs. It also examines some 
existing strategies of MFIs (i.e., geographic and revenue diversification, the provision 
of both financial and nonfinancial services) to determine whether they are beneficial to 
MFIs in terms of risk reduction and financial sustainability. This examination can be 
viewed as a way of finding out whether these strategies are good business models for 
MFIs. 
 Microfinance is the provision of financial services to poor people and 
microenterprises that have been excluded from mainstream banking markets 
(Ledgerwood, 1999; Schreiner, 2002). As mentioned above, microfinance has been 
successful in achieving this objective and as a result has been admired by many since 
its inception. Notable events marking the success of MFIs include the United Nations’ 
proclamation of 2005 as the year of microcredit in celebration of the microfinance 
industry’s success in achieving poverty reduction and the awarding of the Nobel Peace 




 The success of microfinance relates to its unique lending models. First, the provision 
of smaller loans makes it possible to reach out to many poor borrowers. Second, the 
introduction of group and progressive loans helps to mitigate screening and repayment 
problems (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Hulme & Mosley, 1996). Under group 
lending, a person in a group of 4 to 6 people is given a loan by an MFI but all the other 
members are jointly liable for its repayment. Progressive lending is a step-wise method 
where subsequent loan size increases only if previous loans have been paid (Armendáriz 
& Morduch, 2010).  
 MFIs are mostly funded by donations (Ghosh & Van Tassel, 2013). Other funding 
sources are commercial debt and equity financing as well as microfinance investment 
vehicles (MIVs). MIVs are private impact investment funds that channel capital from 
private investors in developed economies (who are interested in both a financial return 
and a social return) to MFIs in developing economies. MFIs take different 
organizational forms, including nongovernmental organizations, cooperatives and 
credit unions (member-based organizations), banks, and nonbank financial institutions 
(Mersland, 2009). 
 The microfinance industry is growing rapidly. For instance, the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign reported in 2015 that over 211 million borrowers worldwide had been served 
by MFIs as of December 31, 2013, an improvement on the previous year’s number of 
borrowers (204 million) (Reed, 2015). Despite the growth in microfinance outreach 
efforts, a large proportion of the world’s unbanked population remains unserved. 
According to the 2018 Global Financial Inclusion report of the World Bank, about 33 
percent of the world’s adult population do not have an account with a financial 
institution (World Bank, 2018). This shows that there is still a huge supply gap and 
hence more knowledge is needed on how to enhance the performance of MFIs. 
Therefore, an investigation of the sustainability-related issues faced by MFIs is 
warranted.  
 The remaining part of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents a review of the literature on risk management and efficiency in the 
microfinance industry. Section 3 presents the relevant theories. Section 4 describes the 







2. Overview of Risk and Efficiency Literature in Microfinance 
In finance, credit risk has three main elements: default risk, credit spread risk, and 
downgrade risk (Anson, Fabozzi, & Choudhry, 2000; Bielecki & Rutkowski, 2004). 
Default risk is defined as the risk that a party to a financial contract will not honor 
his/her obligation. Credit spread risk is about variation in the spread between risky and 
risk-free bonds after buying the risky bond. Downgrade risk concerns deterioration in 
credit ratings. For a detailed understanding of these types of credit risk and how they 
are related to each other as well as how credit risk is measured, see Zamore, Djan, Alon, 
and Hobdari (2018). Credit risk can be analyzed on three levels: borrower, bank and 
country (i.e., systemic credit risk). This dissertation focuses on the second level: the 
quality of MFIs’ loan portfolios. Poor loan portfolio quality can bankrupt an MFI by 
rendering it unable to honor its deposits and other debts.  
 Credit risk comprises several dimensions and this dissertation does not touch on all 
of them. Of the different dimensions of credit risk researched since the 1980s, gender 
is dominant. Several studies explore the relationship between gender and loan 
repayment in microfinance. For instance, Hossain (1988), Hulme (1991), Kevane and 
Wydick (2001) and D’Espallier et al. (2011) find that credit risk is lower among women 
than men, while Bhatt and Tang (2002), Brehanu and Fufa (2008), Godquin (2004) 
show otherwise.  
 Since group lending is an innovation by microfinance (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; 
Sharma & Zeller, 1997), the next important dimension of credit risk research is the 
relationship between the lending method and the default rate. For example, Bratton 
(1986) and Jahangir and Zeller (1995) find that credit risk is lower among group loans 
than individual loans. Similarly, Sharma and Zeller (1997) find that repayment rates of 
group loans in microfinance are higher than those in traditional banking. However, Giné 
and Karlan (2014) and Beck and Behr (2017) do not find any significant effect of group 
lending on repayment compared to individual lending. 
 Other dimensions of credit risk in microfinance include, but are not limited to, 
competition and over-indebtedness (McIntosh, De Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2005), social 
ties and sanctions (Ahlin & Townsend, 2007; Karlan, 2007), repayment frequencies 
(Barboni, 2017; Field & Pande, 2008), grace periods (Field et al. 2013), loan officer 
(Agier, 2012; van den Berg, Lensink, & Servin, 2015), borrower runs and contagion 
effects (Bond & Rai, 2009; Goedecke, forthcoming), capital structure (Chakravarty & 
Pylypiv, 2015), organizational status (Chakravarty & Pylypiv, 2015) and loan size 




 This dissertation contributes to the literature on credit risk in microfinance in three 
ways. First, it examines the relationship between geographic diversification and credit 
risk (Study 1) and the relationship between revenue diversification and financial 
sustainability (Study 2). In the banking literature, geographic diversification is found to 
be an important determinant of credit risk (Booth & Martikainen, 1999; Fang & 
Lelyveld, 2014; Winton, 1999). While the banking literature has long been concerned 
with the influence of geographic diversification on risk, I am not aware of any study 
using microfinance data. This research gap is unfortunate, especially considering the 
growth of the microfinance industry and the recommendations by industry players that 
MFIs should diversify geographically (Steinwand, 2000).  
 Second, the dissertation contributes to the literature on credit risk in microfinance 
also by investigating the effect of microfinance plus on loan asset quality as well as on 
other performance dimensions of MFIs (Study 3). Introduced in the early days  of 
microfinance (1970s) (Goldmark, 2006; Hulme & Mosley, 1996), microfinance plus is 
the provision of nonfinancial services in addition to core financial services. The main 
argument is that “microcredit, by itself, is usually not enough” (Reed, 2011, p. 1). For 
instance, FINCA International, a microfinance organization that operates in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, provides business development training, 
health care, and social empowerment services to its clients (Maes & Foose, 2006). This 
dissertation investigates empirically whether microfinance plus improves the portfolio 
quality of MFIs, which would support the claim that business development training 
improves the repayment ability of borrowers (Biosca et al., 2014).  
 Finally, the dissertation contributes to the literature on credit risk in microfinance 
by examining the link between loan default rates and the efficiency of MFIs (Study 4). 
To present an overview of efficiency related research in microfinance, I used 
“efficiency” and “microfinance” and searched in the ISI Web of Science database over 
the period 1945–2018 as of July). The search reveals that Hermes, Lensink, and 
Meesters (2011) is the most-cited study (131 citations), followed by Mersland and 
Strøm (2010) (122 citations) .  
 Hermes et al. (2011) examine the tradeoff between the social impact and efficiency 
of MFIs. Using a global sample of 435 MFIs observed over an eleven-year period, they 
find that microfinance outreach is negatively related to the efficiency of the institution. 
This finding is supported by Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland (2013) and Abate, Borzaga, 
and Getnet (2014). Indeed, serving the poor at the expense of maintaining the 




microfinance (Rhyne, 1998). However, Annim (2012), Louis, Seret, and Baesens (2013) 
and others find a positive relationship between outreach and efficiency. 
 In a similar investigation, Mersland and Strøm (2010) test whether MFIs are drifting 
from their social mission for the sake of financial sustainability. Using a cross-country 
sample of 379 MFIs within an eleven-year period (1998–2008), they do not find 
evidence to support claims of mission drift in microfinance. The next study on the list 
of efficiency/sustainability publications in terms of citations is by Hermes and Lensink 
(2011) (73 citations) who review the outreach-sustainability tradeoff studies including 
those of Hermes et al. (2011) and Hudon and Traca (2011).   
 Hudon and Traca (2011) (58 citations) examine whether subsidies compromise the 
efficiency of MFIs. Using a sample of 100 rated MFIs, they find that subsidy intensity 
and efficiency are positively related. However, this positive relationship has a limit 
beyond which the efficiency of MFIs is compromised. Similarly, Caudill, Gropper, and 
Hartarska (2009) (49 citations) find that efficient MFIs are those with fewer subsidies 
and larger deposits.   
 Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and Molinero (2007) (72 citations) offer a 
methodological approach to analyzing the efficiency of MFIs. Using data from 30 Latin 
American MFIs, they show that efficiency can be assessed from four angles: overall 
efficiency, NGO status, choice of inputs, and choice of output. That is, the efficiency of 
an MFI is based on the angle employed.  
 Other elements relating to efficiency research include, but are not limited to, 
ownership (Abate et al., 2014; Servin, Lensink, & van den Berg, 2012), governance 
(Hartarska & Mersland, 2012), size of MFI (Hartarska et al., 2013; Kumar & Sensarma, 
2017; Mia & Soltane, 2016; Mahinda Wijesiri, Yaron, & Meoli, 2017), capital structure 
(Bogan, 2012; Kumar & Sensarma, 2017; Mahinda  Wijesiri, Viganò, & Meoli, 2015), 
managerial capabilities (Chan, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mia & Chandran, 2016), 
gender of CEO (Hartarska, Nadolnyak, & Mersland, 2014), and age of MFI (Kumar & 
Sensarma, 2017; Mahinda Wijesiri et al., 2017).  
 This dissertation responds to calls for more efficiency-related studies in 
microfinance (Mersland & Strøm, 2010) by examining the link between default risk and 
efficiency of MFIs. In the banking literature, scholars such as Hughes and Mester (1993) 
and Berger and DeYoung (1997) show that loan default and operational efficiency are 
related, but to the best of my knowledge the relationship has never been tested in the 





3. Applicable Theories 
3.1 Portfolio Diversification Theory  
A portfolio is a collection of investments in financial assets (e.g., stocks and bonds) and 
physical assets (e.g., real estate and commodities). Modern portfolio theory, developed 
by Nobel Prize-winning economist Harry Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952), assumes that 
there is a tradeoff between risk and return: the higher the risk an investor is willing to 
take, the higher the financial return, and vice versa. The theory also assumes that returns 
from different asset classes are imperfectly correlated. That is, market conditions vary 
from one asset class to the next. An efficient portfolio is  a set of investments that 
maximize returns for a given level of risk. It is difficult to set up an efficient frontier in 
real life; however, diversification provides a way out.  
 Portfolio diversification is similar to common behavior, as expressed in the saying 
“Don’t put all your eggs in one basket”  (Watson & Head, 2007, p. 210). For instance, 
Opportunity Albania, a member of the international microfinance network Opportunity 
International, lends to borrowers in different sectors, including agriculture, 
manufacturing, trade, and service. Thus, diversification is practiced not only at the 
investor level but also at the bank, or in this case the MFI, level. To maximize returns 
at the lowest possible risk, an investor has to diversify across different asset classes 
(e.g., risk-free and risky securities) in different markets and locations. Portfolio 
diversification is common in the banking industry since it helps to reduce default risk 
and increase returns (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004). It allows financial institutions 
to diversify across different revenue sources as well as geographic locations through 
branch networks. Geographic diversification is therefore a type of diversification 
reflecting the degree to which a firm’s operations are spread across different regions or 
states or countries (Larsen, Leatham, Mjelde, & Wolfley, 2008). This dissertation 
applies the concept of diversification to study (1) the link between geographic 
expansion and credit risk in microfinance (Study1) and (2) the link between holding 
multiple revenue sources and the financial sustainability of MFIs (Study 2). 
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory emerged from the study of agency relationships, which are viewed as 
one of the most common and oldest types of social interactions (Ross, 1973). According 
to Ross (1973), an agency relationship occurs when two (or more) individuals enter into 
a relationship where one individual, known as the principal, appoints the other 




decision-making. Examples of agency relationships include shareholders (Principal, P) 
and management (Agent, A), employer (P) and employee (A), and debtholders (P) and 
shareholders (A) (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Ross, 1973; Thomson & Conyon, 2012).  
  In most agency relationships, the agent has a knowledge of the business superior to 
that of the principal. As a result, the principal delegates decision-making authority to 
the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), who applies his knowledge and skills to act on 
the principal’s behalf. For example, in the shareholder-manager agency relationship, the 
shareholders delegate decision-making authority to the management on condition that 
the management puts their money to good use and delivers returns. By controlling the 
daily affairs of the firm, managers have access to information, including management 
accounting data and financial reports (Watson & Head, 2007). Shareholders learn what 
is happening in the firm only by reading published annual reports and attending annual 
general meetings. Thus, there is an information asymmetry problem in agency 
relationships.  
  This asymmetry of information creates room for some managers to behave 
opportunistically since their actions are often not observable (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 
2009). Furthermore, from an economic perspective, if both the shareholders and the 
managers are utility maximizers, it is expected that the managers will act contrary to 
the interests of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Overall, an agency problem 
arises when the agent does not act in the best interest of the principal.  
  Agency theory has been applied in microfinance research mostly in the context of 
corporate governance (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Strøm, D’Espallier, 
& Mersland, 2014) and ownership studies (Galema, Lensink, & Mersland, 2012; 
Mersland, 2009; Servin et al., 2012), but also in other fields like international business 
(Mersland, Randøy, & Strøm, 2011). This dissertation applies agency theory in the 
context of geographic diversification and the risk-taking behavior of the management 
of MFIs (Study 1). Lessons from the banking industry (Bandelj, 2016; Goetz, Laeven, 
& Levine, 2012) suggest that branch managers of MFIs are likely to be self-interest-
seeking at the expense of the institution’s goal. Moreover, Winton (1999) argues that 
the monitoring ability of the head office diminishes as a bank diversifies geographically. 
This implies that, based on agency theory, geographic diversification can increase the 








3.3 Microfinance Plus 
Microfinance plus is an integrated approach to poverty alleviation in microfinance. It 
involves the provision of both financial and nonfinancial services to the poor. 
Nonfinancial services are any services other than finance (Goldmark, 2006) and they 
are meant to enhance the well-being of poor families (e.g., through nutrition services 
and health care services) and their microenterprises (e.g., through business development 
training). Khandker (2005) argues that since poverty has many different dimensions, 
microfinance services should be more comprehensive.  
  Thus, poor families and their microenterprises can benefit if services other than 
credit are provided alongside lending (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011). Moreover, other 
proponents of the microfinance plus view (Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015; 
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2015) argue that access to credit for the poor 
has been overemphasized. The bottom line is that the microfinance plus model should 
enhance the social impact of MFIs (Dunford, 2001). However, the model may also 
influence the financial performance (e.g., portfolio quality) of the institution (Sievers & 
Vandenberg, 2007). Study 3 of this dissertation focuses on the latter. 
 
3.4 Efficiency and Risk Relationship 
The theoretical arguments of Hughes and Mester (1993) and Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) are often used to show the relationship between efficiency and risk. The 
skimping hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997), introduced by Hughes and Mester 
(1993), maintains that a bank can postpone resource deployment in order to look 
efficient today. The effect of this skimping is that loan defaults are likely to be high in 
the future since fewer resources are allocated to the screening process. To control the 
nonperforming loans induced by skimping, extra resources are required; hence, both 
efficiency and asset quality decline. Thus, efficiency and credit risk are related. 
 Berger and DeYoung (1997) further argue that when unexpected external factors 
(e.g., floods) occur at the borrower’s end, a bank may experience more nonperforming 
loans. When nonperforming loans increase, the bank needs to exert extra effort in terms 
of monitoring and renegotiation in order to avert the situation. This again illustrates that 
efficiency and risk are related. The third argument is the bad management hypothesis 
(Berger & DeYoung, 1997), which assumes that poor management practices result in 
low efficiency and poor asset quality. For instance, bad managers care less about 




managers are less adept at screening loan applicants, which leads to a higher number of 
nonperforming loans.  
 Study 4 of this dissertation applies the above arguments to study the relationship 
between nonperforming loans and the efficiency of MFIs. In general, MFIs often have 
lower loan default rates than regular banks (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, & Narain, 2009; 
Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007), but at the same time they appear to be less inefficient 
than banks. Operating costs are generally high in microfinance (Gonzalez 2007; Hardy 
et al. 2003) due to the provision of small loans (Helms & Reille, 2004) and the poor 
institutional environments in which MFIs operate (Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002). In 
addition, overemphasis on risk can also contribute to high operating costs. Thus, the 
question Study 4 seeks to answer is whether MFIs are overly concerned with asset 
quality at the expense of their operational efficiency. 
 
 
4. Data Sources 
This dissertation uses an unbalanced global panel sample of 607 microfinance 
institutions in 87 countries over the period 1998–2015 (Study 3 uses 478 MFIs in 77 
countries over the period 1998–2012). The dataset is compiled based on rating reports 
from five specialized microfinance rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet 
Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril), hand-collected from either the rating agencies or 
www.ratingfund2.org. All these agencies have been approved by the Rating Fund of the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP),  the microfinance branch of the World 
Bank. The length of the reports range from ten to over forty pages and each report 
provides information on governance, management, social performance, financial 
performance, and operations. All entries in the dataset are based on yearly observations 
and local currencies have been converted to US dollars according to official exchange 
rates. The methodologies applied by the rating agencies indicate that the variables 
included in the dataset are assessed similarly.  
 Table 1 provides a distribution of MFIs (or observations) per year; it ranges from a 
minimum of 6 MFIs per year (in 1998) to a maximum of 370 MFIs per year (2006). 
Overall, the majority of the data (3296) are taken from the period 2001–2012, with 
observations ranging from 100 (2012) to 370 (2006) per year. The years before 2006 






Table 1: Distribution of MFIs by year 
Year Frequency (# of MFIs) Percent 
1998 6 0.18 
1999 29 0.88 
2000 78 2.37 
2001 148 4.49 
2002 199 6.04 
2003 270 8.19 
2004 331 10.04 
2005 366 11.1 
2006 370 11.23 
2007 345 10.47 
2008 294 8.92 
2009 276 8.37 
2010 232 7.04 
2011 165 5.01 
2012 100 3.03 
2013 52 1.58 
2014 27 0.82 
2015 8 0.24 
Total 3296 (MFI-year) 100 
 
 This dataset is an updated version of an earlier version used in many published 
articles, e.g., Galema et al. (2012), Randøy et al. (2015), Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012), Strøm et al. (2014), D'Espallier et al. (2011), and Pascal et al. (2017) . The 
dataset is frequently updated. When I started my PhD in 2015, the dataset had 299 
variables and 2311 firm-year observations (478 MFIs were observed between 1998 and 
2012). To help me to understand the data and expand the dataset, I joined forces with 
other PhD colleagues and research assistants under the guidance of Professor Roy 
Mersland, who originally designed the dataset and owns it. Currently, the dataset has 
313 variables and 3296 firm-year observations (607 MFIs were observed between 1998 
and 2015). Indeed, the dataset is very large and other data not used in this dissertation 
could be used in post-doctoral research I hope to undertake. 
 Finally, this dissertation also draws on data from the World Bank’s World 
Development and Worldwide Governance databases to control for country differences 
across MFIs. For instance, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, retrieved from the 
World Development database, is used to control for differences in economic 





5. Research Design 
A doctoral dissertation is a scientific piece of writing and the candidate adopts a 
philosophical approach in the writing process. Thus, assumptions about the existence 
of things in the world (ontology) as well as the way a researcher views the creation of 
scientific knowledge (epistemology) inspire the choice of a research design. This 
section presents the philosophical foundation I used and, relatedly, the methods I 
applied. 
5.1 Philosophical Position 
There are different schools of thought concerning the philosophy of science. Figure 1 
illustrates three main philosophical traditions. At one end is positivism 
(objectivism/empiricism) and at the other end is constructivism (subjectivism); critical 





 Figure 1: Philosophical traditions in social sciences (Piekkari, 2016). 
  
 The dominant philosophical position in the social sciences is positivism (Piekkari, 
Welch, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2009). The positivists believe that there is one truth 
(reality) independent of the observer (Yin, 2014). This view is variable-oriented (Ragin 
1992), where relationships between variables are explained by universal causal rules; 
context is not taken into consideration (Piekkari et al., 2009). Thus, the positivist’s goal 
is “the development of testable hypotheses and theory which are generalizable across 
settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 546). A major advantage of the positivist position is 
that it is objective and theories and findings are generalizable. A shortcoming is that it 
does not take into account the research context. In other words, unobserved phenomena 
are not discussed in the process of creating scientific knowledge.  
 As seen in Figure 1, constructivism is the complete opposite of positivism. This view 
puts the human mind at the center of the creation of scientific knowledge. To the 
constructivist, scientific knowledge is socially and culturally created by “interpreting 
perceptual experiences of the external world” (Jonassen, 1991, p. 10). Thus, to create a 
piece of scientific knowledge, the researcher needs to interact with the unit of analysis. 

















exploration of the phenomenon under investigation. A limitation of the constructivist 
position is that it is subjective and the findings are often specific to the context. 
 Critical realism resides between these two philosophical extremes. This position was 
introduced by Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 2008). Critical realism has two main basic 
assumptions about the creation of scientific knowledge. First, a realist believes in the 
existence of the real world. The second assumption is that the real world is not 
influenced by scientific investigation. 
  Bhaskar (2008) divides the world into three parts: real, actual, and empirical. The 
real component concerns “objects and structures with inherent causal powers and 
liabilities which result in mechanisms that may not be visible” (Zachariadis et al. 2013, 
p.3). The actual aspect “refers to what happens if and when those powers are activated, 
to what they do and what eventuates what they do” (Sayer, 2000, p. 12). The third, 
empirical component concerns entities that can be experienced or observed. To 
summarize the world according to Bhaskar, the real component contains the 
mechanisms of nature, which generate actions in the actual world, but these actions are 
observed in the empirical world.  
 The bottom line of critical realism is that scientific inquiry should combine the 
features of positivism and constructivism. Thus, critical realism concerns “ideologically 
deformed reality which calls for critique consisting of mediation and advancement of 
understating through a moment of explanation” (Delanty & Strydom, 2003, p. 210). 
This is the approach adopted in this dissertation.  
 
 
5.2 Analytical Approaches  
Since the dataset is quantitative in nature, this dissertation adopts a quantitative 
analytical approach. Specifically, panel-data techniques (random effects, fixed effects, 
Hausman and Taylor, generalized method of moments (GMM), and stochastic frontier 
analysis) are employed. Compared to cross-sectional data, panel data has many 
advantages including (i) the ability to account for unit heterogeneity, (ii) the ability to 
control for unobserved fixed effects (omitted-variable bias), and (iii) the availability of 
more information, variability, degrees of freedom, efficiency, and fewer 
multicollinearity problems (Baltagi, 2013). However, for robustness checks, this 







6. Summary of Studies and Conclusion 
This dissertation comprises four related studies and all of them share a similar 
structure. Encouraged by my PhD advisors, I presented my studies in many academic 
fora in order to get constructive feedback and improve their quality. Thus, all four 
studies were presented and discussed in at least two academic conferences and most of 
them went through blind peer-review processes. At present, two of the four studies 
have been accepted for publication in international journals, one is under second 
review, and the other is under first review. 
 The first two studies are concerned with whether diversification is beneficial in 
achieving the financial sustainability objective of MFIs. MFIs are hybrid organizations 
with two objectives: social and financial. In particular, Study 1, “Geographic 
Diversification and Credit Risk in Microfinance,” which is under second review at 
the Journal of Banking and Finance, investigates whether diversifying geographically 
can reduce the credit risk of MFIs. The results show that geographic diversification 
instead increases credit risk. A further organizational comparative analysis indicates 
that the positive relationship is likely to be more pronounced among non-shareholder-
owned MFIs compared to shareholder-owned MFIs. Thus, for nonprofit MFIs, it is 
better to remain geographically focused, since there are no owners to effectively 
monitor them as they diversify. However, from a risk perspective, shareholder-owned 
MFIs may find it beneficial to diversify geographically.  
 Study 2, “Should Microfinance Institutions Diversify or Focus? A Global 
Analysis,” published in Research in International Business and Finance, grew out of 
Study 1. If geographic diversification is not beneficial in terms of risk, what about 
revenue diversification? To answer this, the study examines whether revenue 
diversification is beneficial in achieving the financial objective of microfinance. The 
finding in this study is that revenue diversification enhances the financial performance 
of MFIs in terms of operational sustainability and profitability. The study concludes 
that revenue diversification can contribute to the achievement of the financial objective 
of MFI, which in turn can enable MFIs to reach out to more poor people.  
 The findings of Study 2 motivate Study 3. Thus, Study 3, “Do Microfinance 
Institutions Benefit from Integrating Financial and Nonfinancial Services?,” 
published in Applied Economics, examines further financial sustainability avenues for 
MFIs. This study investigates whether the microfinance plus model is beneficial to 
MFIs. Though the empirical investigation includes comprehensive coverage of both 




The general finding is that the provision of nonfinancial services neither reduces nor 
increases the financial performance of MFIs. However, in terms of credit risk 
management, the microfinance plus strategy improves the loan portfolio quality of 
MFIs. The study thus concludes that MFIs that offer nonfinancial services are not less 
sustainable than MFIs that don’t offer such services. On the contrary, MFIs struggling 
with loan defaults can find this strategy beneficial.  
 Study 4, “Excessive Focus on Risk? Nonperforming Loans and Efficiency of 
Microfinance Institutions,” draws its inspiration from the findings of Study 3. If 
economies of scope (the combination of financial and nonfinancial services) do not 
improve the efficiency of MFIs, what other factors might explain efficiency in 
microfinance? Banking research shows that defaults and operating costs are related. 
Therefore, in this study I draw on lessons learned in regular banking to understand the 
phenomenon in microfinance. The findings indicate a nonlinear relationship between 
default rates and costs. Specifically, an increase in loan default rates results in higher 
cost efficiency up to a certain threshold beyond which a further increase in loan default 
rates results in lower cost efficiency. The study concludes that each MFI needs to search 
for its own balancing point between asset quality and operational efficiency.  
 To conclude, the findings in this dissertation suggest that from the perspective of 
risk, geographic diversification is not beneficial to all types of MFIs. Non-shareholder-
owned MFIs (NGOs and cooperatives) may find it useful to stay focused on a few 
geographical areas while shareholder-owned MFIs (banks and nonbank financial 
institutions) may have their overall credit risk reduced if they diversify geographically. 
In terms of overall financial sustainability, MFIs that rely solely on interest income may 
find it advantageous to have other revenue-generating activities. The findings further 
indicate that the financial sustainability of MFIs that provide both financial and 
nonfinancial services is neither diminished nor improved. In fact, such MFIs stand to 
gain in terms of lower credit risk. Finally, for efficiency reasons, each MFI is 
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This paper examines the relation between geographic diversification and credit risk in 
microfinance. The empirical findings from the banking industry are mixed and 
inconclusive. This study extends the discussion into a new international setting: the 
global microfinance industry with lenders having both social and financial objectives. 
Using a large global sample of microfinance institutions (MFIs), we find that 
geographic diversification comes with more credit risks. However, this finding is more 
pronounced among non-shareholder MFIs like NGOs and cooperatives, compared to 
shareholder-owned MFIs. Moreover, the results show that MFIs can mitigate the effect 
of geographic diversification on risk by means of better governance and group lending 
methods.   
Keywords: microfinance, geographic diversification, credit risk, portfolio at risk, loan-
loss provisions, nonperforming loans. 
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1. Introduction  
This study examines the relationship between geographic diversification and credit risk 
in microfinance institutions (MFIs). The long-standing question of whether financial 
institutions and banks should diversify their operations has yet to be answered clearly. 
There is a growing body of scholarly literature on whether geographic diversification 
(or “diversification” for short) increases or decreases bank risk, but there is no 
consensus to date in the banking industry. Despite the importance of the debate, it 
appears that the issue has never been tested in the microfinance industry. This is 
unfortunate because industry insiders often recommend that MFIs diversify 
geographically as a means of reducing loan portfolio risk (Steinwand, 2000). For 
example, in reports from specialized external microfinance rating agencies, the source 
of data used in this study, it is frequently recommended that MFIs should diversify 
geographically as a means of reducing risk. Moreover, the findings from the banking 
industry may or may not be applicable to the microfinance industry. After all, MFIs 
pursue the double bottom-line objectives of financial sustainability and social outreach 
and hence differ from commercial banks. Credit risk and diversification potentially 
affect both financial performance and MFIs’ ability to fulfil their social objective of 
reaching out to more low-income customers.   
Increasingly, MFIs face banking regulation and oversight, similar to mainstream 
banks (Ledgerwood, 1999). Such regulation and supervision may create incentives for 
either diversification or specialization (Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 2006; Allen N. 
Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2010; Hayden, Porath, & Westernhagen, 2007). Thus, the 
present study is of potential interest to policymakers who are concerned whether 
diversification is beneficial to financial institutions such as MFIs (Bandelj, 2016).  
Credit risk can also be related to the recent criticism of the microfinance industry 
for its high interest rates and heavy-handed collection methods (Bateman, 2010). A 
particularly dramatic incident was the suicide crisis that occurred in India in 2010 
(Bandyopadhyay & Shankar, 2014). This suicide crisis was attributed to the heavy-
handed collection of defaulted microcredit and showed that a good credit risk strategy 
is fundamental for MFI managers. Thus, the present study is of potential interest also to 
microfinance practitioners and stakeholders, particularly managers, donors, investors, 
and regulators. 
Although there are empirical studies on the effect of diversification on bank risk, 
scholars have yet to arrive at a consensus (Bandelj, 2016). Empirical findings consistent 
with modern portfolio theory suggest that banks should diversify across regions to 
eliminate region-specific credit risk and thereby reduce their overall risk level. For 
instance, Fang and Lelyveld (2014) find that international diversification is beneficial 
to banks because their credit risk level is reduced. Similarly, following the introduction 
of the US Riegel–Neal Act of 1994, banks that expanded beyond their home states 
benefited from a reduction in credit risk (Akhigbea & Whyte, 2003) and deposit risk 
(Aguirregabiria, Clark, & Wang, 2016). Deng and Elyasiani (2008) also find that 
diversification is associated with a reduction in bank risk. Their findings suggest that 
banks can increase their customer portfolios through diversification to reduce bank 
failure.  
By contrast, studies based on agency theory suggest that banks should avoid 




monitoring, branch managers of banks may pursue their personal goals at the expense 
of the bank’s goals (Bandelj, 2016; Goetz, Laeven, & Levine, 2012). Moreover, 
diversification increases the complexity of bank operations, thereby making it difficult 
for headquarters to monitor loans and control risk (Acharya et al., 2006; Winton, 1999). 
Gulamhussen, Pinheiro, and Pozzolo (2014) find that, contrary to the above-mentioned 
results of Fang and Lelyveld (2014), international diversification increases bank risk.  
To date, scholars have paid little attention to the issue of diversification versus focus 
(i.e., non-diversification) in the rapidly growing microfinance industry. This lack of 
research is unfortunate in a banking industry where, for instance,  MFIs provided a total 
of US$102 billion in loans to 132 million poor borrowers worldwide in 2016 
(Convergences, 2017). Our novel research applies a sample of 607 MFIs in 87 countries 
over the period 1998–2015 to provide initial international evidence on the issue of 
diversification in the microfinance industry. 
The findings suggest that diversification and credit risk are positively related: 
geographic diversification comes with more credit risks. This risk can be attributed to 
the difficulty of monitoring remote operations. It can also be attributed to the fact that 
institutions tend to expand into similar economic areas with the same underlying 
systematic factors and therefore gain few diversification benefits. For these reasons, the 
net effect of geographic diversification in microfinance is higher credit risk.  
The results further show that the positive relation is more pronounced among MFIs 
without owners (i.e., non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and member-based 
cooperatives) compared to shareholder MFIs (i.e., banks and non-bank financial 
institutions). Because shareholder entities in general are expected to have governance 
structures superior to those of non-shareholder entities, this finding strengthens the 
claim that the increased risk is driven primarily by monitoring challenges. In line with 
this monitoring argument, the results further indicate that the positive effect of 
diversification on risk can be mitigated by having an internal auditor report to the board 
and/or by practicing group lending rather than individual lending. Overall, the findings 
should encourage further research and guide microfinance practitioners and 
policymakers about which type of MFI might potentially benefit from diversification.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and 
reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 describes 
the econometric model. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theory and Related Literature 
2.1 Theory of Risk Diversification 
MFIs, like other financial institutions, are exposed to different types of risk, including 
credit, interest rate, market, currency, liquidity, operational, and country risks. Among 
these risks, credit risk is typically the most important for MFIs because their main 
service is the provision of microcredit (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Saunders and 
Cornett (2011, p. 186) define credit risk as the “risk that the promised cash flows from 
loans and securities held by financial institutions may not be paid in full.” Credit risk 
has great implications for the survival of banks. This was dramatically illustrated by the 




and MFIs are not immune to its effects because microfinance is simply banking in small 
quantities. Moreover, credit risk in microfinance is normally higher than that in regular 
banking because of the shorter repayment periods that are typically around 12 months. 
Hence, MFIs may face serious problems within a few weeks if loan repayments are 
delayed. Moreover, repayment problems among a few microfinance clients may rapidly 
spread to many clients (Bond & Rai, 2009). This may lead to serious problems for the 
MFIs as well as the overall microfinance sector in a country. For instance, between 1996 
and 2000, Bolivian MFIs faced many repayment problems, which precipitated an 
economic crisis (Vogelgesang, 2003).   
Diversification in finance involves holding many different investments to reduce the 
risk of financial loss. The concept of diversification is fundamental to the portfolio 
theory developed by Markowitz (1952). The theory assumes imperfect correlations 
between asset returns. This allows for lower portfolio risk compared to the sum of 
individual investment risks. Through diversification, a bank can reduce default risk on 
the loan portfolio without decreasing the expected returns (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 
2004). Geographic diversification is one type of diversification where a bank’s activities 
are dispersed in different locations (within/across cities, regions, and countries).  
Therefore, drawing on portfolio theory, MFIs can potentially reduce risk by 
geographic diversification. Specifically, the diversification strategy can limit MFIs’ 
likelihood of insolvency by reducing credit and liquidity risk (Liang & Rhoades, 1988). 
Applying portfolio theory to the credit risk of MFIs, one can assume that this type of 
risk is reduced when loans are spread among many borrowers in different geographic 
locations. The logic of this line of reasoning is straightforward: a farming-related crisis 
such as a drought might be limited to a specific geographic area, a factory closure might 
hit borrowers in a certain locale, a natural disaster might befall cities and villages in a 
limited region, and so on. With regard to liquidity risk, diversification can be 
particularly important for deposit-taking MFIs because it reduces the standard deviation 
of deposit flows (Liang & Rhoades, 1988).  
Agency theory, by contrast, suggests that diversification may not be beneficial to a 
firm because managers may have improved opportunities to extract private benefits at 
the expense of owners’ value (Goetz, Laeven, & Levine, 2016). More diversified 
entities are potentially more complex than other entities, which can reduce monitoring 
effectiveness. Empire building by managers is one possible consequence of reduced 
monitoring (Jensen, 1986). Effective monitoring may be particularly challenging in 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because these organizations do not have 
owners with pecuniary incentives (Hansmann, 2000). Many MFIs are incorporated as 
NGOs (47 percent in our sample; see below), thus potentially making the predictions of 
agency theory more relevant in microfinance than in traditional banking.  
If we disentangle the discussion from both portfolio theory and agency theory and 
apply a more practical lens to the issue, we are left with little doubt that the increased 
complexity diversification brings can pose a challenge to MFIs. For instance, according 
to Winton (1999), diversification complicates client monitoring. Thus, diversification 
can lead to an increase in MFIs’ credit risk due to an inability to monitor multiple 






2.2 Institutional Background of MFIs 
Microfinance institutions are hybrid organizations with two competing logics, namely, 
social and financial logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The first logic relates to the 
provision of financial services to the unbanked populations in the world. MFIs aim at 
providing uncollateralized microcredit to economically poor people, who have little or 
no collateral to qualify for loans from commercial banks. Social logic refers to the social 
outreach goal of MFIs.  
 The second logic concerns the financial sustainability of the MFIs themselves. Thus, 
in providing financial services to poor people and microenterprises, the institutions aim 
to be profitable or at least break even. To achieve this goal, MFIs charge interest on 
microcredit and fees for other financial services much as commercial banks do. Hence, 
MFIs follow a financial logic. Morduch (1999) describes this combination of social and 
financial logics as the “win-win” promise of microfinance. 
 MFIs are normally registered either as shareholder firms (banks and non-bank 
financial institutions) or as non-profit organizations (cooperatives and non-
governmental organizations or NGOs) (Mersland, 2009). Cooperatives (and so-called 
“credit unions,” which are similar to cooperatives) are member-based organizations and 
are therefore funded by the members. That is, cooperatives are controlled by the 
members, who are at once the customers and the recipients of any profits generated 
from the operations of the organization. NGOs are organizations without legally 
recognized owners (Mersland, 2009). They are mostly financed by international impact 
investors as well as benevolent donors like the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, government agencies, and private individuals. Since NGOs do not 
have owners, they are exposed to diverse influences from many stakeholders.  
 NGOs and cooperatives make up the vast majority of MFIs (Misra & Lee, 2007), 
though they normally serve fewer clients compared to shareholder-owned MFIs, which 
have easier access to capital from investors and depositors (D’Espallier, Goedecke, 
Hudon, & Mersland, 2017; Ledgerwood, 1999). Because shareholders have rights to 
residuals, shareholder-owned MFIs are assumed to be better controlled (Hansmann, 
2000; Mersland, 2009) and this suggests that credit risk may be lower in shareholder-
owned MFIs than in NGOs and cooperatives. For instance, stricter monitoring of 
shareholder-owned MFIs can prevent CEOs from engaging in extreme risk-taking 
behavior to achieve private benefits or build an “empire,”  whereas such risk-taking 
behavior can easily go unchecked in NGOs (Galema et al. 2012). 
 It is these organizational differences among MFI types as well as their dual 
institutional logics that make MFIs unique and different from traditional banks. Figure 
1 summarizes the main differences between MFIs and traditional banks. First, MFIs are 
double bottom-line achievers, whereas banks are single bottom-line achievers. Second, 
the main customers of MFIs are the customers excluded by traditional banks. Third, 
MFIs offer smaller, uncollateralized loans guaranteed by groups or individuals, whereas 
banks provide larger, collateralized loans to (mostly) individual borrowers and firms. 
Fourth, MFIs are registered as either shareholder firms or non-profit organizations like 
NGOs and cooperatives, whereas banks are mainly incorporated as shareholder firms. 
Finally, MFIs are financed by donors, social investors, and commercial investors, 




are indeed unique; hence, an investigation into the link between diversification and risk 
in MFIs is warranted. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison between microfinance institutions and traditional banks 
Basis of comparison Microfinance Institutions Traditional Banks 
Goal Social and financial orientations Profit-oriented 
Customer type  Low-income people (poor 
families and microenterprises). 




SMEs, large enterprises). 
Lending model • Group lending 
• Individual lending 
• Small uncollateralized loans 
• Mostly individual 
lending 




• Bank (shareholder-owned) 
• Nonbank financial institution 
(shareholder-owned) 
• Nongovernmental 
organization (no legal 
owners) 




Funding sources • Donations 
• Subsidized debt 
• Commercial debt  
• Equity  
• Commercial debt 
• Equity  
 
 
2.3 Empirical Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Empirical studies on diversification and bank risk report mixed results. For instance, 
Rose (1996), Levonian (1994), and Liang and Rhoades (1988) find that diversification 
reduces bank risk. According to Rose (1996), there is a threshold of diversification (e.g., 
more than 50 percent of bank-held assets outside the home state) above which risk 
declines.  
Other studies show that diversification reduces bank failure (Demsetz & Strahan, 
1997; Deng & Elyasiani, 2008) and credit risk (Akhigbea & Whyte, 2003). 
Furthermore, the risk-return tradeoff achieves a lower risk level (Acharya et al., 2006), 
insolvency risk declines, bank efficiency improves (Hughes, Lang, Mester, & Moon, 
1996b), and deposit risk declines (Aguirregabiria et al., 2016). Goetz et al. (2016) add 
that diversification lowers risk to a greater extent when banks expand into different 
economic areas. These findings are consistent with modern portfolio theory. 
Accordingly, this paper’s first hypothesis (stated as an alternative to the null hypothesis 
of no relationship) is formulated as follows: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between geographic diversification and credit 




Contrary to the predictions based on portfolio theory, some empirical findings 
suggest that diversification not only does not reduce bank risk but in fact increases it. 
For instance, Gulamhussen et al. (2014) find that diversification is associated with 
higher credit risk. Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996a) also find that when an 
efficient bank is more geographically diversified, it reports higher returns, but also 
higher levels of risk. This finding is consistent with risk-return tradeoff, given that 
higher returns come with higher risks.  
Similarly, Chong (1991) reports that diversification presents an opportunity for 
banks to take on more risk. Banks increase their leverage to diversify, which can lead 
to higher bankruptcy risk and market risk. Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2012) find that 
diversification increases the complexity of the bank and that this makes monitoring 
difficult. Complexity enables corporate insiders to extract larger private benefits, which 
has an adverse effect on firm value. Additionally, Cerasi and Daltung (2000) note that 
it is costly to monitor multiple operations resulting from diversification. On the other 
hand, poor monitoring of borrowers due to dispersed operations can result in higher 
loan defaults.  
The findings of Deng and Elyasiani (2008) suggest that as the distance between the 
bank headquarters and its branches increases, so does risk. This finding is consistent 
with Winton’s (1999) argument linking higher complexity and weaker monitoring, 
which may lead to higher nonperforming loans. Similarly, Berger and DeYoung (2001) 
show that diversification increases bank inefficiency since monitoring gets weaker as 
the distance between the head office and a branch office increases. The increased 
inefficiency can lead to higher credit risk (Berger & DeYoung, 1997; Fiordelisi, 
Marques-Ibanez, & Molyneux, 2011). Furthermore, other findings also indicate that 
diversification does not reduce bank risk (Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Turkmen & Yigit, 
2012). Thus, a second, alternative hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between geographic diversification and credit 
risk in microfinance institutions. 
 
 In light of these conflicting theoretical predictions (i.e., portfolio theory versus 
agency theory), it may come as no surprise that the empirical findings on the 
relationship between diversification and risk are also mixed. Overall, traditional 
banking studies do not offer an unambiguous expectation for the microfinance 
industry. We have therefore proposed the two alternative hypotheses. Moreover, 
conflicting research in other settings suggests that the effect of diversification is 
context-dependent and that it is an empirical question whether diversification has a 
positive or negative relationship to microfinance risk. Due to this ambiguity, all 











3. Data and Variable Definitions  
3.1 Data 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel sample of 607 MFIs from 87 countries (see the 
Appendix) covering the period 1998–2015, comprising a total of 3296 MFI-year 
observations. The dataset is compiled based on rating assessment reports (formerly 
available at www.ratingfund2.org and the rating agencies’ websites). The reports are 
produced by five specialized rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, 
Crisil, and M-Cril). All of them have been approved and supported by the Rating Fund 
of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP), a microfinance branch of the 
World Bank. Each of the rating reports contains data for the current rating year and 
previous years. It is worth noting that there is no perfect dataset to accurately represent 
the microfinance industry (Strøm, D’Espallier, & Mersland, 2016). However, we 
believe that our dataset is particularly suited to this study because it excludes small 
MFIs or development programs that do not seek to apply microfinance in a business-
like manner.  
In the microfinance industry, rating reports are one of the most reliable and 
representative sources of available data (Gutiérrez-Nieto & Serrano-Cinca, 2007; 
Hudon & Traca, 2011). The rating of MFIs, with support from donors such as the Inter-
American Development Bank and the European Union, has been key to achieving 
transparency in the industry (Beisland, Mersland, & Randøy, 2014). Notably, the 
microfinance ratings provided by the five agencies are much wider in scope than 
traditional credit ratings are. They cover a wide range of categories, including financial 
information, outreach, ownership, regulation, governance, clients, and financial 
products.  
The variables applied in this study are identically defined across rating agencies; 
however, the specific information published varies across agencies and reports, causing 
a different number of observations for different variables. That is, as an unbalanced 
panel dataset, not all MFIs have the same number of observations for some variables. 
For instance, our main metric of diversification, the variable “number of branches,” has 
the lowest number of observations (1277), while the variable “total assets” has the 
highest number of observations (3219). Thus, in regressions involving the number of 
branches, the maximum number of observations is 1277, whereas in regressions without 
this variable the number of observations is higher. Finally, we use country-level data 
from the World Bank’s World Development and Worldwide Governance databases.  
 
 
3.2 Variables Definitions 
Credit risk measures  
A common measure of credit risk in banking is the nonperforming loans rate (e.g., 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997)), defined as the proportion of a loan portfolio that is in 
arrears for longer than 90 days. In microfinance, a shorter period (30 days) is often used 
because loans are mostly short-term in nature. Loan terms are typically around 12 
months. Thus, nonperforming loans are commonly referred to as the 30-day Portfolio 
at Risk (PaR30). PaR30 has been used in other studies such as Caudill, Gropper, and 
Hartarska (2009) and Mersland and Strøm (2009). An increase in PaR30 indicates that 




higher credit risk for the MFI. Loan loss provisions (LLP) represent another common 
measure of credit risk (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011; Rose, 1996). It is the proportion of 
the loan portfolio that is reserved in anticipation of future loan losses.  
 As a robustness check, we use volatility of returns on assets (ROA) (e.g., 
Aguirregabiria et al. 2013) and a z-score, based on the sum of PaR30 and LLP, as 
alternative risk metrics. The z-score is defined as the number of standard deviations 
from the mean of composite risk (i.e., the sum of PaR30 and LLP). It is calculated as 
composite risk minus its mean divided by its standard deviation per MFI. The z-score 
has been used in prior studies, e.g.,  Meslier, Morgan, Samolyk, and Tarazi (2016). 
 
Geographic diversification measure 
The most common measures of geographic diversification in banking include number 
of branches and number of regions or states (Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Fraser, Hooton, 
Kolari, & Reising, 1997). In this study, geographic diversification is measured as the 
number of branches an MFI has. This variable has also been used by Aguirregabiria et 
al. (2016) and Hughes et al. (1996a). 
  However, Deng and Elyasiani (2008) argue that number of branches does not 
capture the distance between the head office and a branch office; hence, it is not a 
perfect measure of geographic diversification. However, to us it is not only the 
geographic distance per se that matters. The mere fact that a bank has branches, whether 
in the same city/region or different cities/regions, increases the complexity of the bank. 
That is, even within the same location, having a large number of branches affects credit 
risk since it is difficult to monitor many branch-level loans at the same time (Winton, 
1999). For instance, an MFI with five branches in Mexico City is more complex in terms 
of risk management and monitoring than an MFI with two branches in different cities 
in Mexico. 
  To increase the robustness of our results, we also analyze the MFIs’ market focus 
to account for the geographic distance concerns. MFIs that target both urban and rural 
clients are likely to be more geographically diversified than MFIs that operate in either 
exclusively urban areas or exclusively rural areas. Moreover, diversification into rural 
areas exposes the MFI to greater credit risk since the productivity of most farming-
related borrowers is influenced by unexpected natural disasters like floods, droughts, 
and plant and animal diseases. Such exogenous factors affect the ability of the 
borrowers to repay loans and hence lead to higher defaults. In our sample, some MFIs 
target urban clients only, others focus on rural areas only, while some focus on both 
urban and rural areas. In our robustness test, we use the urban-rural dimension as a 
direct measure of diversification.  
 
Firm-level control variables 
MFI size. The size of the MFI has an influence on diversification. Due to their capacity 
base, larger firms are more diversified than smaller ones (Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; 
Gulamhussen et al., 2014). Thus, additional diversification requires additional size 
(Winton, 1999), making it necessary to control for size in our analysis. Moreover, size 
and number of branches can be expected to be correlated. Thus, to isolate the geography 
and complexity components of the branch variable it is important to capture the size 




(natural logarithm), which is a common measure of firm size (e.g., Deng and Elyasiani 
2008).  
MFI experience. MFI experience is measured by the number of years that the 
institution has been in operation as an MFI. Older MFIs are likely to control credit risk 
better than younger ones do. Learning curve theory suggests that firms become more 
efficient over time because they learn their business better through the constant 
repetition of their operations. Caudill et al. (2009) show that over time, some MFIs 
become cost-efficient. Improved efficiency should result in lower numbers of 
nonperforming loans (Berger & DeYoung, 1997). Thus, inexperienced MFIs are more 
likely to have higher credit risks than experienced ones are.  
Lending methods. MFIs use different lending methodologies (group and individual), 
which may influence credit risk. Group lending is an important innovation of 
microfinance (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). It enhances the repayment of credit by enlisting 
peer pressure from other group members. This pressure is due to the fact that group 
members are jointly liable for the default of one member. Overall, group loans are less 
risky than individual loans because of better screening, monitoring, auditing, and 
enforcement (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). Moreover, it is easier to monitor groups than 
individuals because it is more cost-efficient. Thus, we expect MFIs that offer group 
loans to have lower credit risk than those that offer individual loans.   
MFI type. According to agency theory, microfinance NGOs may have higher risk 
levels compared to other types of MFIs because the absence of owners may lead to less 
monitoring of the CEO, which  in turn may lead to excessive risk-taking by the CEO 
(Galema, Lensink, & Mersland, 2012). However, because NGOs tend to have broader 
objectives toward helping the poor than do other types of MFIs, they may monitor credit 
clients more closely (D'Espallier, Guerin, & Mersland, 2011). This monitoring may 
result in a lower credit risk for NGOs. Likewise, clients in member-based MFIs like 
credit cooperatives have strong incentives to repay their loans since a saving instalment 
is part of the business model of cooperatives (Ledgerwood, 1999). Overall, credit risk 
may vary between shareholder-owned and non-shareholder-owned MFIs. In our 
sample, we have four types of MFIs: non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
cooperatives (coop), banks (bank) and non-bank financial institutions (nonbank). We 
categorize bank and nonbank MFIs as shareholder-owned MFIs, and NGO and coop 
MFIs as non-shareholder-owned MFIs, and we use this categorization to control for 
MFI type.  
Leverage. We control for the risk-taking behavior of MFIs by including the equity-
to-total-assets ratio. MFIs with different capital structures may also have different credit 
risk levels. Similar to the previous argument, shareholders may monitor the institution 
to ensure that excessive risks are not taken. Debtholders, on the other hand, do not have 
residual rights and hence they do not exhibit the same motivations to monitor a firm as 
long as contract terms are followed. 
 
Country-level and time control variables 
Macroeconomy. We control for the influence of systematic factors on credit risk, 
following other scholars such as Ahlin et al. (2011) and Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas 
(2012). Accordingly, we include in our estimations GDP per capita from the World 




       Governance. We also control for the quality of the governance structure in each 
country since it may influence credit risk at the MFI level (Ahlin et al., 2011). Thus, we 
construct a governance index from six of the Word Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, namely: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. A 
similar construction has been used in Mia and Lee (2017).   
       Time effect control. Finally, we control for time effects in two ways. First, we 
interact year with country to account for time effects within each country. This approach 
controls for differences in time effects across countries since  the economic performance 
or policy of a country may vary from year to year. Second, we control for the global 
financial crisis by constructing a binary variable (Crisis) based on the sample period 
(1998–2015). Crisis takes the value of 1 for the period 2007–2009 following Geiger et 
al.’s (2013) cut-off points, and 0 otherwise. We assume that the credit risk of MFIs in 
the crisis period is higher than in normal periods. A list of all the variables is provided 
in Table A2 of the Appendix. 
  
    
4. Methodology  
This study employs panel-data regressions to examine the influence of diversification 
on credit risk. According to Baltagi (2013), the use of panel data has several advantages 
over cross-sectional data. One advantage is that panel data helps control for individual 
heterogeneity. Additionally, panel data provides more information, variability, degrees 
of freedom, and efficiency, while mitigating the effects of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, panel data helps account for unobserved effects that are not detectable in 
cross-sectional models (Wooldridge 2011). Based on Wooldridge (2011), our empirical 
model is expressed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + ℽ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                              (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 represents credit risk of MFI i at time t. Credit risk is measured in terms 
of PaR30, LLP, volatility of ROA, and z-score, as discussed above. 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡  is number 
of branch offices of the ith MFI at time t and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, namely, 
MFI size, MFI experience, lending method, organizational form of MFI, and 
macroeconomic and macroinstitutional factors. 𝛽0 is the mean of unobserved 
heterogeneity, and β1 and ℽ are coefficients. 𝐶𝑖 is the firm-specific unobserved effect 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the remaining error term that varies across both t and i.  
 We start the empirical analysis by first checking whether panel techniques are 
indeed more appropriate than ordinary least squares (OLS) by applying the Breusch–
Pagan test (Greene, 2003). If the test rejects the null hypothesis, then the panel-data 
model is preferable. The test results (unreported) show that panel-data techniques are 
appropriate. Next, to decide whether the fixed effects (FE) estimator or the random 
effects (RE) estimator is suitable for the data, we use Hausman (1978) specification test. 
The FE estimator assumes that 𝐶𝑖 is correlated with all of the explanatory variables, 
whereas the RE estimator assumes that 𝐶𝑖 is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 




the empirical section, we let the Hausman test decide whether the RE or FE estimator 
is appropriate for each regression.  
 To control for possible endogeneity bias, we use the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) as a robustness test. It is possible that the decision to diversify geographically 
is an endogenous choice. That is, the number of branches variable can be influenced by 
the previous period’s credit risk. While it is often difficult to get relevant instruments to 
remove endogeneity bias statistically, panel data offers more opportunities to do so than 
cross-sectional data (Deaton, 1995). In this regard, the GMM estimator is appropriate 
(Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012) because it generates instruments using both lagged 
dependent and explanatory variables. Specifically, we use Blundell and Bond’s (1998) 
system GMM model, where lagged differences of the dependent variables are used as 
instruments in level equations in addition to lagged levels of dependent variables for 
equations in the first differences (Baltagi, 2013). 
 The GMM model requires two specification tests: the serial correlation test and the 
test for over-identification restrictions (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The serial correlation 
test considers the presence of second-order autocorrelation in the residuals from 
differenced equations (Arellano & Bond, 1991). If the p-value is larger than 0.05, it 
means that there is no second-order autocorrelation – which is the case in this study. 
The null hypothesis for the over-identification restrictions test (the Hansen test) is that 
the instrument set is valid. If this test result does not reject the null hypothesis, then the 
instruments are valid – as they are in our case. 
 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. On average, 6 percent of the 
total loan portfolio is in arrears for longer than 30 days and 4 percent is reserved in 
anticipation of future loan losses. The sum of the two indicators is used to produce a 
mean z-score of 5. The mean volatility of ROA is 6 percent. The average MFI is 11 
years old, has 18 branches, and holds US$15 million in total assets, of which 38 percent 
is financed by equity capital. Regarding lending methodology, 42 percent of the MFIs 


















Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Portfolio at risk (%) 6.06 7.50 0.10 48.90 2777 
Loan loss provisions 
(%) 3.61 4.64 0.10 56.60 2561 
Z-score  4.57 0.89 -2.01 3.45 2261 
Volatility of ROA (%) 5.98 7.73 0.05 75.66 3208 
Number of branches 18.11 32.70 1.00 376.00 1277 
MFI age 10.76 6.34 2.00 33.00 3078 
Assets (US$000) 14944.97 33153.55 50.00 365256.99 3219 
Leverage 
(equity/assets) 0.38 0.24 0.01 1.00 3101 
Shareholder firm 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 3049 
NGO 0.47 0.49 0.00 1.00 3096 
Coop  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 3096 
Bank  0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 3096 
Nonbank  0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00 3096 
Group  0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 2842 
GDP per capita (US$) 6533.41 5007.46 703.39 26429.35 3244 
Governance index -2.95 2.22 -10.47 8.63 3082 
Rural and urban 0.55 0.49 0.00 1.00 2641 
 
 Concerning ownership structure, 37 percent of the MFIs are shareholder-owned 
(consisting of 5 percent banks and 32 percent nonbank financial institutions) and the 
rest are non-shareholder-owned MFIs (comprising 47 percent non-governmental 
organizations and 15 percent cooperatives and member-owned organizations). In terms 
of geographical focus, about 55 percent of the MFIs serve both rural and urban clients 
and the rest focus on either rural or urban clients only. With respect to macroeconomic 
and macroinstitutional indicators, GDP per capita has a mean value of US$6,533 and 
the mean governance index is -2.95. A higher governance index means a higher quality 
of governance structure in the country.  
 Next, we present pairwise correlations and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores 
between the independent variables (Table 2). Most of the correlations are significant at 
the 5 percent level or lower but all of them are below 0.50. That is, all of the correlations 
are below the suggested rule of thumb of 0.80 (Studenmund, 2011). Similarly, all of the 
VIF scores are below 5 (Studenmund, 2011). This indicates that multicollinearity is not 













Table 2: Pairwise correlation matrix and variance inflation factor 
 VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Branches 1.65 1.0000        
2. MFI age 1.39 0.2034* 1.0000       
3. ln assets 1.38 0.4362* 0.3182* 1.0000      
4. Leverage 1.32 -0.0669 -0.0985* -0.2221* 1.0000     
5. SHF 1.2 -0.0886 -0.1855* 0.1451* -0.1035* 1.0000    
6. Group 1.18 0.0978* -0.1068* -0.2449* 0.1102* -0.0751* 1.0000   
7. GDP/cap. 1.14 0.0029 0.0472 0.1657* 0.0148 -0.0576 -0.2173* 1.0000  
8. Gov. ind. 1.07 -0.0240 -0.0025 0.0560 0.0149 -0.0220 -0.0837* 0.4376* 1.0000 
9. Crisis 1.02 -0.0246 0.0724* 0.1214* -0.0877* 0.0454 0.0229 0.0194 -0.0413 
Notes: The table reports pairwise correlations among explanatory variables. ln = natural logarithm, SHF = 
shareholder firm, VIF = variance inflation factor.                
 * Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level or lower. 
 
5.2 The Relation between Geographic Diversification and Credit Risk 
Table 3 presents estimates of both random and fixed effects models based on Hausman’s 
(1978) test, as well as OLS2 estimates for the volatility of earnings since the variable is 
computed per MFI. We control for country and time effects in two ways. First, we 
interact country with year in models (1–4). This strategy results in higher explanatory 
power (22–29% R-square) compared to that of the other models (6–11% R-square). 
Second, in models (5–8), we replace the country and year interaction term with two 
country-level variables, namely, GDP per capita and the governance index, and a time 
indicator (crisis).   
 The results of models (2–8) show that number of MFI branches (Branches) has a 
significant positive relationship with risk. This clearly suggests that MFIs with a larger 
number of branches may also have higher default rates and vice versa for those with 
fewer branches. The finding implies that the disadvantages of diversification (typically 
arising from agency costs and increased complexity) outweigh the advantages (as 
suggested by modern portfolio theory). Thus, the net effect of diversification in this 
study is higher loan defaults.  
 Concerning the control variables, we get some indications that larger MFIs have 
lower nonperforming loans – significant in models (4), (5), and (8) but showing a 
negative coefficient in 6 out of 8 models – suggesting that larger MFIs may have a 
greater ability to monitor loans (Baele, De Jonghe, & Vennet, 2007). However, it is 
interesting to note that number of branches is a much more significant variable in the 
regressions than MFI size. In principle, the number of branches variable could also have 
been used as a size indicator. However, we control for size through assets to separate 
the size effect and leave branches as a more clear-cut indicator of geographic 
diversification. This methodological choice allows us to suggest that the diversification 
effect is far more important than the mere size effect for the level of credit risk.   
 
2 Since the volatility of returns on assets is computed per MFI, it is not logical to use a panel 




Table 3: The link between geographic diversification and credit risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PAR30 LLP Z-score StdROA PAR30 LLP Z-score StdROA 
Branches  0.0119 0.0242*** 0.0091*** 0.0205*** 0.0097* 0.0223*** 0.0075*** 0.0150* 
 (0.0117) (0.0068) (0.0029) (0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0079) 
Group  -0.3010 0.3523 0.2478 2.0686*** -2.3293*** 0.3724 0.0229 1.8415*** 
 (0.9342) (0.5860) (0.3144) (0.5347) (0.4989) (0.5166) (0.2294) (0.4177) 
MFI size 0.1764 0.1749 -0.1988 -0.9388*** -1.0215*** -0.1379 -0.1729 -0.7961*** 
 (0.7551) (0.6856) (0.1884) (0.2092) (0.1897) (0.5629) (0.1806) (0.1895) 
Leverage -0.6278 -2.0749 -0.1396 1.3087 -1.6566 -4.5316*** -0.6512 0.3077 
 (1.9158) (1.6706) (0.6194) (0.9825) (1.1769) (1.6407) (0.5400) (0.9769) 
MFI experience -0.0290 0.2710*** 0.2457*** -0.0429 0.2074*** 0.1432 0.1507*** -0.0391 
 (0.3384) (0.0466) (0.0139) (0.0447) (0.0491) (0.1520) (0.0515) (0.0346) 
SHF 1.3395 0.0298 0.1674 1.2583** 1.0331** 0.5051 0.2382 0.9842** 
 (0.9038) (1.0379) (0.4624) (0.5320) (0.4367) (0.7220) (0.2980) (0.3986) 
Country*year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes No  No No  No 
Gov. index     0.3105*** 0.2753 0.1430 0.2200* 
     (0.1201) (0.2768) (0.1315) (0.1195) 
GDP per capita     -1.2542*** -6.1204** -2.7995*** 0.1891 
     (0.3040) (2.5362) (0.8578) (0.3038) 
Crisis     0.0955 0.5796* 0.2478** -0.0555 
     (0.3309) (0.3170) (0.1102) (0.4325) 
Constant 75.2915 854.8619*** 332.9617*** -448.7531*** 31.3904*** 57.0262*** 25.0795*** 16.3197*** 
 (682.9691) (295.3657) (89.2207) (157.9873) (4.3037) (19.5171) (6.6189) (4.0423) 
Observations 1,013 915 847 1,046 982 888 824 1,018 
R-squared 0.229 0.235 0.218 0.294 0.108 0.066 0.075 0.061 
Number of MFIs 477 443 390 -  460 428 379 - 
F/Chi2-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 - 0.1793 0.0000 0.0009 - 




Notes: This table lists fixed, random effects and OLS estimates on the link between geographic diversification and credit risk. PaR30 is nonperforming loans over 30 days, LLP 
is loan loss provisions, z-score is computed based on the sum of PaR30 and LLP, and StdROA is volatility of returns on assets.  Branches represents number of branches, MFI 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is the age (years) of the institution, and Leverage is calculated as equity divided by total assets. Group = 1 if group 
loans and = 0 if individual loans, SHF = 1 if shareholder-owned firm and = 0 if non-shareholder-owned firm, Gov. index  represents governance index capturing 
macroinstitutional differences, GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity, and Crisis = 1 if global 
financial crisis period and = 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  




 Surprisingly, older MFIs are not efficient in controlling defaults because they have 
higher nonperforming loans (evident in four models). The finding concurs with that of 
Caudill et al. (2009) who document evidence of MFIs not becoming efficient over time. In 
their study, inefficient MFIs are those that rely more on subsidies and less on deposits. In 
model (5), group lending is negatively associated with lower risk, consistent with 
microfinance literature (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). However, the coefficient is positive 
and significant in the two OLS models, suggesting higher risk and hence a mixed effect of 
group lending on risk. The mixed results render this variable far less important than our test 
variable of diversification.  
 Furthermore, in model (6), financial leverage is significantly associated with lower 
risk, suggesting that an increase in equity financing in microfinance can lead to lower credit 
risk. The finding that MFIs with higher financing risk take on less credit risk is reasonable 
and expected. However, the results further show that shareholder-owned MFIs carry higher 
risk than non-shareholder-owned MFIs. This departs from expectation and we will return 
to this later. 
 As expected, economic development tends to reduce credit risk, as is evident in the 
significant negative coefficient of GDP per capita, consistent with the literature (Carey, 
1998; Louzis et al., 2012). That is, in more developed economies, borrowers have more 
income to repay debts. However, high-quality governance structure in a country does not 
necessarily reduce risk. This finding departs from expectation, though it is not necessarily 
surprising since MFIs serve clients operating in the informal economy where a country’s 
formal governance structure does not often have much influence. Finally, we find that credit 
risk is not necessarily time-invariant: as expected, credit risk was higher during the global 
financial crisis as more clients struggled to repay their debts during this economic 
downturn.  
  As a robustness check, we repeat models (1–8) using the rural-urban dummy (1 = an 
MFI serves both rural and urban clients, and 0 = otherwise). This is to account for the 
geographic distance concerns of Deng and Elyasiani (2008), i.e., whether number of 
branches actually measures geographic diversification. The (untabulated) results reveal that 
the rural-urban variable is positively related to risk in all eight models, but with fewer 
significant coefficients. This implies that MFIs extending their services to clients in many 
geographic areas end up incurring more loan defaults. Overall, the results of this additional 
test lend support to our main conclusions.  
 In Table 4, we present results based on trend analysis, continuing with the number of 
branches as our main explanatory variable. We are interested in knowing whether the 
positive relationship between number of branches and credit risk is the same before, during, 
and after the global financial crisis (2007–2009). In other words, in which part of the sample 
period (1998–2015) does the positive effect of branches on risk set in? To answer this, we 
regress the z-score on number of branches and all the controls except the financial crisis 
dummy. The results indicate that the positive effect started during the financial crisis but 
became significant after this period. We stress that the numbers of observations are smaller 
in the subperiods, but we report the additional test to suggest that our findings of increased 
credit risk following increased diversification are relevant.   




 (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Full period 
Branches  -0.0001 0.0381 0.0057*** 0.0079*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0419) (0.0017) (0.0020) 
Group  - 0.5341* -0.1781 0.0774 
 - (0.2782) (0.2950) (0.2422) 
MFI size 0.3191 -1.1888** -0.0312 -0.0833 
 (0.4719) (0.4995) (0.4703) (0.1693) 
Leverage -1.0149 -0.1723 -1.9988 -0.6395 
 (0.9069) (1.0554) (2.1095) (0.5420) 
MFI experience -0.0036 0.4665*** 0.2270 0.1193** 
 (0.1417) (0.1717) (0.1400) (0.0485) 
Governance index 0.0001 -0.4049 0.2848 0.0884 
 (0.2080) (0.4920) (0.2985) (0.1359) 
GDP per capita -5.8405** -3.0894 -6.3545* -2.4677*** 
 (2.4193) (3.4044) (3.2341) (0.8609) 
Shareholder firm 1.0689 0.8743** 0.1373 0.2170 
 (1.0376) (0.4280) (0.3523) (0.3143) 
Constant 44.8250** 36.7957 53.2684* 21.0886*** 
 (18.0804) (28.2888) (27.9075) (6.5895) 
Observations 259 294 272 825 
R-squared 0.111 0.162 0.091 0.062 
Number of MFIs 192 203 166 380 
F-test (p-value) 0.3625 0.0565 0.0000 0.0000 
Estimator  Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Notes: This table lists fixed-effects estimates across different periods of the sample. The dependent variable is z-score. 
Pre-crisis refers to the portion (1998–2006) of the sample period (1998–2015) before the global financial crisis (2007–
2009) and post-crisis to 2010–2015. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 In Table 5, we compare the diversification-risk link across ownership/organizational 
structures of MFIs. As mentioned before, MFIs without owners may carry higher risk due 
to slacker monitoring compared to MFIs with owners (Galema et al. 2012). Because 
shareholders have rights to residuals, they have incentives to monitor a firm more closely 
than other stakeholders. As the results in Table 5 show, this is indeed the case. It is clearly 
seen that there is a strong positive relationship between number of branches and risk in 
terms of PaR30 (as well as the other 3 risk metrics, according to the untabulated results) in 










Table 5: Geographic diversification and credit risk: An organizational comparative 
analysis 
 (21) (22) 
 SHF NonSHF 
Branches  0.0009 0.0134*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0051) 
Group  -2.0069*** -2.3523*** 
 (0.7347) (0.5957) 
MFI size -1.0215*** -1.1732*** 
 (0.3589) (0.2353) 
Leverage -4.6016** 0.6609 
 (1.9253) (1.6821) 
MFI experience 0.3074*** 0.1694*** 
 (0.1126) (0.0487) 
Governance index 0.5441*** 0.0792 
 (0.1852) (0.1588) 
GDP per capita -1.2654*** -1.3541*** 
 (0.4705) (0.3828) 
Crisis  -0.0868 0.2087 
 (0.4886) (0.4673) 
Constant 33.1635*** 33.4804*** 
 (7.7881) (5.0290) 
Observations 414 571 
Number of MFIs 200 282 
R-squared 0.1192 0.1388 
Chi2 test (p-value) 0.0002 0.0000 
Estimator Random effects Random effects 
Notes: This table lists random-effects estimates across different organizational types of MFIs. The dependent variable 
is PaR30. SHF = shareholder firms; NonSHF = non-shareholder firms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 In other tests we check how the positive effect of diversification on risk might be 
mitigated. First, we repeat models (1–8) in Table 3, excluding the group lending control 
and compare the results between group and individual lending methods. The (untabulated) 
results reveal that the positive influence of number of branches is more pronounced among 
MFIs offering individual loans. This suggests that the difficulty in monitoring individual 
borrowers becomes worse when an MFI diversifies geographically. Second, we interact 
number of branches with group lending (1 = group loan, 0 = individual loan) and rerun 
models (1–8). The results (see Table A3 in the Appendix) indicate that the main effect of 
number of branches is stronger and the effect of group lending remains the same as in the 
main results in Table 3, but that the interaction term between branches and group lending 
is negatively (all models) and significantly (in 5 out of 8 models) related to risk. This 
suggests that MFIs may mitigate the effect of diversification on risk by employing a group 




importance of the group lending methodology in microfinance (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010; Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). 
 We further check whether stricter governance can mitigate the negative effect of 
diversification in terms of higher risk. To do so, we interact internal audit (1 = an MFI has 
an internal audit function reporting to the board, and 0 = otherwise) with number of 
branches and rerun the models. The results (see Table A4 in the Appendix) show that 
number of branches is no longer significantly correlated with risk and that internal audit is 
negatively related with risk but is significant only in the LLP model. The interaction term 
between the two variables has no strong statistical influence on risk. Overall, the internal 
audit function seems to be a control mechanism that MFIs may use to mitigate the effect of 
diversification on risk.  
  To further check the robustness of the general positive relationship between 
diversification and risk, we rerun models (1–8) using a standard OLS estimator, first using 
number of branches as the test variable and, second, replacing branches with the rural-
urban dummy. In both robustness tests, the (untabulated) results show that the positive 
relationship between diversification and risk remains unchanged. Our final robustness 
check relates to a possible reverse causality concern, which we address by using a GMM 
estimator. Again, the results (see Table A5) suggest a positive relationship between number 
of branches and credit risk. The result is statistically significant for the loan-loss provision 
model.  
 Overall, the results of the four estimators (random effects, fixed effects, OLS, and 
GMM) indicate that geographic diversification of microfinance institutions may result in 
higher risk in terms of higher nonperforming loans and higher loan-loss provisions as well 
as higher volatility of earnings. Our findings further highlight that the positive relationship 
is more pronounced among non-shareholder-owned MFIs (like NGOs) compared to 
shareholder-owned MFIs. Finally, the positive effect of diversification on risk can be 
mitigated with monitoring mechanisms like group lending and the internal audit function. 
Thus, diversification can be beneficial to MFIs if internal control and monitoring are 
improved.  
 Theoretically, the findings are generally in line with agency theory arguments. Branch 
managers of microfinance institutions may tend to use diversification to extract private 
benefits at the expense of the MFI (Bandelj, 2016; Goetz et al., 2012). This is possible 
because diversification increases the complexity of an institution (Winton, 1999), thus 
making it difficult for owners and headquarters to monitor remote operations (Acharya et 
al., 2006). In microfinance, monitoring by owners may be weaker than it is in regular 
banking because a majority of the MFIs are NGOs, which do not have owners. Thus, higher 
agency costs may offset any diversification premium, which seems to be the case in this 
study. The findings may also be attributed to increased complexity, which may diminish 
the monitoring of clients. To conclude, the findings provide support for the second 
hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between geographic diversification and credit 






6. Conclusion  
This study investigates the relation between geographic diversification and credit risk in 
microfinance. The existing empirical studies are inconclusive as to whether banks should 
diversify. We extend the scope of the literature to include hybrid organizations 
(organizations with both social and financial logics; Battilana and Dorado 2010) and 
analyze from a risk perspective whether MFIs should diversify geographically. Number of 
branches and rural-urban focus are used as proxies for geographic diversification, and credit 
risk is measured in terms of portfolio at risk, loan loss provisions, z-score, and volatility of 
returns on assets. 
 The findings suggest that there is a significant positive relationship between geographic 
diversification and credit risk in microfinance. In particular, diversification seems to lead 
to higher  nonperforming loans, which in turn leads to higher loan loss provisions. From a 
risk perspective, this finding suggests that diversification is not beneficial to MFIs, 
especially non-shareholder-owned MFIs. Operating with many branches makes the 
institution more complex and probably weakens the monitoring ability of both the owners 
and the head office. In view of the monitoring argument, the findings further suggest that 
the effect of diversification on risk can be mitigated by implementing a group lending 
methodology as well as better internal controls.  
 The results have important practical implications for both the microfinance industry 
and banking authorities. For practitioners in general, it is important that they consider their 
management and monitoring capabilities before making geographic diversification 
decisions. That is, diversification is not bad in and of itself as long as there are enhanced 
monitoring and control mechanisms in place. Otherwise, an MFI is better off focusing 
geographically as far as credit risk is concerned. In the absence of such internal controls, 
NGOs, in particular, would do well to remain focused on a few geographic areas. 
Regulatory authorities and other policymakers should avoid issuing general 
recommendations that MFIs reduce their risk by diversifying geographically. After all, 
microfinance is a relational transaction requiring close contact between the lender and the 
borrower. MFIs thus need proper governance and management structures before venturing 
into new geographic areas.  
 We conclude by noting that this study is limited to risk. From a risk-return  
perspective, higher credit risk may improve the financial performance of MFIs if the MFIs 
reach out to new customers. Even if these customers increase the loan losses, the net effect 
on bottom-line earnings can still be positive. In future research, it would be interesting to 
expand the diversification universe and study the effects of product diversification on risk. 
An additional aspect that should be researched is the relationship between diversification 
and social performance. Many MFIs have clear objectives of fighting poverty. An important 
dimension of social performance is outreach to new and more remote clients. Socially 
concerned MFIs would be willing to increase their risk if the outcome were that more poor 
people have access to microfinance services.  
 Notably, it is possible that the number of branches can be influenced by the previous 
period’s credit risk, making the decision to diversify geographically an endogenous choice. 




completely rule out the possibility that we are observing an association rather than 
causation. This issue should be further addressed in future research, and a survey study 
among managers is needed to shed light on the relation between geographic diversification 
and credit risk.  
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Table A1: Distribution of number of microfinance institutions by country 
# Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs 
1 Albania 3 30 Mexico 31 59 Tajikistan 11 
2 Argentina 2 31 Moldova 2 60 Croatia 1 
3 Armenia 6 32 Morocco 8 61 Chad 3 
4 Benin 8 33 Nicaragua 14 62 Rwanda 12 
5 Bolivia 17 34 Pakistan 2 63 Zambia 3 
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 35 Paraguay 2 64 China 5 
7 Brazil 14 36 Peru 40 65 Serbia 2 
8 Bulgaria 3 37 Philippines 22 66 Ghana 5 
9 Burkina Faso 9 38 Romania 7 67 Malawi 2 
10 Cambodia 14 39 Russia 17 68 Gambia 1 
11 Chile 2 40 Senegal 12 69 Kosovo 5 
12 Colombia 14 41 South Africa 4 70 Congo 1 
13 Dominican Republic 7 42 Sri Lanka 2 71 Burundi 6 
14 Ecuador 20 43 Tanzania 8 72 Niger 8 
15 Egypt 6 44 Togo 5 73 Dem. Rep. Congo 1 
16 El Salvador 7 45 Trinidad and Tobago 1 74 Afghanistan 2 
17 Ethiopia 10 46 Tunisia 1 75 Costa Rica 3 
18 Georgia 8 47 Uganda 25 76 Lebanon 2 
19 Guatemala 8 48 Montenegro 2 77 Turkey 1 
20 Haiti 3 49 Cameroon 5 78 Palestine 3 
21 Honduras 13 50 Guinea 3 79 Comoros 1 
22 India 32 51 Timor 1 80 Italy 3 
23 Indonesia 4 52 Bangladesh 2 81 Samoa 1 
24 Jordan 3 53 Nepal 5 82 Sierra Leone 1 
25 Kazakhstan 8 54 Vietnam 4 83 South Sudan 1 
26 Kenya 18 55 Azerbaijan 9 84 United Kingdom 1 
27 Kyrgyz Republic 9 56 Mongolia 4 85 Yemen 1 
28 Madagascar 3 57 Nigeria 6 86 Angola 1 
29 Mali 11 58 Mozambique 1 87 Macedonia 1 













Table A2: Definitions of variables  
Variable  Definition 
Portfolio at Risk  Fraction of loan portfolio in arrears for more than 30 
days. 
Loan loss provisions Fraction of loan portfolio reserved for future loan losses. 
z-score  Calculated as the difference between composite risk 
(sum of portfolio at risk and loan loss provisions) and its 
mean divided by its standard deviation.  
Volatility of ROA The standard deviation of returns on assets per MFI. 
Branch  The number of branch offices an MFI has. 
MFI experience Number of years in operation as a microfinance 
institution. 
MFI size Total assets (log values used in estimations).  
Leverage   Equity divided by total assets. 
Group  1 = if loans are made mainly to groups, 0 = individuals. 
Shareholder firm (SHF) 1 = shareholder owned firm, 0 = non-shareholder-owned 
firm. 
NGO 1 = nongovernmental organization, 0 = otherwise.  
Cooperative 1 = if MFI is registered as a cooperative, 0 = otherwise. 
Bank 1 = if MFI is registered as a bank, 0 = otherwise. 
Nonbank 1 = nonbank financial institution, 0 = otherwise. 
Governance index This is the sum of six global governance scores on voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption. Data are taken 
from the World Bank database. 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita, converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates 
(constant 2011). 
Crisis  1 = global financial crisis period (2007–2009), 0 = 
otherwise. 
Rural and urban 1= if an MFI serves both rural and urban clients, 0 = 









Table A3: Geographic diversification and credit risk: Interaction between branches and lending method 
 PAR30 LLP Z-score StdROA PAR30 LLP Z-score StdROA 
Branches  0.0171* 0.0255*** 0.0104*** 0.0397*** 0.0128** 0.0245*** 0.0087*** 0.0512*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0070) (0.0031) (0.0102) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0018) (0.0103) 
Group loan 0.0716 0.5509 0.4425 2.4926*** -2.2379*** 0.6414 0.2158 2.6537*** 
 (1.0062) (0.6409) (0.3440) (0.5793) (0.5277) (0.5635) (0.2405) (0.4723) 
Branches*group -0.0244 -0.0141 -0.0149** -0.0316*** -0.0056 -0.0190* -0.0151*** -0.0521*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0175) (0.0066) (0.0107) (0.0076) (0.0099) (0.0046) (0.0102) 
MFI size 0.1913 0.1887 -0.1909 -0.9508*** -1.0222*** -0.0416 -0.1513 -0.8952*** 
 (0.7601) (0.6813) (0.1857) (0.2058) (0.1894) (0.5922) (0.1806) (0.1897) 
Leverage -0.5988 -2.0554 -0.1045 1.3401 -1.6609 -4.4138*** -0.6386 0.2304 
 (1.9080) (1.6555) (0.6091) (0.9798) (1.1757) (1.6654) (0.5305) (0.9763) 
MFI experience 0.0624 0.2356*** 0.2081*** -0.0498 0.2061*** 0.1323 0.1515*** -0.0553 
 (0.2741) (0.0607) (0.0220) (0.0444) (0.0493) (0.1537) (0.0510) (0.0347) 
SHF 1.3762 0.0480 0.1889 1.2447** 1.0300** 0.5223 0.2708 1.0453*** 
 (0.8967) (1.0282) (0.4493) (0.5299) (0.4361) (0.7137) (0.2890) (0.3952) 
Country*year Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  No  No  
Gov. index     0.3044** 0.2372 0.1253 0.1814 
     (0.1203) (0.2843) (0.1344) (0.1190) 
GDP per capita     -1.2512*** -6.3088** -2.9216*** 0.2280 
     (0.3045) (2.5356) (0.8485) (0.3035) 
Crisis      0.0933 0.5634* 0.2439** -0.0322 
     (0.3310) (0.3199) (0.1097) (0.4318) 
Constant 229.6775 777.7174** 249.6275** -436.9553*** 31.3373*** 57.0903*** 25.7280*** 17.1272*** 
 (554.9044) (319.5047) (97.1855) (158.2151) (4.3197) (19.3143) (6.5398) (4.0540) 
Observations 1,013 915 847 1,046 982 888 824 1,018 
Number of MFIs 477 443 390 - 460 428 379 - 
R-squared 0.230 0.236 0.225 0.297 0.108 0.069 0.086 0.074 
Estimator  FE FE FE OLS RE FE FE OLS 
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 






Table A4: Geographic diversification and credit risk: Interaction between branches and internal audit 
 PAR30 LLP Z-score StdROA PAR30 LLP Z-score StdROA 
Branches  0.0160 0.0293 -0.0081 0.0144 0.0056 0.0274 -0.0107 0.0038 
 (0.0613) (0.0251) (0.0202) (0.0114) (0.0093) (0.0196) (0.0165) (0.0092) 
Internal audit -0.9384 0.2180 -0.2943 0.5393 -0.6228 -0.5064 -0.5185** 0.5105 
 (0.9047) (0.6592) (0.3237) (0.7116) (0.5223) (0.6050) (0.2557) (0.7144) 
Branches*audit -0.0035 0.0001 0.0110 -0.0095 0.0000 0.0077 0.0121 -0.0092 
 (0.0263) (0.0162) (0.0131) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0114) (0.0085) (0.0098) 
Group  -0.2803 0.2521 0.3501 2.0226*** -2.3053*** 0.0992 0.1835 2.1302*** 
 (1.5119) (0.6858) (0.4603) (0.7025) (0.5435) (0.4984) (0.2747) (0.4924) 
MFI size 1.1193 0.4142 0.0990 -0.7457*** -1.0921*** -0.5212 0.0014 -0.6597*** 
 (1.0758) (0.4671) (0.2588) (0.2374) (0.2425) (0.7106) (0.2479) (0.2217) 
Leverage -0.7727 -1.5198 -0.6909 1.9459* -2.1827* -4.6724** -0.8187 1.7058 
 (1.9516) (1.0800) (0.6391) (1.1128) (1.2826) (1.8630) (0.5776) (1.1209) 
MFI experience -0.0926 0.2900** 0.2880** -0.0666 0.2000*** 0.1560 0.1208* -0.0289 
 (0.2744) (0.1391) (0.1142) (0.0483) (0.0463) (0.1491) (0.0673) (0.0417) 
SHF 2.0763* 0.4179 0.6196 0.7525 1.0141** 0.5385 0.3578 1.2233** 
 (1.2556) (1.1400) (0.4144) (0.6791) (0.4859) (0.8920) (0.2447) (0.5570) 
Country*year Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  No  No  
Gov. index     0.2386** 0.6132* 0.1396 0.1877 
     (0.1177) (0.3276) (0.1400) (0.1290) 
GDP per capita     -1.2723*** -4.0684 -2.4355* 0.1301 
     (0.3153) (3.9643) (1.2622) (0.3584) 
Crisis      0.3486 0.3421 0.1039 -0.1385 
     (0.4207) (0.4133) (0.1635) (0.5473) 
Constant 348.2834 830.8341*** 475.8776** -481.4850** 33.0286*** 46.9099 20.0690** 13.6077*** 
 (529.3721) (303.0831) (218.9712) (222.3313) (4.6860) (29.0330) (9.7407) (4.8784) 
Observations 673 607 553 695 651 587 537 676 
Number of MFIs 439 407 362 -  425 394 353 -  
R-squared 0.144 0.525 0.310 0.286 0.115 0.106 0.085 0.063 






Table A5: Geographic diversification and credit risk: System GMM  
 PaR30 LLP Z-score 
Branches  0.0854 0.0949** 0.0284 
 (0.0925) (0.0382) (0.0195) 
Group   -1.8180 -1.9351*** -0.9583*** 
 (1.6253) (0.3514) (0.3526) 
MFI size -2.5673 -0.4533 -0.5058 
 (1.7714) (1.3316) (0.5795) 
Leverage 2.3479 -3.5073 -3.9181 
 (19.2700) (5.5125) (2.8334) 
MFI experience 2.4072* 1.9291*** 1.1921** 
 (1.2466) (0.4545) (0.5111) 
Governance index  0.3869 0.2547*** 0.2812*** 
 (0.4903) (0.0920) (0.0925) 
GDP per capita 0.2904 0.1661 0.0348 
 (0.2203) (0.1586) (0.0802) 
Crisis  -0.3644 -0.1759 -0.2059 
 (1.7756) (0.4983) (0.2299) 
Shareholder MFI 0.4664 0.7751* 0.1706 
 (0.7418) (0.3984) (0.1665) 
Constant  30.5537 31.3452*** 14.2601** 
 (39.4881) (9.3125) (6.7764) 
Observations 985 889 825 
Number of MFIs 463 429 380 
Number of instruments 34 35 35 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.354 0.006 0.009 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.728 0.394 0.102 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.265 0.294 0.234 
Chi2-test (p-value) 0.062 0.000 0.115 
Notes: This table reports results of system GMM. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first- and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, which is the case for 
PaR30 model. For the LLP and Z-score models, there is serial correlation in the first order but not in the second order. 
The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null hypothesis that the instrument set is valid, as is the case here. 
In specifying the GMM model, we use one-year lags of PaR30, LLP, and z-score as GMM instruments, and the 
“collapse” option of limiting instrument proliferation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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This paper investigates the effects of revenue diversification on the financial performance 
of microfinance institutions (MFIs). The long-standing question about whether financial 
institutions should diversify or focus is a topic of ongoing debate. Using a global sample of 
MFIs, we investigate which view is appropriate for microfinance institutions. The results 
show that, diversification across revenue streams improves sustainability and profitability 
of MFIs. This suggests that revenue diversification is an important strategy for the 
sustainability of microfinance. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the effects of revenue diversification on the financial performance of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). The paper is motivated by increasing trends of interest 
rates ceilings for MFIs.  As of 2004, about 40 countries introduced interest rates ceilings to 
protect poor borrowers from high interest rates charged by micro-lenders (Helms & Reille, 
2004). In 2016, the Kenyan government for example, also established interest rate ceiling 
(The Economist, September 8, 2016) and on March 13, 2017, the National Bank of 
Cambodia announced interest rate ceiling for all MFIs in the country (Sokunthea, 2017).  
 One effect of interest rate ceiling in the microfinance industry is reduced transparency 
concerning cost of loans. “MFIs influenced by interest rate ceilings have tried to cover their 
costs by imposing new charges and fees” (Helms & Reille, 2004, p. 6). The new charges 
and fees are indirect costs of loans but less transparency makes the borrower unware of 
these costs. Moreover, the imposition of interest rates ceilings laws may force MFIs to find 
alternative sources of income to cover their huge operational costs. Interest rates are higher 
in microfinance than mainstream banking because of the high operational costs associated 
with smaller loans (Fernando, 2006; Helms & Reille, 2004; Mersland & Strøm, 2013). 
Thus, revenue diversification in microfinance could possibly be as result of interest rates 
ceilings. In the global sample applied in this study, MFIs get income from non-interest 
sources including investment income, fees and commissions.  However, as far as their 
sustainability is concerned, should MFIs diversify their revenue sources?  
 The question about whether financial institutions such as banks should diversify or 
focus is yet to receive a clear-cut answer. Empirical findings seem to support either view. 
For instance, Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) and Berger et al. (2010)  find that 
diversification does not improve bank performance while Chiorazzo, Milani, and Salvini 
(2008), Cotugno and Stefanelli (2012) and Chen and Lai (2017), on the contrary, document 
evidence to support diversification; it improves bank performance. Besides the mixed 
findings, common in the banking industry, there seems to be few empirical insights from 
the microfinance industry.  
Microfinance is a poverty reduction tool with the primary aim of financial inclusion 
where poor people excluded from mainstream banking are provided with financial services 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Since the 1970s when the concept took its inception, many 
observers worldwide have praised microfinance for the achievement of its primary goal 
(Balkenhol & Hudon, 2011; Biosca, Lenton, & Mosley, 2014; Convergences, 2017).  
Beside financial inclusion, microfinance also aims at being a financially sustainable 
concept, thus, it pursues a double bottom line which Morduch (1999) describes as a “win-
win” solution. Thus, MFIs are hybrid organizations pursuing both social and financial 
objectives. Like other social organizations, MFIs seek to enhance the welfare of the clients 
and like banks, MFIs aim to be profitable or at least break-even.  
The microfinance industry is growing very fast, yet few scholars seem to pay attention 
to it concerning the diversification versus focus issue. For example, in 2016, MFIs provided 
microcredit to 132 million borrowers around the globe with USD 102 billion of loan 
portfolio (Convergences, 2017). The annual growth rates in number of credit clients and 




trends can be found in sources reporting on the state of microfinance  including 
Microfinance Baraometer (Convergences, 2017) and Microcredit Summit Campaign 
(Reed, 2015). Additionally, evidence from the banking industry may not be applicable to 
the microfinance industry since MFIs are hybrid organizations. Commercial banks on the 
other hand are purely profit- oriented firms. Moreover, since there are real world cases to 
support both diversification and focus (Winton, 1999), it makes sense to investigate which 
view is appropriate for micro-banks (MFIs) . Accordingly, this paper investigates the case 
of MFIs by answering the questions: should microfinance institutions diversify or focus? Is 
diversification helpful in attaining their financial objective? To answer these questions, the 
paper employs a unique global data set.  
Scope studies in banking are often criticized since they are based on only a single country 
(e.g., Acharya et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2010; Jouida et al., 2017)  or region (e.g., Bandelj, 
2016; Mercieca et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2003), exceptions include Laeven and Levine 
(2007). This is a disadvantage we overcome with our global panel data set of 607 MFIs in 
87 countries spanning 1998 -2015. This sample at least provides us with some international 
evidence on the diversification versus focus issue from the microfinance industry. 
Finally, this paper is distinguished by its methodological approach from existing studies 
that conducted pure cross-sectional analysis. It uses panel data to investigate a “within” 
analysis and quantify the effects of variations in diversification for an MFI. The main 
advantage of this approach is that, it controls for important omitted variables such as MFI-
specific and regional effects (Wooldridge, 2011). 
This paper could be relevant for policymakers who regulate the activities of MFIs.  Like 
banks, the diversification versus focus issue is vital for MFIs as some of them are being 
regulated by banking authorities. Banking regulations may tend to incentivize banks or 
regulated MFIs to diversify or focus (Acharya et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2010, Hayden et 
al., 2007). Moreover, some MFIs collect deposits, making them delegated monitors on 
behalf of depositors (Diamond, 1984). Effective monitoring of MFI’s activities will depend 
on the degree of its diversification. The more diversified an MFI is, the more complex it 
becomes (Winton, 1999) and this makes monitoring ineffective (Acharya et al., 2006; 
Hayden, Porath, & Westernhagen, 2007). Thus,  policymakers may find this paper relevant 
as to whether or not  financial institutions benefit from diversification (Bandelj, 2016). In 
this regard, it is important to investigate empirically the case of MFIs. 
The results suggest that diversification is helpful for the achievement of MFIs’ financial 
objective. Specifically, revenue diversification improves sustainability and profitability of 
MFIs. The paper therefore makes an important contribution to the microfinance 
sustainability literature. The paper is among the first to provide empirical insights on the 
impact of diversification on the financial performance of MFIs. The findings imply that one 
way MFIs can be sustainable is to diversify into non-interest revenue streams. The revenue 
diversification premium is consistent with the modern portfolio theory, which asserts that 
holding many imperfectly correlated investments results in net positive outcomes 
(Markowitz, 1952). 
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 




approach is provided. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Literature on Diversification 
Theoretically, firms diversify for a number of reasons including: risk management, 
efficiency, market power, resource exploitation, and managerial entrenchment (Chiorazzo 
et al., 2008; Elsas, Hackethal, & Holzhauser, 2010; Goddard, McKillop, & Wilson, 2008; 
Klein & Saidenberg, 1998). Portfolios theory, developed by Markowitz (1952), suggests 
that diversification leads to risk reduction and improved firm’s value as long as assets 
returns are imperfectly correlated. For instance, expanding geographically requires 
“dissimilar” economies where correlations of returns of new and existing assets are low 
(Goetz, Laeven, & Levine, 2016). Thus, diversification reduces total risk resulting in 
improved financial performance, as idiosyncratic risk is minimal if not eliminated in a well-
diversified firm.  
Diversification leads to increased operational efficiency through economies of scope as 
fixed costs are spread among a wide range of products and regions (Drucker & Puri, 2009) 
and through joint production of financial services (Klein & Saidenberg, 1998). Operational 
efficiency is particularly important for microfinance institutions as far as their sustainability 
is concerned. Given that MFIs are struggling with huge operational costs (Mersland & 
Strøm, 2013), gaining operational efficiency through diversification could be a step in the 
right direction.  Like banks, MFIs often enter into a long-term relationship with their 
customers allowing them to reuse previously gathered customer information without 
additional costs (Elsas et al., 2010). MFIs may also diversify to increase their market power 
if market competition intensifies (Goddard et al., 2008; Winton, 1999) and to exploit 
resources in new markets (Goddard et al., 2008) or leverage managerial expertise among 
products and regions (Iskandar-Datta & McLaughlin, 2007). Agency theory suggests that 
managers diversify their firms for private benefits including empire building or managerial 
entrenchment (Campa & Kedia, 2002; Jensen, 1986; Klein & Saidenberg, 1998). 
 
2.2 Empirical Literature on Diversification and Financial Performance 
There is a growing body of empirical literature on the issue of diversification versus focus 
and performance of financial institutions. The findings are mixed and tend to follow two 
main streams of empirical research namely: diversification premium (benefits) and 
diversification discount (disadvantages). Proponents of diversifications suggest that banks 
can enhance profitability by diversifying across a wide range of business lines and regions. 
For instance, Deng and Elyasiani (2008) find that geographic diversification is positively 
correlated with bank’s value. Similarly, Klein and Saidenberg (1998) find that geographic 
diversification is beneficial to banks. Efficiency opportunities associated with internal 
capital allocation can be exploited by expanding geographically. Campa and Kedia (2002) 
also document evidence that counteracts diversification discount and conclude that 




improves bank’s profitability, in terms of both unadjusted and adjusted returns on assets 
and equity  (Chiorazzo et al., 2008; Cotugno & Stefanelli, 2012; Elsas et al., 2010; Sanya 
& Wolfe, 2010; Sissy, Amidu, & Abor, 2017) and these findings are robust during market 
instability (Cotugno & Stefanelli, 2012) and even during the sub-prime crisis (Elsas et al., 
2010).  
In addition, Lamont and Polk (2001) argue that diversification discount must be 
investigated, taking into consideration both future cash flows and assets returns. They find 
that diversified firms with low value tend to have large future returns compared with 
diversified firms with high value. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) also argue that 
diversification is not a value-destroying strategy in that it depends on the financial health 
of the target firm prior to acquisition. Their findings suggest that, acquiring an already 
discounted firm will reduce the value of the acquirer, hence, diversification per se does not 
destroy firm’s value. 
Following the discussion on diversification premium evident in banking, we 
hypothesize that revenue diversification among microfinance institutions could lead to 
improved financial performance. This could be as a result of benefits associated with 
reduced risk based on portfolio theory and operational efficiency through economies of 
scale and scope. Therefore, the first hypothesis to test in this study is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between revenue diversification and financial 
performance of microfinance institutions. 
 
On the other hand, opponents of diversification say it is a value-destroying strategy 
because when a firm diversifies, existing management expertise gets diluted and agency 
costs increase. Other previous studies including Acharya et al. (2006), Hayden et al. (2007) 
and Jouida, Bouzgarrou, and Hellara (2017) find that diversification is inversely related to 
bank’s performance. Similarly, the findings of Berger et al (2010) suggest that MFIs should 
focus instead of diversifying. More focused banks tend to be cost-efficient resulting in 
higher profitability. Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that income 
diversification does not improve financial institutions’ net operating income as non-interest 
income tends to be highly volatile. These results are consistent to those of Goddard et al. 
(2008) who additionally report that income diversification is beneficial to only larger credit 
unions. 
Furthermore, Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversification decreases firm’s value 
and this is as a result of overinvestment or wasteful spending, and subsidization of segments 
with poor performance. Laeven and Levine (2007) report that banks’ diversification 
through financial conglomerates is associated with lower market value. They argue that 
increased agency costs tend to offset gains from economies of scope.  
Like banks, we also believe that diversification discount could be present among 
diversified MFIs too because of monitoring difficulties and operational inefficiencies. 
Having many financial activities could make MFIs worse-off if competent management 
team is not put in place. Thus, for management control purposes, it may be financially 





Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between revenue diversification and 
financial performance of microfinance institutions. 
 
   
3. Data and Methodology 
3.2 Sample 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 607 microfinance institutions observed over 18-year 
period (1998-2015). It is a global sample of MFIs from 87 countries (Table A1 in Appendix) 
covering six regions: East Asia and Pacific (56 MFIs), Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(105 MFIs), Latin America and Caribbean (199 MFIs), Sub-Saharan Africa (176 MFIs), 
South Asia (46 MFIs), and Middle East and North Africa (25 MFIs). The data are collected 
from www.ratingfund2.org and the rating agencies’ (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet 
Rating, Crisil and M-Cril) websites. All of the five rating agencies have been approved and 
supported by the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP), a 
microfinance branch of World Bank. Each of the rating reports contains data for the rating 
year and the previous years. It is worth noting that, there is no perfect data set to accurately 
represent the microfinance industry (Strøm, D’Espallier, & Mersland, 2016). Accordingly, 
the data set used for this paper does not cover all the small savings and credit cooperatives 
worldwide but majority of our MFIs are small in size.  
In the microfinance industry, rating data are one of the sources of the most reliable and 
representative available data (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Rating MFIs, with support from 
donors such the Interamerican Development Bank and the European Union, is one of the 
main ways of achieving transparency in the industry (Beisland, Mersland, & Randøy, 
2014). The rating reports provided by the five agencies are much wider in scope of 
information compared to traditional credit ratings (Beisland & Mersland, 2012). They cover 
a wide range of information including financial, outreach, ownership, regulation, 
governance, clients, financial products among others. Rating assessment is done in order to 
produce independent information for stakeholders’ decision making purposes (Strøm et al., 
2016). The sample for this study is an updated version of the data set used in Lensink et al. 
(2018), Pascal et al. (2017), Randøy et al. (2015) and Delgado et al. (2015). 
 
 
3.3 Measures of Diversification and Financial Performance 
Diversification measure 
There are three dimensions of diversification: across financial products and services, 
geographic expansion, and a combination of these two (Mercieca et al., 2007). This paper 
is concerned with the first dimension. Specifically, this study investigates the effects of 
revenue diversification on the financial performance of MFIs. As mentioned earlier, the 
motivation for investigating revenue diversification in this study is because of the 
increasing trends of interest rates ceilings many MFIs face worldwide. Currently, over 40 
countries have established interest rates ceilings to protect the poor borrowers from high 
interest rates charged by microlenders (Helms and Reille, 2004; Mbengue, 2013). The 




activities to cover their operational costs in order to stay in business.  Hence, we investigate 
the influence of revenue diversification on MFIs’ financial performance.  
We follow other scholars (Jouida, 2017; Morgan & Samolyk, 2003; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh 
& Rumble, 2006) to construct Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for revenue diversification for 
each MFI. The measure of revenue diversification (DIV) takes into consideration various 
sources of net operating revenue, which are broadly grouped into two categories: interest 
and non-interest. Interest represents net interest income from loan portfolio while non-
interest represents all non-interest income including investment income, fees and services 
charges, among others. Based on this breakdown, we construct our revenue diversification 
measure for MFIs as follows. 
 










]                                                                (1)       
                                                                                                 
Where NetOp = net operating revenue and it is the sum of interest and non-interest revenue. 
DIV measures the level of diversification of an MFI’s net operating revenue. Increase in 
DIV means that an MFI becomes more diversified as far as revenue sources are concerned 
and a figure close to zero indicates that all operating revenue nearly comes from one source, 
thus, an MFI is more focused.  
 For robustness checks, we alternatively measure revenue diversification in terms of the 
share of non-interest income (share-non) defined as non-interest income as a proportion of 
total net operating revenue. Increase in Share-non also indicates that an MFI is diversifying 
into non-interest revenue generating activities. Thus, the institution is becoming more 
diversified.  
 
Financial performance measures 
As mentioned earlier, this paper investigates whether diversification is helpful in achieving 
the financial objective of microfinance. Like banks, MFIs should be able to generate profit 
or at least break-even.  Thus, this paper focuses on the sustainability and profitability of 
MFIs. We  use two indicators for each financial dimension. That is, we use OSS and FSS 
as sustainability indicators and ROA and ROE as profitability measures. OSS is operational 
self-sustainability, a ratio that demonstrates the ability of MFIs to be fully sustainable in 
the long-run, in the sense that they can cover all their operating costs and maintain the value 
of their capital. The operational self-sustainability ratio is a better measure of financial 
performance than standard financial ratios, such as return on assets or equity, because it 
entails a more complete list of inputs and outputs. FSS is financial self-sustainability 
(explained below). ROA (return on assets) and ROE (returns on equity) are traditional 
measures for financial performance, used in different fields not only in microfinance. 
Overall, OSS, FSS, ROA and ROE have been widely used to measure the financial 
performance of MFIs (Abdullah & Quayes, 2016; Adusei, Akomea, & Poku, 2017; 
Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007, 2011; Dorfleitner, 
Priberny, & Röhe, 2017; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). 
ROA is a ratio of net operating income of the MFI divided by average assets. This ratio 




benchmark. OSS measures the ability of an MFI to cover its operating costs from operating 




𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑛 (𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
                              (2) 
 
Where operating revenue consists of interest and non-interest income. Funding cost is 
the cost of borrowings (interest and fees on loans and bonds), loan loss provision is the 
amount set aside to cover costs of loans default, and operations refer to cost of operations 
and include staff and non-staff costs. If OSS is 1 or 100 percent means full operational self-
sufficiency. A value less than 1 means that the MFI needs to rely on external funding to 
meet operational costs while a value greater 1 indicates the MFI can operate without 
subsidies; it is “self-sufficient.” 
Note that the computations of both operating revenue and operating costs in equation (2) 
include subsidies enjoyed by some MFIs, hence, they are not intrinsic or market values. 




𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑛 (𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
     (3) 
 
FSS adjusts operating revenue and costs to reflect how sustainable an MFI is if its 
operations were unsubsidized and its borrowings were at arm’s length transactions. It is 
important to make subsidy adjustments since MFIs are heterogeneous in terms of the 
amount of subsidy received. These adjustments allow better comparison among MFIs. 
Additionally, subsidy adjustments allow us to get an objective picture of the true financial 
sustainability of an MFI since they operate on commercial basis. Overall, FSS seeks to 
answer the question: can an MFI continue to operate in the near future without subsidy?  
There are three types of subsidy adjustments: concessionary borrowings, in-kind 
donations, and cash donations (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2014). 
The first concerns adjustment to funding costs and it takes into account the difference 
between subsidized and unsubsidized funding costs. This difference is added back to 
funding costs. The second adjustment captures donations in-kind or where raw materials 
were donated or supplied below market cost. Cash donations adjustment also capture 
monies given to the institution at no cost. This should be deducted from operating revenue.  
 
Control variables 
MFI size. As in other empirical studies [e.g., Mersland and Strøm (2009); Sanya and Wolfe 
(2010)] we take the natural log of total assets to control for MFI size since there are scale 
economies in microfinance (Hartarska, Shen, & Mersland, 2013). It is possible that 
diversification benefits could be related to large size since larger firms are able to diversify 





Capital/Asset. This ratio measures the ability of the institutions to withstand shocks. 
Institution’s probability of failure depends on its level of capitalization, larger capitals are 
safer (Lehar, 2005). 
Loan/Asset. This ratio, gross loan portfolio to total assets, measures differences in MFIs 
loan portfolios. Financial institutions with larger loan assets may focus more on interest 
activities compared with non-interest activities as far as income diversification is concerned 
(Stiroh & Rumble, 2006). Moreover, high switching costs in lending relationships tends to 
stabilize interest income (DeYoung & Roland, 2001). 
MFI experience. Age controls for differences in experience across MFIs. Learning curve 
theory suggests that the older you are, the better experienced you become. Thus, well-
established MFIs are more likely to perform better than less experienced MFIs as they 
already have established relationships with customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. 
MFI age has been used as a control variable in other empirical studies [e.g., Pascal et al. 
(2017); Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters (2011)] 
Portfolio at risk (PaR30). PaR30 is the proportion of loan portfolio that is in arrears over 
30 days. This is a widely used measure of portfolio quality in microfinance as most loans 
are short-term in nature. Other empirical studies have used this measure as control variable 
[e.g. Mersland and Strøm (2009); D'Espallier, Guerin, and Mersland (2011)].   
 Regulation. Some MFIs in our sample are regulated by banking authorities. Regulated 
MFIs stand the chance of gaining greater reputation leading to high customer loyalty. The 
bottom line effect of customer loyalty is improved performance (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). 
However, costs of regulation such as security requirement cost may reduce the amount of 
resources available for innovations. Accordingly, costs associated with regulation may 
offset its benefits leading to lower financial performance (Hardy, Holden, & Prokopenko, 
2003). In sum, regulatory policies concerning activity restrictions, diversification 
requirements, and institutional environment may affect benefits associated with 
diversification (Mercieca et al., 2007). 
 Geographical area. We also control for the geographical areas within which the MFIs 
operate. In our sample, some MFIs serve only urban clients and others focus on only rural 
or both rural and urban clients. Serving urban clients is less costly compared to rural clients. 
For instance, transportation costs relating to monitoring should be lower among MFIs 
serving urban clients compared to those serving rural clients because of differences in 
distance and quality of road.  
 Lending methodology. MFIs adopt three different lending methodologies when it comes 
to the supply of microcredit namely solidarity group, individual and village banking. -
Solidarity group lending is an important innovation of microfinance regarding the 
repayment of credits (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 1999). It enhances the repayment 
rates due to peer pressure from other group members (Ledgerwood, 1999). In the empirical 
analysis, the first two dummies are included while village banking serves as the reference 
category. 
 Finally, the paper controls for other country specific characteristics including GDP 
(gross domestic product) per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (constant 2011 




Additionally, we control for inflation – consumer price index. Table 1 summarizes the 
variables defined above. 
 
 
Table 1: Variables definitions  
Variable Definition  
Diversification      
DIV Revenue diversification index, defined in equation (1) 
Share-non Non-interest revenue as a proportion of total revenue 
Financial performance      
Returns on assets (ROA)  Net operating income divided by average assets 
Returns on equity (ROE) Net income divided by equity 
OSS Operational self-sustainability, defined in equation (2) 
FSS Financial self-sustainability, defined in equation (3) 
Control variables      
MFI size Natural logarithm of total assets 
MFI experience The number of years an institution is in operation as MFI 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR30) Proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days.  
Equity to asset ratio Total equity over total assets  
Loan to asset ratio Gross loan portfolio over total assets  
Urban market 1= MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market 0= 
otherwise 
Group lending 1 = if MFI adopts group lending method, 0 = otherwise 
Individual lending 1 = if individual lending method, 0 = otherwise 
GDP per person  Gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (constant 2011) 
GDP growth Annual gross domestic product percentage growth rate 
Inflation  Annual consumer price index 
Regulation Regulation is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if 










3.4 Estimation Approach 
This paper employs fixed effects model to account for any important variables omitted 
(Wooldridge, 2011). In particular, the paper takes into account any unobserved firm-
specific effects across MFIs. Our basic regression model is expressed as follows. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                         (4) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a vector of dependent variables, DIV is the diversification index for revenue, 
𝛽0 is the mean of unobserved heterogeneity, β1 and ℽ are coefficients, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 constitutes the 
controls for size, experience, loan quality, level of capital, loan to asset ratio, location of 
market, lending method, GDP per person, and GDP growth rate. 𝐶𝑖 is firm-specific 
unobserved effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the remaining error term that varies across both t and i. The 
main advantage of using fixed effects estimator is that, it wipes out all of the firm-specific 
unobserved effects (Ci’s). 
To determine whether our estimation method is appropriate for the data, we first check 
whether panel techniques are more appropriate than ordinary least squares (OLS) by 
applying the Breusch-Pagan  test (Greene, 2003). If the test rejects the null hypothesis, then 
the random effects model (RE) is preferable (i.e., panel-data model is appropriate). The 
results (Table A2 in Appendix) show that RE model is appropriate. Second, we test the 
assumed correlation between MFI-specific effects and regressors using Hausman’s (1978) 
specification test. A rejection of the null hypothesis in the specification test shows that MFI-
specific effects correlate with regressors, such that a fixed effects model is preferable, 
which is the case in this study (see Table A2). Only in two models (using ROA as 
dependent) out of eight models, the RE estimator is desirable.  However, to be consistent, 
we use the fixed effects (FE) estimator for all models. Moreover, when we compare the 
results of the two models (involving ROA) between FE and RE4 and they are not 













4. Results and Discussion  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Variance Inflation Factor scores 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimations. DIV has 
a mean value of 0.13 indicating relatively small degree of diversification across non-interest 
revenue sources. On average, about eight percent of MFI’s total revenue is from non-
interest sources such as commissions and fees (Share-non). Concerning the dependent 
variables, ROA has a mean value of 2.60 percent and that of ROE is 8.20 percent. These 
profitability means are quite low, suggesting that MFIs are not purely profit oriented firms. 
What is important for them is self-sustainability, which is the case in this sample as OSS is 
above one (1.104), indicating that MFIs can cover their operational costs from revenue 
earned. However, the mean value of FSS less than one (0.952) suggests that MFIs cannot 
survive in the long-run without subsidies from governments and other advocates of 
financial inclusion.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. 
Operational self-sustainability (OSS) 1.104 0.315 0.076 1.977 1574 
Financial self-sustainability (FSS) 0.952 0.298 0.064 3.469 1562 
Returns on assets (ROA) 0.026 0.074 -0.298 0.293 3030 
Returns on equity (ROE) 0.082 0.208 -0.887 0.862 2908 
Diversification index (DIV) 0.130 0.135 -0.473 0.500 3167 
Non-interest revenue (share-non) 0.081 0.105 -0.296 0.599 3122 
Total assets in logarithm (MFI size) 15.297 1.642 4.871 20.923 3248 
Age of MFI in years (MFI experience) 10.892 7.584 0.000 52.000 3268 
Portfolio at risk over 30 days (Par30) 0.054 0.067 -0.271 0.398 2949 
Equity to assets ratio (Equity) 0.369 0.273 -1.571 1.000 3216 
Loan portfolio to assets ratio (Loan) 0.745 0.170 0.008 0.999 3167 
Urban market 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 2641 
Group lending (Group) 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000 2855 
Individual lending (Individual) 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 2855 
GDP growth (%) 5.121 3.260 -14.150 14.722 3253 
GDP per person (log) 8.446 0.892 6.307 10.544 3288 
Inflation  0.064 0.051 -0.185 0.287 2298 
Regulation  0.363 0.481 0.000 1.000 2913 




Regarding the control variables, on average, an MFI has about eleven years of experience 
with thirty-seven percent of total assets funded by equity. The average portfolio at risk 
(Par30) is five percent. A large proportion (seventy-five percent) of total assets are loan 
assets. This makes sense, since microfinance mission is to supply financial services to poor 
families and microenterprises. In terms of geographical focus, twenty-seven percent of 
MFIs in the sample serve urban clients and with respect to their lending methodologies, 
about twenty-six percent of MFIs offer solidarity group loans while fifty-seven percent 
offer individual loans. 
Furthermore, on average, gross domestic product (GDP) experiences an annual growth 
rate of about five percent over the eighteen-year period. Similarly, inflation has a mean of 
about six percent.  Finally, about thirty-six percent of MFIs are regulated by banking 
authorities.  
 Table 3 presents pairwise correlations and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores among 
the regressors, which provide information concerning multicollinearity problem. Many 
correlations are significant at one percent level of significance. The correlations indicate 
that multicollinearity is less problematic because all of them (except the one between DIV 
and Share-non) are less than suggested threshold of 0.70 (Kennedy, 2008). The correlation 
between DIV and Share-non is quite high (0.96) because they mean the same thing in 
different measurements. Therefore, we do not include both in a model. An alternative and 
a common approach to detect severity of multicollinearity between explanatory variables 
is the use of VIF score (Studenmund, 2011). The rule of thumb is to have VIF values lower 
than five (Studenmund, 2011) or ten (Gujarati, 2011; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 
2010) in order to conclude absence of severe multicollinearity problem. Accordingly, our 
test for VIF indicates that all values are less than five, the highest value is 2.02 (individual 













4.2 Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 To estimate equation (4), we employ the specific-to-general model-building approach as 
follows (Brooks, 2008; Koopmans, 1937). For each dependent variable, we run four 
models. In the first model, the dependent variable is regressed on only the diversification 
variable (DIV). Then in the second model, we add only MFI-specific controls while the 
third model adds macroeconomic indicators. In the fourth model, industry regulation 
control is included. The reason for this systematic approach is to establish some level of 
robustness of the results. Finally, for comparison and convenience purposes, we then report 
all the dependent variables in one table (Table A2 in the Appendix). 
 Table 4 presents the regression results of the link between revenue diversification and 
sustainability of MFIs. In models (1) to (4), the dependent variables is operational self-
sustainability while models (5) to (8) relate to financial self-sustainability. Thus, both 
variables are sustainability measures. As expected, the R-squared improves with respect to 
the systematic approach from 0.10 percent in model (5) to 28.80 percent in model (8). The 
coefficient of DIV is positive in seven out of eight models indicating that revenue 
diversification comes with improved sustainability. This suggests that MFIs could be more 
sustainable by having several non-interest revenue generating activities. The finding (DIV) 




Table 3: Pairwise correlation matrix and VIF scores 
 VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. DIV      1.20 1.0000             
2. Share-non 1.16 0.9634* 1.0000            
3. MFI size 1.41 0.0077 0.0043 1.0000           
4. MFI experience 1.30 0.0923* 0.0740* 0.3591* 1.0000          
5. Par30 1.22 0.2139* 0.2022* -0.0792* 0.1458* 1.0000         
6. Equity/asset 1.14 -0.1270* -0.1197* -0.1123* -0.0701* -0.1108* 1.0000        
7. Loan/asset 1.16 -0.3616* -0.3411* 0.1208* 0.0428 -0.1895* 0.0176 1.0000       
8. Urban 1.11 -0.0223 -0.0284 -0.0440 -0.0796* 0.0496 0.0601 0.0233 1.0000      
9. Group 1.83 -0.0555 -0.0497 -0.2154* -0.1525* -0.0882* 0.0240 -0.0869* -0.0347 1.0000     
10. Individual 2.02 0.1184* 0.1092* 0.2417* 0.1426* 0.1488* -0.0705 0.0558 0.1479* -0.6784* 1.0000    
11. GDP  growth 1.08 -0.1051* -0.0993* -0.1197* -0.0628 -0.1124* 0.0637 0.0818* -0.0720 0.1044* -0.0843* 1.0000   
12. GDP per person 1.20 -0.1156* -0.1013* 0.1924* 0.0691* -0.0645 0.0315 0.2068*  0.0956* -0.2183* 0.2216* -0.2042* 1.0000  
13. Inflation 1.05 0.0577 0.0521 -0.0608 -0.0320 -0.0490 -0.0188 -0.0345 0.0202 0.0556 -0.0247 0.1229* -0.1068* 1.0000 
14. Regulation 1.28 0.0776* 0.0665 0.2334* 0.0089 0.0128 -0.1500* -0.0605 -0.0967* -0.0332 0.1646* 0.0702 -0.2406* -0.0537 











Table 4: Effects of revenue diversification on sustainability of microfinance institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Operational self-sustainability Financial self-sustainability 
DIV 0.1151* 0.0298 0.0965 0.1116 0.0666 -0.0496 0.0181 0.0296 
 (0.0653) (0.0730) (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0659) (0.0653) (0.0686) (0.0684) 
MFI size  0.1314*** 0.1040*** 0.1099***  0.1408*** 0.1330*** 0.1389*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0201)  (0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0188) 
MFI experience  -0.0129** -0.0158** -0.0143**  -0.0050 -0.0089 -0.0072 
  (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0066)  (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.9335*** -0.9313*** -0.8534***  -0.7150*** -0.9082*** -0.8061*** 
  (0.1723) (0.1860) (0.1891)  (0.1564) (0.1684) (0.1705) 
Equity/assets  0.1742*** 0.2271*** 0.2229***  0.0793 0.1098** 0.1072** 
  (0.0499) (0.0564) (0.0563)  (0.0483) (0.0535) (0.0532) 
Loan/assets  0.3024*** 0.2959*** 0.2749***  0.2717*** 0.2183*** 0.2045*** 
  (0.0746) (0.0755) (0.0757)  (0.0631) (0.0636) (0.0634) 
Urban market  0.1222*** 0.0822 0.0740  0.2582*** 0.2205*** 0.2110*** 
  (0.0470) (0.0531) (0.0531)  (0.0410) (0.0478) (0.0477) 
Group lending  0.2029* 0.1666 0.1521  -0.1785* -0.2530** -0.2647** 
  (0.1101) (0.1172) (0.1171)  (0.1050) (0.1088) (0.1083) 
Individual lending  -0.0284 -0.0947 -0.0766  -0.0816 -0.1375* -0.1146 
  (0.0726) (0.0818) (0.0819)  (0.0728) (0.0766) (0.0766) 
GDP growth   0.0041 0.0038   0.0053** 0.0051** 
   (0.0026) (0.0026)   (0.0024) (0.0024) 
GDP per person   0.3392*** 0.3686***   0.1401 0.1734 
   (0.1238) (0.1240)   (0.1140) (0.1139) 
Inflation    -0.1805 -0.1678   -0.7478*** -0.7559*** 
   (0.1749) (0.1745)   (0.1623) (0.1616) 
Regulation     -0.1123***    -0.1197*** 
    (0.0424)    (0.0391) 
Constant 1.0888*** -1.0638*** -3.4829*** -3.7968*** 0.9438*** -1.3057*** -2.2214** -2.5759*** 




Observations 1,526 1,112 908 903 1,526 1,124 936 931 
Number of MFIs 386 343 272 270 384 347 284 282 
R-squared 0.003 0.180 0.200 0.209 0.001 0.256 0.277 0.288 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where OSS and FSS are  regressed on DIV with(out) controls.  OSS is operational self-sustainability (models 1 to 4), FSS 
is financial self-sustainability (models 4 to 8) and DIV is an indicator for revenue diversification. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is number of 
years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days, Equity/Assets is the ratio of equity to total assets, 
Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market, 0 = otherwise. Group lending = 1 if MFI adopts solidarity 
group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per 
person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  















Concerning the control variables, the coefficient of MFI size is positive and significant 
in all models, confirming scale economies in microfinance (Hartarska et al., 2013). We also 
observe that MFI experience reduces operational self-sustainability. This is in contrast to 
learning curve theory. Probably, younger MFIs leapfrog older ones in terms of current 
efficiency practices, which older MFIs may have to learn by trial and error means (Hermes 
et al., 2011). As expected, portfolio at risk has negative impact on sustainability and it is 
significant in all models. Increase in non-performing loans requires more efforts in 
monitoring, leading to increased operational costs associated with monitoring (Berger & 
DeYoung, 1997).  
 Furthermore, equity and loan portfolio as proportions of total assets have significant 
positive effects on sustainability. As expected, group lending improves operational 
sustainability. However, it reduces financial sustainability. It is also observed that, serving 
urban clients increases MFIs’ sustainability, perhaps, costs of doing business with them are 
lower compared to rural clients. As expected, both GDP indicators are significant, 
suggesting that a healthy economy increases the sustainability of MFIs. However, increase 
in inflation reduces MFIs’ sustainability. Finally, regulation is found to have a negative 
impact on sustainability. This finding concurs with the argument that costs of regulations 
may outweigh its benefits (Hardy et al., 2003).  
Table 5 reports the FE regression results on the effects of revenue diversification on 
financial performance in terms of profitability (ROA and ROE). This time, DIV is 
significant in four models with control variables included. This suggests that MFIs’ 
profitability could be improved if they have many other sources of revenue aside interest 
revenue. With respect to the control variables, the findings are not significantly different 
from those in Table 4.  
  For robustness checks, we replace DIV with the ratio of non-interest revenue to total 
revenue (Share-non) as the independent variable and repeat all the regressions discussed 
above. The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Share-non is highly significant with the 
same positive coefficients in majority of the models. Thus, the additional results provide 
strong evidence that revenue diversification increases the financial performance of 
microfinance institutions.  
Finally, for easy comparison of the results with the different dependent variables used, 
Table A2 presents a summary. The table contains only models with all the controls 




relationship with performance indicators supporting hypothesis 1. This suggests that MFIs 





             Table 5: Effects of revenue diversification on profitability of microfinance institutions 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Variables Returns on assets Returns on equity 
DIV -0.0082 0.0147 0.0313* 0.0287* 0.0362 0.0810** 0.0761* 0.0708 
 (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0359) (0.0407) (0.0459) (0.0464) 
MFI size  0.0137*** 0.0152*** 0.0162***  0.0532*** 0.0532*** 0.0546*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0039)  (0.0088) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
MFI experience  -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0010  -0.0064** -0.0067* -0.0068* 
  (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.1827*** -0.2196*** -0.2222***  -0.7218*** -0.9139*** -0.9239*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0352) (0.0355)  (0.0825) (0.0977) (0.0987) 
Equity/assets  0.0546*** 0.0483*** 0.0483***  0.0021 0.0231 0.0270 
  (0.0093) (0.0106) (0.0108)  (0.0274) (0.0306) (0.0311) 
Loan/assets  0.0867*** 0.0762*** 0.0757***  0.1764*** 0.1585*** 0.1594*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0151)  (0.0383) (0.0423) (0.0429) 
Urban market  0.0092 0.0138* 0.0145*  0.0431** 0.0337 0.0339 
  (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0084)  (0.0198) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
Group lending  0.0140 -0.0048 -0.0014  0.0646 0.0469 0.0475 
  (0.0174) (0.0204) (0.0206)  (0.0493) (0.0568) (0.0573) 
Individual lending  0.0027 -0.0172 -0.0129  0.0237 0.0028 0.0031 
  (0.0159) (0.0188) (0.0191)  (0.0458) (0.0522) (0.0529) 
GDP growth   0.0014*** 0.0013**   0.0018 0.0018 
   (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP per person   0.0029 0.0085   0.0474 0.0433 
   (0.0249) (0.0253)   (0.0691) (0.0704) 
Inflation    -0.0011 -0.0063   -0.1054 -0.1127 
   (0.0339) (0.0343)   (0.0951) (0.0962) 
Regulation     -0.0149*    0.0007 
    (0.0088)    (0.0246) 




 (0.0019) (0.0439) (0.1977) (0.2020) (0.0053) (0.1279) (0.5503) (0.5619) 
Observations 2,956 2,163 1,674 1,648 2,841 2,088 1,634 1,609 
Number of MFIs 591 515 421 417 549 484 410 405 
R-squared 0.000 0.083 0.102 0.107 0.000 0.103 0.134 0.137 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where ROA and ROE are regressed on DIV with(out) controls.  ROA is returns on assets (models 9 to 12), 
ROE is returns on equity (models 13 to 16) and DIV is an indicator for revenue diversification. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total assets, MFI experience 
is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days, Equity/Assets is the ratio of 
equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as main market, 0 = otherwise. 
Group lending = 1 if MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP 
per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the 
annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  

















Table 6: Effects of revenue diversification on sustainability of microfinance institutions 
 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Variables Operational self-sustainability Financial self-sustainability 
Share-non 0.1472* 0.0757 0.1653* 0.1783* 0.1069 -0.0395 0.0301 0.0385 
 (0.0822) (0.0923) (0.0979) (0.0978) (0.0828) (0.0838) (0.0894) (0.0891) 
MFI size  0.1316*** 0.1026*** 0.1084***  0.1405*** 0.1332*** 0.1392*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0202)  (0.0157) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
MFI experience  -0.0135** -0.0165** -0.0150**  -0.0046 -0.0086 -0.0067 
  (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0066)  (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.9563*** -0.9650*** -0.8883***  -0.7324*** -0.9403*** -0.8347*** 
  (0.1736) (0.1873) (0.1908)  (0.1569) (0.1692) (0.1714) 
Equity/assets  0.1710*** 0.2230*** 0.2196***  0.0830* 0.1114** 0.1100** 
  (0.0500) (0.0565) (0.0564)  (0.0484) (0.0535) (0.0532) 
Loan/assets  0.3064*** 0.3015*** 0.2803***  0.2565*** 0.1981*** 0.1812*** 
  (0.0746) (0.0755) (0.0758)  (0.0640) (0.0648) (0.0647) 
Urban market  0.1257*** 0.0877 0.0794  0.2613*** 0.2284*** 0.2192*** 
  (0.0471) (0.0533) (0.0533)  (0.0410) (0.0478) (0.0477) 
Group lending  0.1987* 0.1645 0.1507  -0.1812* -0.2575** -0.2696** 
  (0.1105) (0.1173) (0.1172)  (0.1049) (0.1087) (0.1081) 
Individual lending  -0.0330 -0.0971 -0.0797  -0.0841 -0.1400* -0.1170 
  (0.0732) (0.0820) (0.0820)  (0.0729) (0.0766) (0.0766) 
GDP growth   0.0043* 0.0039   0.0059** 0.0056** 
   (0.0026) (0.0026)   (0.0024) (0.0024) 
GDP per person   0.3497*** 0.3776***   0.1475 0.1809 
   (0.1240) (0.1242)   (0.1139) (0.1138) 
Inflation    -0.1844 -0.1713   -0.6963*** -0.6975*** 
   (0.1749) (0.1747)   (0.1653) (0.1645) 
Regulation     -0.1077**    -0.1204*** 
    (0.0425)    (0.0391) 




 (0.0088) (0.2293) (0.9743) (0.9791) (0.0089) (0.2239) (0.8960) (0.8988) 
Observations 1,513 1,108 905 900 1,515 1,119 932 927 
Number of MFIs 385 343 273 271 383 346 284 282 
R-squared 0.003 0.181 0.202 0.211 0.001 0.258 0.280 0.291 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where OSS and FSS are regressed on Share-non with(out) controls.  OSS is operational self-sustainability 
(models 17 to 20), FSS is financial self-sustainability (models 21 to 24) and Share-non is a ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue. MFI size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears 
over 30 days, Equity/Assets is the ratio of equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban 
areas as main market, 0 = otherwise. Group lending = 1 if the MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual 
loans are offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of 
Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is the annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is 
regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
















Table 7: Effects of revenue diversification on profitability of microfinance institutions 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Variables Returns on assets Returns on equity 
Share-non -0.0061 0.0276 0.0452** 0.0424** 0.0240 0.1125** 0.1244** 0.1195** 
 (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0473) (0.0537) (0.0602) (0.0607) 
MFI size  0.0148*** 0.0155*** 0.0165***  0.0527*** 0.0551*** 0.0566*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0039)  (0.0088) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
MFI experience  -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013  -0.0066** -0.0074** -0.0074** 
  (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Portfolio at risk  -0.1677*** -0.2078*** -0.2104***  -0.6912*** -0.9014*** -0.9118*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0348) (0.0351)  (0.0837) (0.0975) (0.0985) 
Equity/assets  0.0540*** 0.0444*** 0.0445***  -0.0020 0.0167 0.0207 
  (0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0106)  (0.0274) (0.0305) (0.0309) 
Loan/assets  0.0999*** 0.0862*** 0.0861***  0.1971*** 0.1770*** 0.1787*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0152)  (0.0390) (0.0430) (0.0436) 
Urban market  0.0116* 0.0172** 0.0179**  0.0482** 0.0403* 0.0405* 
  (0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0083)  (0.0197) (0.0239) (0.0240) 
Group lending  0.0135 -0.0061 -0.0026  0.0610 0.0441 0.0447 
  (0.0172) (0.0201) (0.0203)  (0.0492) (0.0565) (0.0570) 
Individual lending  0.0020 -0.0181 -0.0139  0.0210 -0.0009 -0.0007 
  (0.0158) (0.0185) (0.0188)  (0.0458) (0.0519) (0.0526) 
GDP growth   0.0014*** 0.0012**   0.0017 0.0016 
   (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP per person   0.0018 0.0071   0.0413 0.0368 
   (0.0245) (0.0250)   (0.0688) (0.0701) 
Inflation    -0.0201 -0.0254   -0.1329 -0.1409 
   (0.0337) (0.0341)   (0.0954) (0.0965) 
Regulation     -0.0146*    0.0005 
    (0.0087)    (0.0245) 




 (0.0017) (0.0437) (0.1946) (0.1987) (0.0046) (0.1282) (0.5470) (0.5584) 
Observations 2,921 2,141 1,664 1,638 2,808 2,066 1,624 1,599 
Number of MFIs 590 513 420 416 548 482 409 404 
R-squared 0.000 0.089 0.104 0.110 0.000 0.101 0.137 0.140 
Notes: This table lists fixed effects regression results where ROA and ROE are regressed on Share-non with(out) controls.  ROA is returns on assets (models 25 
to 28), ROE is returns on equity (models 29 to 32) and Share-non is a ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets, MFI experience is number of years the institution has operated as an  MFI, Portfolio at Risk is proportion of loan portfolio in arrears over 30 days, 
Equity/Assets is the ratio of equity to total assets, Loan/Assets is the ratio of loans to total assets,  and Urban market =1 if MFI emphasizes urban areas as main 
market, 0 = otherwise. Group lending = 1 if MFI adopts solidarity group lending method, 0= otherwise, and individual lending = 1 if individual loans are 
offered, 0= otherwise.  GDP per person is the country’s Gross Domestic Product per person (in log) and GDP growth is the annual growth rate of Gross 
Domestic Product. Inflation is the annual consumer price index and Regulation is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the institution is regulated by 
banking authorities and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  







4. Conclusion  
The academic literature presents two conflicting theories about the extent to which 
financial institutions could expand their operations. Modern portfolio and banking 
theories suggest diversification premium while agency theory argues that it is value 
destroying for a firm to diversify. Thus, it is better to focus in order to reduce agency 
costs. However, since there is empirical evidence supporting each view, the question 
this study asks is, which view is appropriate for microfinance institutions? 
Thus, this paper investigates the effects of revenue diversification on the financial 
performance of MFIs. Using fixed effects estimator, we find evidence that 
diversification premium exists for microfinance institutions. Precisely, diversification 
across revenue streams improves both sustainability and profitability of MFIs.  
The findings imply that microfinance practitioners could expand and sustain their 
revenue generating activities in order to take advantage of diversification benefits. Once 
an institution is self-sustainable, it is in a better position to meet its core objective of 
financial inclusion since more resources could be amassed to effectively serve poor 
people.  
A limitation for this paper is that, since the data is based on rating reports, there can 
be self-selection bias as MFIs that chose to be rated are those included in the sample. In 
order to access external funding, MFIs may choose to be rated and in the process, they 
might massage some information just be included in the rating assessment. Therefore, 
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Table A1: Distribution of number of microfinance institutions by country 
# Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs 
1 Albania 3 30 Mexico 31 59 Tajikistan 11 
2 Argentina 2 31 Moldova 2 60 Croatia 1 
3 Armenia 6 32 Morocco 8 61 Chad 3 
4 Benin 8 33 Nicaragua 14 62 Rwanda 12 
5 Bolivia 17 34 Pakistan 2 63 Zambia 3 
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 35 Paraguay 2 64 China 5 
7 Brazil 14 36 Peru 40 65 Serbia 2 
8 Bulgaria 3 37 Philippines 22 66 Ghana 5 
9 Burkina Faso 9 38 Romania 7 67 Malawi 2 
10 Cambodia 14 39 Russia 17 68 Gambia 1 
11 Chile 2 40 Senegal 12 69 Kosovo 5 
12 Colombia 14 41 South Africa 4 70 Congo 1 
13 Dominican Republic 7 42 Sri Lanka 2 71 Burundi 6 
14 Ecuador 20 43 Tanzania 8 72 Niger 8 
15 Egypt 6 44 Togo 5 73 Dem. Rep. Congo 1 
16 El Salvador 7 45 Trinidad and Tobago 1 74 Afghanistan 2 
17 Ethiopia 10 46 Tunisia 1 75 Costa Rica 3 
18 Georgia 8 47 Uganda 25 76 Lebanon 2 
19 Guatemala 8 48 Montenegro 2 77 Turkey 1 
20 Haiti 3 49 Cameroon 5 78 Palestine 3 
21 Honduras 13 50 Guinea 3 79 Comoros 1 
22 India 32 51 Timor 1 80 Italy 3 
23 Indonesia 4 52 Bangladesh 2 81 Samoa 1 
24 Jordan 3 53 Nepal 5 82 Sierra Leone 1 
25 Kazakhstan 8 54 Vietnam 4 83 South Sudan 1 
26 Kenya 18 55 Azerbaijan 9 84 United Kingdom 1 
27 Kyrgyz Republic 9 56 Mongolia 4 85 Yemen 1 
28 Madagascar 3 57 Nigeria 6 86 Angola 1 
29 Mali 11 58 Mozambique 1 87 Macedonia 1 











Table A2: Effects of revenue diversification on financial performance of microfinance institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable OSS FSS ROA ROE OSS FSS ROA ROE 
Share-non 0.1783* 0.0385 0.0424** 0.1195**     
 (0.0978) (0.0891) (0.0212) (0.0607)     
DIV     0.1116 0.0296 0.0287* 0.0708 
     (0.0763) (0.0684) (0.0163) (0.0464) 
MFI size 0.1084*** 0.1392*** 0.0165*** 0.0566*** 0.1099*** 0.1389*** 0.0162*** 0.0546*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0039) (0.0110) (0.0201) (0.0188) (0.0039) (0.0109) 
MFI experience -0.0150** -0.0067 -0.0013 -0.0074** -0.0143** -0.0072 -0.0010 -0.0068* 
 (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0035) 
Portfolio at risk -0.888*** -0.8347*** -0.2104*** -0.9118*** -0.8534*** -0.8061*** -0.2222*** -0.9239*** 
 (0.1908) (0.1714) (0.0351) (0.0985) (0.1891) (0.1705) (0.0355) (0.0987) 
Equity/assets 0.2196*** 0.1100** 0.0445*** 0.0207 0.2229*** 0.1072** 0.0483*** 0.0270 
 (0.0564) (0.0532) (0.0106) (0.0309) (0.0563) (0.0532) (0.0108) (0.0311) 
Loan/assets 0.2803*** 0.1812*** 0.0861*** 0.1787*** 0.2749*** 0.2045*** 0.0757*** 0.1594*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0647) (0.0152) (0.0436) (0.0757) (0.0634) (0.0151) (0.0429) 
Urban market 0.0794 0.2192*** 0.0179** 0.0405* 0.0740 0.2110*** 0.0145* 0.0339 
 (0.0533) (0.0477) (0.0083) (0.0240) (0.0531) (0.0477) (0.0084) (0.0241) 
Group lending 0.1507 -0.2696** -0.0026 0.0447 0.1521 -0.2647** -0.0014 0.0475 
 (0.1172) (0.1081) (0.0203) (0.0570) (0.1171) (0.1083) (0.0206) (0.0573) 
Individual lending -0.0797 -0.1170 -0.0139 -0.0007 -0.0766 -0.1146 -0.0129 0.0031 
 (0.0820) (0.0766) (0.0188) (0.0526) (0.0819) (0.0766) (0.0191) (0.0529) 
GDP growth 0.0039 0.0056** 0.0012** 0.0016 0.0038 0.0051** 0.0013** 0.0018 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
GDP per person 0.3776*** 0.1809 0.0071 0.0368 0.3686*** 0.1734 0.0085 0.0433 
 (0.1242) (0.1138) (0.0250) (0.0701) (0.1240) (0.1139) (0.0253) (0.0704) 
Inflation  -0.1713 -0.6975*** -0.0254 -0.1409 -0.1678 -0.7559*** -0.0063 -0.1127 
 (0.1747) (0.1645) (0.0341) (0.0965) (0.1745) (0.1616) (0.0343) (0.0962) 




 (0.0425) (0.0391) (0.0087) (0.0245) (0.0424) (0.0391) (0.0088) (0.0246) 
Constant -3.842*** -2.6370*** -0.3441* -1.1480** -3.7968*** -2.5759*** -0.3490* -1.1698** 
 (0.9791) (0.8988) (0.1987) (0.5584) (0.9780) (0.8996) (0.2020) (0.5619) 
Observations 900 927 1,638 1,599 903 931 1,648 1,609 
Number of MFIs 271 282 416 404 270 282 417 405 
R-squared 0.211 0.291 0.110 0.140 0.209 0.288 0.107 0.137 
Breusch: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman: p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.3217 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.4303 0.0059 
Notes: This table lists the results of fixed effects regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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This paper examines the impact of microfinance ‘plus’ (i.e., coordinated combination 
of financial and nonfinancial services) on the performance of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). Using a global data set of MFIs in 77 countries, we find that the provision of 
nonfinancial services does not harm nor improve MFIs’ financial sustainability and 
efficiency. The results however suggest that the provision of social services is 
associated with improved loan quality and greater depth of outreach.  
 Keywords: Microfinance ‘plus’; Business development services; Outreach; Financial 
sustainability 









1. Introduction  
Microfinance aims at providing financial services to low income households and 
microenterprises who have been excluded from traditional banking. The achievement 
of this goal has been universally recognized (Balkenhol & Hudon, 2011; Biosca, 
Lenton, & Mosley, 2014).  Beside this primary social mission of financial inclusion, 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) also seek to remain financially sustainable. According 
to Morduch (1999), this is the “win-win” solution of microfinance. Thus, MFIs are 
hybrid organizations pursuing both social and financial objectives. Like banks MFIs 
should be profitable or at least break-even, and like social organizations MFIs should 
reach out to unbanked clients and enhance their welfare.  
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the provision of financial services to 
microentrepreneurs was often done alongside nonfinancial services (social and business 
development services) (Goldmark, 2006). The social services focused on improving 
clients’ welfare while the business development services were offered to teach the 
clients basic financial management principles. This was believed to enhance clients’ 
business success and thereby improve MFI’s loan quality. This belief was however not 
supported by early studies such as Kilby and D'Zmura (1985) and Boomgard (1989).  
 While some MFIs continue to deliver nonfinancial services in recent times, many 
others have phased out the practice since the late 1990s (Goldmark, 2006). The focus 
on only financial services (minimalist model) could among other things be attributed to 
low impact of the training programs and pressure to commercialize microfinance. Often 
the training programs are counter-productive because they are either of low quality or 
do not meet the specific needs of the poor (Goldmark, 2006; Yunus, 2007). 
 Moreover, proponents of the minimalist approach argue that access to credit alone 
is enough for the poor to work themselves out of poverty. For instance, Dr Muhammad 
Yunus, a renowned pioneer of microfinance, states that “rather than waste our time 
teaching them new skills, we try to make maximum use of their existing skills. Giving 
the poor access to credit allows them to immediately put into practice the skills they 
already know” (Yunus, 2007, p. 225). Another argument for the minimalist approach is 
that, including ‘‘plus’’ services will have a negative influence on MFIs’ financial 
sustainability. This argument is related to the claimed trade-off between social mission 
and financial sustainability (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007, 2011; Hermes, 
Lensink, & Meesters, 2011). This can be described as a “win-loss” situation for the 
clients and MFIs respectively. 
 However, the minimalist approach has been reassessed (Lanao-Flores & Serres, 
2009) with an increasing conclusion that the “microcredit, by itself, is usually not 
enough” (Reed, 2011, p. 1). To this end, some MFIs today still adopt the credit-plus 
model (what we call microfinance ‘plus’) by bundling financial and nonfinancial 
services to clients. A typical proponent of this model is Freedom from Hunger, a U.S.- 
based village banking organization. Proponents argue that, the credit-plus model 
maximizes MFIs’ social impact (Dunford, 2001).  
 About 27 percent of MFIs in our sample adopt a ‘plus’ model while the remaining 
73 percent follow the minimalist approach. The fact that some MFIs are specialized 
while others are ‘plus’ providers offers an interesting research setting. Thus, what we 
set out to study in this paper is to investigate whether the microfinance ‘plus’ model is 




social and financial objectives. This has not been addressed in the academic literature 
to the best of our knowledge. Empirical literature on the impact of microfinance ‘plus’ 
in general is very limited (Biosca et al., 2014). In addition, we adopt several estimation 
methods to address potential endogeneity.  
 The relevance of this study is demonstrated by recent concerns that the client’s 
impact of accessing stand-alone credit has been overstated (Angelucci, Karlan, & 
Zinman, 2015; Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2015). These studies imply that 
providing only microcredit as a solution to poverty is probably not adequate. According 
to Armendáriz and Morduch (2010), poor households benefit from a combination of 
services, rather than the simple provision of credit. Similarly, Khandker (2005) argues 
that because poverty is multidimensional, poor people need access to a coordinated 
combination of both financial and nonfinancial services (e.g., business trainings) to 
overcome poverty. Such developmental services are crucial for making credit more 
productive and impactful for the clients.  
 The arguments for the importance of the microfinance ‘plus’ (maximalist) approach 
are further supported by several studies documenting improved clients’ impact when 
accessing credit in combination with nonfinancial services or ‘‘plus’’ services 
(Copestake, Bhalotra, & Johnson, 2001; Dunford, 2001; Halder, 2003; Karlan & 
Valdivia, 2011; McKernan, 2002; Noponen & Kantor, 2004; Smith, 2002). A main 
problem with these studies, in addition to being case studies with relatively little 
external validity, is that they focus on the impact of microfinance ‘plus’ on clients, 
without considering the outcomes for the MFIs. In contrast, this paper uses a global 
sample to investigate the potential influence of microfinance ‘plus’ on the MFIs’ 
performance. 
 Since controversies persist between the minimalist and maximalist approaches 
(Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Morduch, 2000),  it is the aim of this paper to provide 
policymakers and practitioners with informed information as to whether the provision 
of ‘‘plus’’ services influences the financial and social performance of MFIs.  To achieve 
this aim, the paper focuses on two main questions: (1) do MFIs that combine financial 
and nonfinancial services achieve better financial performance, in terms of financial 
sustainability, efficiency and portfolio quality, than MFIs that deliver only financial 
services? and (2) do microfinance ‘plus’ providers attain better social performance, in 
terms of outreach, than their specialist peers? 
 Using a unique sample of MFIs in 77 countries we find that there is no evidence of 
microfinance ‘plus’ influence on financial sustainability and efficiency. The results 
however indicate that MFIs that provide social services have higher repayment rates 
and greater depth of outreach than those that do not. Thus, bundling financial services 
with nonfinancial further enhance the outreach mission of MFIs (Dunford, 2001).  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the concept of microfinance 
‘plus’ and then provide a conceptual framework on the impact of such services on 
performance. This precedes the hypothesis development. Section 3 presents the data 
and the specific variables used in the estimation. Section 4 outlines the estimation 
procedure taking into account endogeneity concerns. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the empirical results while Section 6 concludes the paper with some remarks for 





2. Conceptual Framework: Influence of Microfinance ‘Plus’ 
on MFI Performance 
2.1 The Concept of Microfinance ‘plus’ 
Microfinance ‘plus’ services are any activities aside financial services (Goldmark, 
2006) targeted at improving both the welfare of poor people and their businesses. An 
overall understanding of the concept is relatively straightforward, but a more detailed 
explanation is also possible. For example, an MFI that provides savings, insurance, or 
money transfers together with loans is not involved in microfinance ‘plus’, because all 
these services are financial in nature. An MFI that provides informational sessions to 
potential clients or trains existing clients in the use of credit or the importance of 
repayment is not practicing microfinance ‘plus’, nor is an MFI that partners with another 
organization that provides clients with ‘plus’ services. Rather, a ‘plus’ service refers 
specifically to a nonfinancial service provided by the MFI itself. 
 Various MFIs offer a wide variety of ‘plus’ services, ranging from access to 
markets and business development services (BDS) to health provision and literacy 
training (Goldmark, 2006; Maes & Foose, 2006). In most cases, these ‘plus’ services 
are either BDS or social services (Goldmark, 2006). The former aims to boost 
competitiveness by improving productivity, product design, service delivery or market 
access (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). These services include (but not limited to) 
management or vocational skills trainings, technical and marketing assistance 
(Goldmark, 2006; Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). Social services (e.g. health, nutrition, 
education, etc.) on the other hand are intended to raise the general welfare of clients.  
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework for the Effects of Microfinance ‘plus’ 
Empirical studies on the impact of microfinance ‘plus’ programs on microenterprises 
are limited (Biosca et al., 2014). One of the earliest studies that evaluated the influence 
of ‘plus’ services in microfinance is McKernan (2002) who finds positive effect of such 
services on clients’ profitability. Other impact studies include Smith ( 2002) Bjorvatn 
and Tungodden (2010), Karlan and Valdivia (2011), McKenzie and Woodruff (2013), 
among others. The findings of these and other studies range from no significant impact 
of microfinance ‘plus’ to mixed effects.  However, what seem not to be taken into 
account is that nonfinancial services have the potential to influence not only the 
outcome for the clients but may also influence the performance of the MFI (Sievers & 
Vandenberg, 2007). 
  Thus, this study examines the influence of microfinance ‘plus’ on the institution 
itself and not on the clients. Although no clear-cut theory exists on the link between 
microfinance ‘plus’ and performance, we can use different theories from extant 
literature to derive a framework that demonstrates potential outcomes of microfinance 
‘plus’ (Figure 1). Specifically, we argue that microfinance ‘plus’ services may have 
both positive and negative outcomes on the performance of MFIs.  By providing ‘plus’ 
services, an MFI could benefit from client loyalty, potential clients, high repayment 
rates, self-sustainability, better social outreach, and greater access to client information 
(see top of Figure 1). On the other hand, the microfinance ‘plus’ model comes with 
some challenges for the provider. Among other things, the MFI may suffer from 





Figure 1: Effects of microfinance ‘plus’ on microfinance institutions’ performance. 













 Client loyalty. A key benefit of adding ‘plus’ services to microfinance is the 
stimulation of client loyalty (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). If the ‘plus’ services 
improve client satisfaction, they should help increase retention rates. Such an increase 
in retention rate was confirmed by Karlan and Valdivia (2011) in their randomized 
control trial study from Peru. Another example from Financiera Solucion, also shows 
that the institution benefits from including management training because it can better 
retain clients (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007) which is, of course, beneficial for the MFI 
(Reichheld, 1996).  
 Potential clients. MFIs providing nonfinancial services have the opportunity to earn 
a comparative advantage in terms of attracting new clients (Khandker, 2005; Paul 
Mosley & Hulme, 1998) especially in the increasing competition in microfinance 
markets (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005). Attracting more clients improves the financial 
sustainability of the MFI because of scale economies (Hartarska, Shen, & Mersland, 
2013). And, obviously, having more clients could be equated with greater breadth of 
microfinance outreach mission.  
 High repayment rates. Microfinance ‘plus’ can help reduce the risk of default. 
Relevant training programs could for example increase the clients’ business success and 
trainings on how to invest loans could help borrowers avoid using loans for 
consumption purpose rather than productive activities (Marconi & Mosley, 2006). For 
instance, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) find some evidence of improved repayment rates 
arising from microfinance ‘plus’. Giné and Mansuri (2014) however do not find 
evidence of improved repayment rates following clients’ participation in business 
training programs. 
 Self-sustainability. Since borrowers are normally limited by their lack of business 
knowledge, they often end up doing petty trade where even negative return on capital 
• Increased costs  
• Additional resources required  
• Lower client retention  
 
• Customer loyalty  
• Potential customers  
• High repayment rates  
• Financial self-sustainability  
• Greater social outreach  
• Access to client information  
 







is a possible outcome (De Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2008). ‘Plus’ services may 
motivate better investments with higher potential returns which could enhance loan 
repayment rates. Likewise, with improved human capital, the clients may be able to 
service bigger loans which enhances the financial performance of MFIs (Hartarska et 
al., 2013).  Finally, ‘plus’ services might be offered for a fee, resulting in a positive 
profit margin for the MFI (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007).  
 Greater social outreach. By providing ‘plus’ services an MFI maximizes its social 
mission with a wide range of social services such as health education (Dunford, 2001). 
Although MFIs aim to reach poor people, most of them access the ‘upper poor’ more 
than the ‘very poor’ (P. Mosley, 2001). In addition, pressure from governments and 
donors to ensure financial sustainability leads many MFIs to ignore social protection 
objectives and target less risky clients. Therefore, a major argument in support of the 
microfinance ‘plus’ approach is that it might enable MFIs to reach poorer and more 
vulnerable clients compared to the minimalist model (Halder, 2003; Maes & Foose, 
2006).  After all, other antipoverty modalities including primary health and education 
may be more effective than microfinance when wishing to enhance the welfare of the 
poorest sectors (P. Mosley, 2001). Of course, providing ‘plus’ services is not devoid of 
potential disadvantages for the MFI as outlined in the following.  
 Increased costs. The microfinance ‘plus’ approach may come with additional 
operational and administrative costs for the MFI. A study of four Freedom from Hunger 
affiliates reveals that the direct cost of including learning sessions, related to family, 
health, nutrition, business development and self-confidence, accounted for between 4.7 
and 10 percent of each MFI’s operational costs (Vor der Bruegge, Dickey, & Dunford, 
1999).  Also Dunford (2001) documents that combining financial and education 
services offers benefits for borrowers but increases the costs for the MFI.  
 Additional resources required. The provision of ‘plus’ services requires additional 
resources (e.g., time, money, staff, etc.) from the institution. It increases administrative 
burdens and may distract managers and other staff from credit administration, which 
could decrease repayment rates (Berger, 1989). Since many MFIs are already struggling 
to be financially self-sustainable, adopting the maximalist model may make them 
worse-off. Probably, the difficulty in being self-sustainable makes some MFIs unwilling 
to incorporate nonfinancial services into their business models. 
 Lower client retention. Just as the provision of specific and relevant ‘plus’ services 
could lead to client loyalty, poor quality or irrelevance of such services could also lead 
to client dissatisfaction.  Some evidence shows that microfinance borrowers do not 
consider training useful and do not retain or apply their acquired knowledge, such that 
time spent in training appears to be an opportunity cost for credit (Goldmark, 2006). In 
this regards, dissatisfied clients are more likely to stop doing business with ‘plus’ 
providers (Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). On the other hand, the positive outcomes of 
business training on clients’ business success may also result in reduced client retention 
because successful microenterprises may progress to the formal banking sector (Karlan 
& Valdivia, 2011).  
 Based on the conceptual framework above, we formulate our hypotheses. Given 
that providers of ‘plus’ services benefit from client loyalty, possibility to attract new 




that MFIs providing ‘plus’ services are likely to perform financially better than 
specialized MFIs. 
  Second, there is some evidence that ‘plus’ services, especially BDS, may improve 
the creditworthiness of borrowers resulting in higher repayment rates (e.g., Karlan and 
Valdivia 2011). Therefore, we hypothesize that repayment rates in MFIs providing 
‘plus’ services are higher than those in specialized MFIs. Since the positive 
creditworthiness effect probably holds only for BDS providers, and not for SS ‘plus’ 
providers, we hypothesize that BDS ‘plus’ providers are more effective in improving 
financial performance than SS ‘plus’ providers.  
 Third, many studies (e.g., Vor der Bruegge et al. 1999, Dunford 2001) suggest that 
‘plus’ services come with additional costs for the institutions. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that ‘plus’ providers will experience higher costs ratios than specialists. 
 Finally, we hypothesize that ‘plus’ providers perform better socially than MFIs 
providing only financial services. Moreover, to distinguish which ‘plus’ services lead 
to higher social performance, we hypothesize that the social performance of SS 
providers is better than for BDS providers. However, we must highlight that there are 
potential trade-offs between social and financial performance of MFIs (Cull et al., 2011) 
which could become evident in our results.  
 
 
3. Data and Variables Definitions 
3.1 Data 
The dataset is hand-collected from rating reports from the five leading rating agencies 
in the microfinance industry; i.e. Microrate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-
CRIL. The rating reports are narratives consisting of contextual and MFI specific 
information including accounting details, organizational features and benchmarks. The 
reports are not fully standardized and therefore differ in their emphasis and in the 
amount of information available. The result is that not all reports have information on 
all variables. When necessary, all numbers in the dataset have been annualized and 
dollarized using the official exchange rates from the given time. Overall, we use 
observations of 478 rated MFIs from 77 countries6 spanning the period 1998–2012.  
 No dataset is perfectly representative of the microfinance field. Ours contains 
relatively fewer mega-sized MFIs and does not cover all small savings and credit 
cooperatives. The former are rated by agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; 
the latter are not rated by these traditional agencies. However, our use of rating reports 
should be relevant for studying the effects of microfinance ‘plus’, because MFIs that 
are rated have a common interest in accessing funding and increasing their 
sustainability. The data set includes specialists and providers of ‘plus’ services, so it 
enables meaningful comparisons. For a further description of the dataset please see 










3.2 Variables definitions 
Dependent variables 
We focus on financial sustainability, efficiency and portfolio quality as measures of 
financial performance and outreach as a measure of the social performance of MFIs.  
 Financial sustainability measures. We consider the operational self-sufficiency 
ratio (OSS) as a main indicator of financial performance. This ratio demonstrates the 
ability of MFIs to be fully sustainable in the long run, in the sense that they can cover 
all their operating costs and maintain the value of their capital. As a robustness check, 
we include financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and return on assets (ROA). Operational 
self-sufficiency, financial self-sufficiency and return on assets have been used widely 
to measure the financial sustainability of MFIs (Cull et al., 2007, 2011; Mersland & 
Strøm, 2009). 
 Efficiency measures. We use four indicators for efficiency. The operating expense 
ratio which measures the MFI’s operating expenses compared with the annual average 
loan portfolio. A decrease in this ratio implies an increase in efficiency. Since MFIs 
offering small loans will look worse than MFIs offering large loans we also include the 
cost per client variable (Rosenberg, 2009). Next, we employ the ratio of credit clients 
per loan officer as well as credit clients per staff member to evaluate how ‘plus’ 
activities influence the employment of personnel resources in the MFI.    
 Loan portfolio quality measures.  We use two indicators of portfolio quality. First, 
the portfolio at risk beyond 30 days (PAR30) reveals the potential for future losses 
based on the current performance of the portfolio. Second, the write-off ratio measures 
the actual amount of loans that have been written off as unrecoverable during a given 
period of time, in relation to the outstanding loan portfolio. The variables have been 
used in previous studies   (D'Espallier, Guerin, & Mersland, 2011). 
 Social performance measures. To evaluate social performance, we use three 
indicators of outreach: number of clients, average loan size and percentage of women 
clients. First, the number of clients serves as a proxy for the ‘breadth of outreach’ 
(Rosenberg, 2009; Schreiner, 2002).  For the ‘depth of outreach’, i.e. economic poverty 
level of the clients, we apply  average loan size and share of female borrowers. We 
recognize that average loan size and share of female borrowers are rough proxies for 
‘depth of outreach’ (for a discussion of their shortcomings see Armendariz and Szafarz, 
2011), still the most commonly used variables to measure clients poverty level  (Ahlin, 
Lin, & Maio, 2011; Cull et al., 2007; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009; Hermes 
et al., 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Schreiner, 2002).  
 
Independent variables 
We distinguish three types of MFI services: (1) specialized financial services only, (2) 
financial services and BDS and (3) financial services and social services (SS). We 
include BDS and SS dummies, as well as a constant in our estimates. BDS equals 1 if 
the MFI provides business development services and 0 otherwise. Similarly, SS equals 
1 if the MFI provides social services and 0 otherwise. 
 
Control variables 
To control for macroeconomic institutional differences we include annual percentage 




(GDP growth) and inflation (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; Lensink & 
Hermes, 2004). To further control for country influence we include the countries’ scores 
on the human development index (HDI). HDI is a composite index that combines three 
dimensions of human development: education, economy and life expectancy. Finally, 
we include regional as well time dummies in all estimations.  
 To control for MFI-specific characteristics, we include number of credit officers 
since the number of field officers may be driving the results and not the ‘plus’ service 
itself. We further control for the size by including the total assets of the MFI. The 
lending methodology, either group based or individual has the potential to influence 
efficiency levels, repayment as well as outreach, thus we include group lending as a 
control variable  regarding the repayment of credits (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 
1999). It enhances the repayment rates due to peer pressure from other group members 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). Furthermore, it is cost-efficient to offer group loans due to scale 
economies. Group loans are less risky than are those offered to individuals because of 
better screening, monitoring, auditing and enforcement (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). 
Thus, we expect MFIs offering group loans to have improved portfolio quality and high 
efficiency than those offering individual loans.  Also, in line with Mersland, Randøy, 
and Strøm (2011) and Mersland, D’espallier, and Supphellen (2013), we control for 
MFI experience (age), whether the MFI is a member of an international network, and 
whether it was initiated by a religious organization. Finally, we control for the 
organizational form of the MFI (NGO, Bank, Cooperative, and Non-Bank financial 


























Operational self-sufficiency Operating revenue / (Financial expense + loan loss 
provision expense + operating expense) 
Financial self-sufficiency Adjusted operating revenue / adjusted (financial 
expense + loan loss provision expense + operating 
expense) 
Return on Assets Net operating income / average total assets 
Portfolio at risk (PAR30) Portfolio at Risk > 30 days/ loan portfolio 
Write-off ratio Write-off of loans / loan portfolio 
Clients Number of  active clients  
Average loan size Amount issued in the period / Number of issued loans 
Women Percentage of female clients 
Operating expense ratio Operating expenses/ loan portfolio 
Cost per client ratio Operating expenses/ number of active clients 
Staff productivity Number of active borrowers/ Number of staff 
Loan officer productivity Number of active borrowers / Number of loan officers 
BDS 1 if business development services, 0 otherwise  
SS 1 if MFI provides social services, 0 otherwise  
Group lending 1 if MFI uses group lending methodology, 0 otherwise  
MFI experience (age) Number of years the MFI has  been in operation 
Credit officers Number of credit officers at the end of year 
Assets  Total assets of the MFI 
Bank 1 if a MFI is registered as a bank, 0 otherwise 
Nonbank 1 if a MFI is non-financial institution, 0 otherwise 
NGO 1 if non-governmental organization, 0 otherwise 
Coop 1 if a MFI is registered as a cooperative, 0 otherwise 
International network 1 if the MFI is member of an international network, 0 
otherwise 
Religious organization 1 if the MFI was initiated by an organization with a 
religious agenda, 0 otherwise 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth (constant 2005) 
HDI Human Development Index 




4. Estimation Approach  
We employ panel data modelling to examine the potential effects of microfinance ‘plus’ 
on the financial and social performance of MFIs. Thus, we specify our panel model as 
follows: 
             𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                  (1)                                          
 
where the dependent variable yijt is a measure of financial and social performance of the 
ith MFI located in country jth at time t, and β0 is a constant term.  BDSijt  equals 1 if the 
ith MFI is a ‘plus’ provider that integrates BDS and 0 if it is a specialist or a ‘plus’ 
provider that integrates social services in country j at time t; SSijt equals 1 if the ith MFI 
is a ‘plus’ provider of social services and 0 if it is a specialist or ‘plus’ provider that 
integrates BDS in country j at time t. Furthermore, Mjt is a vector of control variables 
describing the macroeconomic environment in country j at time t; MFijt is a vector of 
control variables describing the features of the ith MFI in county jth at time t;  is the 
MFI’s individual unobserved effects; and εijt is mean-zero errors. 
 First, we use the random effects model (RE) because our main variables of interest 
(i.e., BDS and SS) are time invariant and  a fixed effects model (FE) is impossible. 
However, the rejections of  Hausman test null hypothesis in our results show that FE is 
consistent. Since FE is not appropriate time-invariant variables, our second estimator is 
the Hausman-Taylor’s (HT). This estimator distinguishes between regressors that are 
uncorrelated with FEs and those that are potentially correlated with them. Hausman and 
Taylor (1981) suggest using an economics intuition to determine which variables should 
be treated as potentially correlated with the FE. The model also distinguishes time-
varying from time-invariant regressors. It is specified as follows. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽2+𝑊1𝑖𝑗𝛾1 + 𝑊2𝑖𝑗𝛾2 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                             (2) 
where the dependent variable yijt is a measure of performance of the ith MFI located in 
country j at time t; β0 is a constant term; X denotes time-varying regressors: Inflation, 
GDP growth, MFI size, MFI experience, Credit officers, HDI, and W denote time-
invariant regressors; International network, Religious organization, BDS, SS, Group 
lending, Coop, bank, NGO, non-bank and  are MFI-specific unobserved effects; and 
εijt is idiosyncratic errors. Regressors with subscripts 1 are uncorrelated with , whereas 
those with subscripts 2 are specified as correlated with . All regressors are assumed 
uncorrelated with εijt .7  
 The MFI’s choice to integrate financial and ‘plus’ services depends substantially 
on its specific characteristics. Therefore, we treat BDS and SS as endogenous. We 
similarly assume that group lending is endogenous and must be instrumented. The same 
holds for the number of credit officers. Group lending offers an excellent platform for 
the delivery of ‘plus’ services alongside microfinance (MkNelly, Watetip, Lassen, & 
Dunford, 1996). The decision to provide individual or group lending also depends on 
 
7The Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator assumes that the exogenous variables serve as their own 









the presence of some MFI-specific characteristics. The remaining control variables are 
treated as exogenous.  
 The validity of instruments used in the Hausman-Taylor model is tested by Sargan-
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of this test is that the 
instruments are valid. If the test results reject the null hypothesis (which is the case in 
this study), it suggests that there are endogeneity problems other than fixed effects.  This 
leads us to the use of Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM (generalised method of 
moments) estimator which uses lagged differences of the dependent variable as 
instruments for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of dependent variable 
for equations in the first differences (Baltagi, 2013).  
 
  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2  presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in the estimations. On 
average, an MFI can cover operational costs from revenue 1.13 times, indicating that 
the MFI is self-sustainable. However, OSS does not depict the intrinsic self-
sustainability of the MFI because of the presence of subsidies and that is what FSS 
corrects. The mean value for FSS is 0.95 which shows that on average, MFIs in our 
sample are not financially self-sustainable. Returns on assets has a mean value of 2.4 
percent. In terms of outreach, the average MFI has about 15000 clients of which 66 
percent are women and the average loan size 1.3 times GDP per capita. With respect to 
loan quality, on average, about 6 percent of the total loan portfolio is in arrears over 30 
days and 1.4 percent is written off as loan loss. Concerning efficiency dimension, an 
MFI has on average, operational costs of 25 percent of gross loan portfolio, cost per 















Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Operational self-sufficiency 1.128241 0.3678306 0.075 2.96 
Financial self-sufficiency  0.9484163 0.3047077 0.063 3.469 
Return on assets 0.0240719 0.0858322 -0.373 0.373 
Number of clients  15008.51 18951.42 24 98639 
Average loan size  1.296353 2.826229 0.027 35.72 
Percentage of women  0.6646034 0.2601223 0.000 1.000 
Portfolio at risk  0.0601583 0.0689986 0.001 0.39 
Write-off ratio 0.0135395 0.0196164 0.000 0.099 
Write-off ratio (log) -5.053952 1.616904 -6.907 0.948 
Operating expense ratio  0.2458689 0.1269165 0.016 0.6 
Cost per client 118.648 107.004 0.242 574.99 
Borrowers per staff member 132.1854 111.304 1 1893 
Borrowers per loan officer  272.4617 159.7607 3 989 
Assets  11301397.26 24831411.8 19288 279350816 
MFI age 9.782793 5.828356 0 29 
Group lending 0.1923767 0.3942558 0 1 
Credit officers 38.10859 39.05367 1 199 
International network 0.3729858 0.483713 0 1 
Religious organization 0.1685289 0.3744224 0 1 
BDS 0.2524664 0.4345248 0 1 
SS 0.2699552 0.4440358 0 1 
Bank  0.0483496 0.2145538 0 1 
Nonbank  0.2924221 0.454981 0 1 
NGO 0.5099954 0.5000163 0 1 
Coop  0.1338912 0.3406146 0 1 
GDP growth 5.206064 3.175086 -14.149 17.33 
Inflation  0.0611677 0.0487948 -0.185 0.287 
HDI 0.6060426 0.1358599 0.058 0.806 
 
 Furthermore, about 25 and 26 percent of MFIs offer business development and 
social services respectively. The average MFI has about: USD 11.3 million of total 
assets, 10 years of industry experience and 38 credit officers. Approximately 37 percent 
of the MFIs are members of an international network, 17 percent of them (MFIs) were 
started by religious organisations and 19 percent offer group loans only. In terms of 
legal status, about 51 percent of the MFIs are NGOs, 29 percent are nonbank financial 
institutions, 13 percent are cooperatives and 5 percent are banks. Finally, the mean 
values for GDP growth, inflation and HDI are 5.2 percent, 6.1 percent and 0.606 
respectively8. 
 
8 Testing (unreported) for multicollinearity problems indicates that none of the correlation values are above cut-
off point of 0.90 (Hair et al. 2010). The only correlation close to the cut-off point is that of BDS and SS (0.84) 





5.2 The Link between Microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI Performance: 
Random Effects  
First, we present the results of the RE estimator. Table 3 presents estimates of the effects 
of microfinance ‘plus’ on financial sustainability. The statistics show that we pass the 
Hausman’s test in models (1) and (2) as the p-values are greater than 0.05 but fail in 
model (3) because the p-value is less than 0.05. The Wald’s chi-squared test is 
significant showing that our models are correctly specified, and our regressors explain 
up to 27 percent of the variance of the outcome variables (model 2) and as low as 17 
percent (model 3). The results show that BDS and SS are statistically insignificant 
suggesting that they have no effect on the financial sustainability of MFIs.  
 As for the control variables we observe that HDI is negatively associated with the 
FSS while MFI size significantly enhances financial sustainability. As expected, 
inflation reduces financial self-sustainability of MFIs because it increases their cost of 
production. The results further indicate that MFIs with large number of loan officers 
tend to reduce financial sustainability in terms of OSS, FSS and ROA. Similarly, MFIs 
with religious orientation have lower financial sustainability compared to those without, 
while group lending is associated with increased ROA. Finally we observe that any 
ownership type is better than being state owned when it comes to financial 
sustainability. Finally, group lending is associated with increased returns on assets.  
 
Table 3: The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial sustainability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables OSS FSS ROA 
BDS 0.0089 -0.0214 -0.0067 
 (0.0333) (0.0270) (0.0095) 
SS -0.0060 0.0030 0.0072 
 (0.0292) (0.0249) (0.0097) 
HDI -0.2367 -0.2811** -0.0170 
 (0.1769) (0.1408) (0.0642) 
GDP growth 0.0023 0.0057* 0.0013 
 (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0010) 
MFI size 0.1342*** 0.1075*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0159) (0.0038) 
MFI experience -0.0069 -0.0072 0.0005 
 (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0007) 
Inflation  -0.1548 -0.7004*** 0.0737 
 (0.2662) (0.2398) (0.0677) 
Credit officers -0.0026*** -0.0017*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
International network -0.0399 0.0109 0.0003 
 (0.0471) (0.0358) (0.0086) 
Religious organization -0.0463 -0.0837* -0.0193* 
 (0.0534) (0.0430) (0.0100) 
NGO 0.3541 0.3995*** 0.0346 




Non-bank 0.2093 0.3175** 0.0170 
 (0.3557) (0.1261) (0.0459) 
Bank  0.3720 0.3933*** 0.0385 
 (0.3645) (0.1462) (0.0473) 
Coop  0.3281 0.4057*** 0.0306 
 (0.3565) (0.1368) (0.0466) 
Group lending 0.0447 0.0333 0.0187*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0264) (0.0065) 
Constant -0.8750* -0.7562*** -0.3634*** 
 (0.4797) (0.2712) (0.0853) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 628 654 1,104 
Number of MFIs 196 211 317 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.7758 0.4205 0.0016 
R-squared (overall) 0.2071 0.2658 0.1688 
Chi-squared   142.12*** 306.36*** 133.38*** 
Notes: This table lists Random effects results of the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial sustainability 
of MFIs. OSS is operational self-sustainability and measures the ability of MFI to cover its operational costs from 
revenue, FSS is financial self-sustainability and measures the ability of MFI to cover operational costs from 
revenue without subsidies and ROA is returns on assets. BDS=1 if MFI provides business development services, 
0=otherwise, and SS=1 if MFI provides social services, 0=otherwise. MFI size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets, MFI experience is the number of years the MFI has been in operation, and Credit officers is the number of 
credit officers at the end of the year. Group lending=1 if MFI offers group loans, 0= otherwise, International 
network=1 if MFI is a member of international network, 0=otherwise, Religious organisation=1 if MFI was started 
by a religious organisation, 0=otherwise. NGO =1 if the MFI is registered as a nongovernmental organisation, 0 
=otherwise, Non-bank =1 if the MFI is registered as a non-bank financial institution, 0 =otherwise, Bank =1 if the 
MFI is registered as a bank, 0 =otherwise, and Coop =1 if the MFI is registered as a cooperative, 0 =otherwise. 
GDP growth is the real annual Gross Domestic Product growth rate, Inflation is annual producer price index, and 
HDI is human development index. In parentheses are robust standard errors.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%  respectively. 
 
 Table 4 also presents RE results on the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and 
efficiency. Like in Table 3, BDS and SS are not significant and thus, have no effect on 













Table 4: The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI efficiency 









BDS 0.0046 -11.1686 -6.4027 -13.6241 
 (0.0092) (8.2730) (4.6786) (9.7459) 
SS -0.0006 7.3049 1.8171 1.3546 
 (0.0102) (7.2725) (4.6595) (10.1066) 
HDI -0.1051 100.1630 84.3848* 61.4425 
 (0.0999) (76.6951) (44.5177) (117.7688) 
GDP growth 0.0010 -1.8255** 0.6072 0.8140 
 (0.0011) (0.7907) (0.6034) (1.3391) 
MFI size -0.0551*** 12.6214* 16.3686*** 39.5467*** 
 (0.0066) (6.7782) (3.6843) (7.1674) 
MFI experience -0.0009 0.2095 0.7911 1.9210 
 (0.0015) (1.2514) (0.8511) (1.7786) 
Inflation  -0.0367 -6.5753 -82.5389** -165.1948* 
 (0.0876) (62.6171) (41.7542) (86.9073) 
Credit officers 0.0006*** -0.3000** -0.2736** -1.2017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.1443) (0.1184) (0.2305) 
International network 0.0463*** -8.9624 21.2268** 58.0469*** 
 (0.0147) (10.9173) (9.9890) (19.0053) 
Religious organization -0.0235 -6.6840 26.6914* 17.3264 
 (0.0167) (13.1452) (15.0120) (23.1394) 
NGO -0.0829** 4.1400 -31.1030 -28.3443 
 (0.0382) (37.1670) (18.9918) (37.8816) 
Non-bank -0.0907** 31.7750 -40.0253** -39.4110 
 (0.0373) (36.5450) (18.8842) (35.8501) 
Bank  -0.0599 -16.4869 -76.2367** -19.1276 
 (0.0449) (47.5149) (30.9760) (57.5899) 
Coop  -0.1948*** -29.9296 -76.8696*** -69.6188 
 (0.0416) (39.1691) (22.6003) (42.7219) 
Group lending -0.0137** -2.0071 0.4042 8.5278 
 (0.0067) (6.0482) (3.9206) (8.6970) 
Constant 1.2140*** -152.1842 -135.6015** -334.4640** 
 (0.1207) (111.7720) (63.4283) (132.5162) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations 994 960 1,123 1,106 
Number of MFIs 295 278 315 313 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0002 0.9036 1.0000 
R-squared (overall) 0.3410 0.2724 0.1924 0.2093    
Chi-squared 334.69*** 266.08*** 172.43*** 154.27*** 
Notes: This table lists Random effects estimates of the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI 
efficiency. Operating expense is total operating expenses as a percentage of average gross loan 
portfolio, Cost per client is total operating expenses as a percentage of number of active clients, Staff 




of active borrowers per credit officer. Regressors are defined previously. In parentheses are the robust 
standard errors.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%  respectively. 
  
 Next, we provide the RE estimates on the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and 
loan quality. Table 5 lists the results and it is clearly shown that BDS does not affect 
loan quality in terms of portfolio at risk and write-offs but SS has positive outcome on 
the former suggesting that providing social services enhances repayment rates. Our 
interpretation is that the provision of social services enhances clients’ loyalty and that 
in turn improves their repayment of loans. Thus, clients find the SS services relevant. 
The finding that MFIs do not improve repayment rates over time is not necessarily 
surprising since more experienced MFIs can allow a larger share of their clients to be 
in arrears.  
 
Table 5: The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and loan quality 
 (8) (9) 
Variables PAR30 Write-off 
BDS 0.0038 0.1091 
 (0.0054) (0.2420) 
SS -0.0110** -0.3611 
 (0.0055) (0.2361) 
HDI 0.0330 -0.8982 
 (0.0504) (0.9150) 
GDP growth -0.0023*** -0.0244 
 (0.0006) (0.0206) 
MFI size -0.0055 0.0935 
 (0.0033) (0.0701) 
MFI experience 0.0023*** 0.0169 
 (0.0007) (0.0159) 
Inflation  -0.0628 1.4634 
 (0.0431) (1.1286) 
Credit officers 0.0001 -0.0008 
 (0.0001) (0.0021) 
International network -0.0234*** -0.1109 
 (0.0073) (0.1565) 
Religious organization 0.0082 0.1442 
 (0.0083) (0.1959) 
NGO 0.0177 0.5172 
 (0.0332) (0.5032) 
Non-bank 0.0221 0.2957 
 (0.0333) (0.5000) 
Bank  0.0054 0.0621 
 (0.0357) (0.5943) 




 (0.0347) (0.5327) 
Group lending 0.0023 0.2515* 
 (0.0044) (0.1404) 
Constant 0.0939 -7.0021*** 
 (0.0698) (1.2779) 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1,001 1,087 
Number of MFIs 298 301 
Hausman test (p-value) chi2<0 0.4105 
R-squared (overall) 0.1640    0.0913 
Chi-squared  117.50*** 228.54*** 
Notes: This table lists Random effects estimates of the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and loan portfolio quality 
of MFIs. PaR30 is nonperforming loans over 30 days, and Write-off is natural logarithm of the proportion of loans 
portfolio that have been written off as loan loss.  Regressors are defined previously. In parentheses are robust 
standard errors.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%  respectively. 
 
 Table 6 presents the last set of RE estimates on the link between microfinance ‘plus’ 
and social performance. SS is significantly and positively related to women suggesting 
that the provision of social services maximizes MFIs’ outreach efforts (Dunford, 2001). 



















Table 6: The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and social performance 
 (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Clients Average loan size Women 
BDS -602.9183 -0.0212 -0.0098 
 (777.4759) (0.1556) (0.0443) 
SS 597.1599 0.0755 0.0899** 
 (699.2822) (0.1505) (0.0431) 
HDI 3,861.4355 -1.6081 0.4286** 
 (5,486.8614) (1.4455) (0.2067) 
GDP growth 110.2542 -0.0238 0.0143** 
 (83.0698) (0.0348) (0.0065) 
MFI size 1,933.2793*** 0.1736* -0.0615*** 
 (516.9265) (0.1006) (0.0202) 
MFI experience 142.4659 -0.0321 0.0038 
 (115.0366) (0.0349) (0.0043) 
Inflation  -5,247.5854 -2.1151 -0.5878* 
 (6,821.1764) (2.8034) (0.3159) 
Credit officers 222.4752*** -0.0022 0.0009** 
 (21.2049) (0.0038) (0.0004) 
International network 2,452.8597* -0.3416 0.1434*** 
 (1,290.6792) (0.4111) (0.0401) 
Religious organization -1,606.7106 0.3312 -0.0466 
 (1,166.1896) (0.5857) (0.0602) 
NGO -2,557.9972 0.7308** -0.0822 
 (2,521.8525) (0.3527) (0.0728) 
Non-bank -1,930.1692 1.6658** -0.1872** 
 (2,504.2784) (0.6494) (0.0806) 
Bank  -2,524.7437 2.3336** -0.2099** 
 (3,992.8307) (1.0651) (0.1055) 
Coop  3,843.7740 1.3902** -0.2162* 
 (3,551.6547) (0.5984) (0.1105) 
Group lending 82.3783 -0.0524 0.0214 
 (525.3579) (0.2298) (0.0268) 
Constant -32,712.4700*** -1.0653 1.2537*** 
 (8,845.9372) (1.9017) (0.3633) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 976 645 176 
Number of MFIs 277 201 139 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.2034 0.0000 0.3599 
R-squared (overall) 0.6376 0.1521 0.4716 
Chi-squared 827.32*** 66.19*** 229.78*** 
Notes: This table lists Random effects estimates of the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and social performance 
of MFIs. Clients is the number of active clients an MFI has, Average loan size is the amount of loan disbursed per 
borrower scaled by gross domestic product per capita, and women is a percentage of female clients. Regressors 
are defined previously. In parentheses are robust standard errors. 




5.3 The Link between Microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI Performance: 
Fixed Effects present 
The results of the Hausman’s specification test presented in Tables 3-6 suggest that 
there are fixed effects as we did not pass the test in some of the models (e.g.,3, 4, 5). To 
account for fixed effects, we use the HT estimator which uses exogenous regressors as 
instruments. The results for the financial sustainability are presented in Table 7 while 
the results for the efficiency, repayment and outreach effects are available from authors 
upon request. We pass the Sargan-Hansen test with p-values greater 0.05 in all models 
(Table 7) suggesting that our instruments are valid. We however fail the test especially 
in three  models for efficiency (unreported). Generally, the results in the HT models 
mirror those of the random effects models reported in tables 3-6 – the provision of ‘plus’ 
services does not have significant effect on the MFI’s performance. However, the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of valid instruments suggests that the results may be 
biased; there are real endogeneity problems aside fixed effects. Next, we employ the 
























Table 7: The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial sustainability 
 (13) (14) (15) 
Variables OSS FSS ROA 
BDS -0.0114 -0.0302 -0.0099 
 (0.0514) (0.0339) (0.0106) 
SS -0.0023 0.0017 0.0066 
 (0.0492) (0.0326) (0.0104) 
HDI -0.0794 -0.0837 0.0598 
 (0.2881) (0.2324) (0.0592) 
GDP growth 0.0030 0.0064* 0.0014 
 (0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0010) 
MFI size 0.1507*** 0.1551*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0191) (0.0048) 
MFI experience -0.0090 -0.0067 0.0003 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0009) 
Inflation  -0.1246 -0.6438*** 0.0731 
 (0.3045) (0.2235) (0.0591) 
International network -0.0485 -0.0112 0.0007 
 (0.0563) (0.0573) (0.0104) 
NGO 0.5578** 0.5296*** 0.0591* 
 (0.2845) (0.1549) (0.0355) 
Non-bank 0.4077 0.4339*** 0.0363 
 (0.2826) (0.1422) (0.0348) 
Credit officers -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Group lending 0.0611 0.0429* 0.0252*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0242) (0.0074) 
Religious organization -0.0386 -0.0808 -0.0208 
 (0.0630) (0.0653) (0.0129) 
Bank  0.5090* 0.4489** 0.0549 
 (0.2963) (0.1986) (0.0402) 
Coop  0.5225* 0.5182*** 0.0460 
 (0.2833) (0.1609) (0.0370) 
Constant -1.4732** -1.7077*** -0.5844*** 
 (0.6083) (0.3850) (0.1012) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 628 654 1,104 
Number of MFIs 196 211 317 
Chi-squared 106.24*** 262.62*** 199.78*** 
Sagran-Hansen (P-value) 0.6688 0.1783 0.2927 
Notes: This table presents estimates of the Hausman-Taylor model. Our endogenous regressors are credit officers, 
BDS, SS, and Group lending, of which credit officers is time varying and the rest are time-invariant. The 
remaining regressors are considered exogenous. Time varying exogenous variables are HDI, GDP growth, MFI 
size, MFI experience and inflation. The remaining exogenous regressors are time invariant. Variables are defined 





5.4 The Link between Microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI Performance: 
Endogeneity Present 
 Table 8 reports system GMM results on the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and 
financial sustainability of MFIs. The statistics show that there is first-order serial 
correlation as the p-values of AR(1) are all less than 0.05 but no second-order serial 
correlation (p-values>0.05). We pass the Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions 
indicating joint validity of instruments set (all p-values > 0.05). All the lags of the 
dependent variables are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. Once 
again, neither BDS nor SS are significantly associated with the financial sustainability 
confirming the results previously reported. Likewise, we find that the GMM regressions 
do not result in significant findings for the effect of BDS or SS on the efficiency, 
repayment or social outreach of the MFI (unreported).   
  
Table 8: The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial sustainability 
 (16) (17) (18) 
Variables OSS FSS ROA 
OSSt-1 0.4490**   
 (0.1794)   
FSSt-1  0.4881**  
  (0.2207)  
ROAt-1   0.5066*** 
   (0.0875) 
BDS 0.1630 0.0109 0.0009 
 (0.1221) (0.1047) (0.0132) 
SS -0.0864 0.0743 0.0011 
 (0.1477) (0.1745) (0.0131) 
HDI -0.2846 0.3117 0.0236 
 (0.2883) (0.6601) (0.0646) 
GDP growth -0.0007 0.0128 0.0012 
 (0.0060) (0.0124) (0.0008) 
MFI size  0.0468* 0.0703 0.0025 
 (0.0266) (0.0725) (0.0031) 
MFI experience 0.0019 -0.0201 -0.0009* 
 (0.0067) (0.0205) (0.0005) 
Inflation  0.1433 -0.1500 0.0550 
 (0.5422) (0.6218) (0.0749) 
Credit officers -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0000 
 (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0001) 
International network 0.0518 -0.0541 0.0036 
 (0.0593) (0.1124) (0.0045) 
Religious organization 0.0003 -0.0590 0.0085 
 (0.0464) (0.0993) (0.0075) 
NGO -4.5378 4.1261 -0.1938 
 (5.3656) (6.0511) (0.3040) 
Non-bank -4.7924 4.3736 -0.2106 




Bank  -4.4579 4.0063 -0.1954 
 (5.3021) (5.9865) (0.3022) 
Coop  -4.5834 4.0857 -0.2145 
 (5.3237) (6.0198) (0.3056) 
Group lending -0.0672 -0.0698 -0.0046 
 (0.0678) (0.0642) (0.0120) 
Constant 4.7866 -4.7093 0.1909 
 (5.4758) (7.0737) (0.3576) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 466 472 844 
Number of MFIs 187 201 305 
Number of instruments 41 41 43 
Chi-squared 229.83*** 210.41*** 321.87*** 
AR(1) test (P-value) 0.045 0.033 0.000 
AR(2) test (P-value) 0.412 0.296 0.792 
Hansen test (P-value) 0.800 0.284 0.176 
Notes: This table lists system GMM (generalized methods of moments) results of the link between microfinance 
‘plus’ and financial sustainability of MFIs. OSS is operational self-sustainability and measures the ability of MFI 
to cover its operational costs from revenue, FSS is financial self-sustainability and measures the ability of MFI to 
cover operational costs from revenue without subsidies and ROA is returns on assets. Regressors are defined 
previously. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first-and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the 
null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. In specifying the two-step System GMM model, we use lags of: 
dependent variables, BDS and SS as GMM instruments allowing the default lags limits in Stata. “By default, 
gmmstyle() generates the instruments appropriate for predetermined variables: lags 1 and earlier of the 
instrumenting variable for the transformed equation and, for system GMM, lag 0 of the instrumenting variable in 
differences for the levels equation” (Roodman, 2009, p. 124). The exogenous regressors are also standard 
instrumental variables, and the ‘collapse’ option is used to limit instrument proliferation. In parentheses are robust 
standard errors.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%  respectively.            
  
 A concern with the system GMM estimates relates primarily to our time-invariant 
regressors (i.e., BDS and SS) as their lagged values cannot be used as instruments 
because their lagged first differences are zero. This leaves us with first differences of 
time-varying variables which  unfortunately cannot be valid instruments either because 
they suffer from Nickell’s bias (Nickell, 1981) and do not also correlate sufficiently 
with the observed BDS and SS. Thus, the estimates of the system GMM are also 
problematic. Therefore, the random effects estimates are preferred because of the nature 
of our variables of interest which get wiped out if the fixed effects model is used and 
their estimation in the HT model is not appropriate due to invalidity of instruments. In 
any case, results from the three estimators (RE, HT and system GMM) suggest that 
microfinance ‘plus’ do not influence overall performance of MFIs. Only in few cases 
the RE estimates provide some evidence of improved loan quality and outreach and thus 








This paper set out to examine the potential impact of microfinance ‘plus’ on the 
financial and social performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Impact studies of 
nonfinancial services have always used the clients as their unit of analysis. In contrast, 
this paper focuses on the providers of ‘plus’ services. Using a unique global sample of 
MFIs and an arsenal of estimation methods, we find insignificant impact of business 
development services on MFIs’ financial and social performance. Furthermore, we find 
only meagre evidence of improved loan quality and outreach with the provision of social 
services. Specifically, providing social services   comes with lower portfolio at risk and 
more women clients though these findings are not stable across estimation methods.  
 Thus, this paper provides a first-hand information on the outcome of microfinance 
‘plus’ from the perspective of the providers.  Overall, it appears there is no performance 
disparity for those MFIs providing ‘plus’ services and those that do not. Perhaps, the 
benefits of microfinance ‘plus’ might have been neutralised by the disadvantages 
associated with it, hence, leaving a negligible net impact on MIFs’ performance.  
 The insignificant findings in this study actually offer important policy lessons for 
MFIs. With this information, microfinance practitioners are informed that, adopting the 
maximalist approach causes no harm on their overall financial and social performance. 
Thus, if the ‘plus’ services are of value for the customers, the provision of such does 
not harm the performance of the MFI. We do however recognize that the design and the 
cost structure of the ‘plus’ service does of course influence the outcome for the client 
as well as the MFI. Our study only shows that MFIs offering ‘plus’ services today have, 
on average, been able to design these in such a way that they do not harm the 
performance of the MFIs. We thus recommend future studies to look deeper into how 
the design and cost structure of ‘plus’ services have an influence on the MFI 
performance. Likewise, an interesting area for future researchers could be an 
investigation of how “smart subsidies” (Morduch, 2007) might account for the 
additional costs of providing ‘plus’ services, as well as how coordinated nonfinancial 
services provided by non-MFIs, in cooperation with MFIs, might influence MFI 
performance. Finally, like Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2014) recognise the need 
for more research, studies are much warranted on whether  or not different ‘plus’ 
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Microfinance is a banking market in which operating costs are high while defaults rates 
are low. While the existing literature tends to explain that the high operating costs arise 
from the provision of small loans, we argue that excessive efforts to control loan losses 
can also be a contributing factor. Therefore, this paper investigates the relationship 
between non-performing loans and the cost efficiency of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). Using a unique global sample of rated MFIs and applying stochastic frontier 
analysis, we find, in contrast to positive linear relationship evidence in commercial 
banking studies, a nonlinear (U-shape) relationship between operating costs and 
defaults. This implies that MFIs need to balance their operational efficiency with asset 
quality. 
JEL:  F34, G21, G23, G24, L31, O16 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we aim to be the first to rigorously study the relationship between non-
performing loans and operational efficiency in the global microfinance industry. 
Modern microfinance emerged in the 1970s as a response to the failures (e.g., high 
default rates) of state-funded credit programs (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Hulme 
& Mosley, 1996). Lower default rates have been one of the main achievements and 
advantages of microfinance over the former credit programs. In fact, default rates in 
microfinance are lower than those in traditional banking markets (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, 
& Narain, 2009; Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). 
 However, in the ongoing attempt to meet the high demand for credit of micro-
enterprises, microfinance institutions (MFIs) failed to pay sufficient attention to their 
cost efficiency. The main reason for this is that borrowers were willing to pay high 
interest rates. Given that businesses in the informal economy are normally profitable 
due to the availability of promising investment opportunities (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010), the poor are often willing to pay a high price for credit. Based on the principle 
of diminishing marginal returns to capital, Lucas (1990) shows that Indian borrowers 
were willing to pay 58 times more interest than American borrowers. As a result, MFIs 
often pass the cost of lending on to the borrower in the form of high interest. Thus, 
while default rates are low in microfinance, operating costs are generally high. This 
suggests a possible trade-off between defaults and costs, and hence offers an interesting 
research setting. 
   While banking scholars have long been concerned with the relationship between 
operating costs and loan defaults (e.g., Hughes & Mester, 1993; Berger & DeYoung, 
1997; Fiordelisi et al., 2011),  we are not aware of similar studies using microfinance 
data. This omission is unfortunate considering the relationship between the high 
operating costs and the high interest rates in the industry. Moreover, an overemphasis 
on risk may lead MFIs to practice too strict credit screening, thus leaving the target 
clientele unserved (Amin, Rai, & Topa, 2003; Pearlman, 2012).  
 To cover the high operating costs, MFIs are forced to charge high interest rates on 
loans (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Hardy, Holden, & Prokopenko, 2003). There are 
several examples of MFIs charging 50 and even 100 percent or more on loans to 
economically poor individuals. This practice has brought discredit on the microfinance 
industry (Bateman, 2010; Malkin, 2008). Nevertheless, the high interest rates in 
microfinance are generally a result not of high profits but of the high costs of delivering 
microcredit. As shown by Mersland and Strøm (2010), it is not the “hunger for high 
profits” but the need to cover costs that is the main operating compass of MFIs. 
Therefore, reducing operating costs means that MFIs’ lending rates can be reduced, and 
poorer segments of the population can be served in a sustainable manner.  
Relationship banking theory, which many MFIs practice (Serrano-Cinca & 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014), suggests a negative relationship between operating costs and 
non-performing loans. In relationship banking, more resources are often invested in 
creating and maintaining ties with clients in the form of more screening and monitoring 
(Boot, 2000; Diamond, 1991; Petersen & Rajan, 1995). This investment makes the 
overall operating costs of the financial institution shoot up, while, obviously, repayment 
rates improve (Puri, Rocholl, & Steffen, 2017), and hence there is a negative 




historical account of microfinance (see Section 2), where cost efficiency was sacrificed 
for high repayment rates, also suggests a negative relationship. 
However, many banking studies show that there is a positive link between non-
performing loans and operating costs (e.g., Altunbas et al., 2007; Berger & DeYoung, 
1997; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Berger and DeYoung (1997) outline three reasons for the 
positive relationship. First, poorly managed banks tend to offer many low-quality loans, 
which eventually increase the stock of non-performing loans. Second, skimping on 
screening costs results in the issuance of poor-quality loans, which leads to more 
defaults and more costs to control the defaults. Third, external exogenous factors cause 
borrowers to default, which in turn causes the lender to incur extra monitoring costs to 
curb the defaults. Since MFIs mirror banks in the services they provide (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010), one can also expect such a positive relationship in microfinance. 
Taken together, all these arguments –those for a negative relationship and those for a 
positive relationship between non-performing loans and operating costs – suggest the 
possibility of a nonlinear relationship between cost efficiency and asset quality in 
microfinance.  
We apply a unique, hand-collected global sample based on external rating reports 
on 607 MFIs operating in 87 countries. Using stochastic frontier analysis, we find that, 
indeed, there is a significant relationship between operating costs and loan defaults in 
microfinance. While previous banking studies indicate a linear relationship between 
cost efficiency and default rates, we find a nonlinear, U-shaped relationship. 
Specifically, our findings show that an increase in non-performing loans enhances the 
cost efficiency of MFIs, but a further increase deteriorates it.  
An important implication of this result is that microfinance practitioners should 
consider the trade-off between the two types of costs in order to avoid an overemphasis 
on asset quality at the expense of cost efficiency. High operating costs are argued by 
many to be the main challenge facing MFIs today (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Thus, 
MFIs operating with low loan defaults could consider relaxing some of their screening 
and monitoring efforts in order to reduce their operational costs and potentially include 
more vulnerable customers. At the same time, MFIs with higher non-performing loans 
could put emphasis on reducing such loans in order to help them reduce their operating 
costs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and describes the econometric 















2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Determinants of Operating Costs 
There are many factors influencing the operating costs of MFIs. Such factors may 
include economies of scale and scope (Hartarska, Shen, & Mersland, 2013), learning 
and experience, technological advancement (Caudill, Gropper, & Hartarska, 2009), and 
the operating institutional environment. Economies of scale concern the link between 
average cost per unit and the number of units produced by a firm (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 
1996). The ability to produce in large volumes is associated with cost savings as lower 
per-unit costs are achieved. Hartarska et al. (2013) prove the existence of economies of 
scale in the microfinance industry.  
 Economies of scope are achieved when a financial institution reuses previously 
gathered customer information as well as infrastructure to generate new revenue 
without incurring additional costs (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Such economies are 
basically concerned with joint production, where the total production cost is less than 
the sum of individual production costs (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1996).  Delgado et al. (2015) 
show that most, if not all, MFIs achieve economies of scope when offering clients 
saving services alongside loans. Learning curve theory suggests that cost efficiency 
improves over time as a firm repeats its processes and learns from them each time. 
Caudill et al. (2009) produce evidence to support learning curve theory in the 
microfinance industry where a group of MFIs becomes more cost effective over time.   
 In addition, with the introduction of new technologies in production, a bank may 
improve its cost efficiency level. For instance, new microfinance technologies such as 
mobile banking and online crowdfunding may help reduce costs and increase MFIs’ 
outreach (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009). Furthermore, the costs of financial 
intermediation can be influenced by banking regulation (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & 
Levine, 2004). Like banks, some MFIs are regulated by banking authorities 
(Ledgerwood, 1999) and the costs associated with this regulation are passed on to their 
clients  in the form of higher lending rates (Hardy et al., 2003).  
 Finally, relationship banking influences the cost of lending when financial 
intermediaries like MFIs create and maintain ties with their customers over a long 
period. To create such ties, the financial institution begins by gathering private or “soft” 
information about the client and such private information is costly to gather (Diamond, 
1984). Thus, , screening and monitoring costs are often high in the short run, but at the 
same time intermediation costs decline because of information reusability and lower 
defaults, resulting in lower screening and monitoring costs in the long run (Bharath et 
al., 2011; Boot, 2000; Petersen & Rajan, 1994)  . In sum, relationship banking 













2.2 Efficiency and Non-performing Loans 
Hughes and Mester (1993) and Berger and DeYoung (1997), among others, 
demonstrate how non-performing loans relate to cost efficiency. Hughes and Mester 
(1993) argue that when a bank fails to invest resources in the initial screening and 
monitoring of borrowers, the result is lower operating costs in the short run but higher 
non-performing loan defaults in the long run. The high defaults then require more 
monitoring efforts, leading to high monitoring costs. Berger and DeYoung (1997) refer 
to this as the “skimping” hypothesis. They further illustrate that bad luck or external 
factors (e.g., economic downturns), which are beyond the borrowers’ control, can cause 
defaults resulting in additional costs for the lending institution. These additional costs 
may relate to factors such as additional monitoring efforts, renegotiations of contract 
terms, and the efforts of senior management to curb losses on loan (Berger & DeYoung, 
1997). 
 In general, banking studies (e.g., Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1996; Berger & DeYoung, 
1997; Altunbas et al., 2000; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) provide evidence for a positive 
relationship between operating costs and non-performing loans. Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1996) use a stochastic efficient frontier approach to investigate inefficiency of US 
banking firms in relation to their non-performing loans. They find that inefficient banks 
tend to have higher non-performing loans. Similar findings have been documented by 
Berger and DeYoung (1997). In a relatively recent study, Fiordelisi et al. (2011) report 
similar findings to those of Berger and DeYoung (1997).  
 To the best of our knowledge, empirical evidence on the link between efficiency and 
risk is missing in the microfinance literature. We aim to close this gap. The importance 
of improving MFIs’ cost efficiency has been stressed not only because the high costs 
jeopardize the overall sustainability of the industry  (Cull et al., 2009), but also because 
the high interest rates impede MFIs’ ability to benefit their target customers, the poorest 
potential clients (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Thus, the high operating costs of MFIs are 
actually the main challenge in the industry as well as the main reason for much of the 
criticism that has been directed at the microfinance industry (Rosenberg et al., 2009).  
 Equation (1) illustrates why operating costs are the main challenge in microfinance:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 –  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 –  𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 –  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠,                      (1)  
 
where yield is the interest revenue from the loan portfolio, funding cost is the interest 
expense on borrowings, operating cost includes salaries and administrative costs, and 
loan loss represents losses arising from non-performing loans. Thanks to access to 
international loans from impact investors (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013), subsidies 
(Hudon & Traca, 2011), and low interest on deposits, the finance costs and loan losses 
of MFIs are generally quite low. As mentioned earlier, loan losses are also low in 
microfinance. The challenge is the operating costs, which are the main determinant of 
lending rates in microfinance (Cull et al., 2009).  
 As Mersland and Strøm (2014) illustrate, operating costs represent about 61 percent 
of financial revenue, funding costs 17 percent, and loan loss provisions only 7 percent, 
leaving a profit margin of 15 percent. This indicates that reducing operating costs could 
greatly reduce lending rates and improve MFIs’ profitability level, which could pave 




unprofitable to offer small loans to target clientele; thus, reduced operating costs could 
facilitate MFIs’ outreach to poorer clients (Mersland & Strøm, 2010).  
 Finally, focusing too much on repayment of microcredit has the tendency to drive 
away the poorest segments of the poor populations, whom MFIs claim to be their target 
clients. Using data from Peru, Pearlman (2012) shows that because of strict repayment 
requirements and penalties in microfinance, very poor people have less of a tendency 
to use microcredit. This finding supports that of Amin et al. (2003) who use data from 
Bangladesh. Thus, overemphasis on risk has implications on not only the operational 
efficiency but also the outreach of MFIs. That is, both the sustainability and social 
objectives of MFIs are affected by too much focus on defaults. 
 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Relationship banking theory suggests a negative relationship (trade-off) between 
operating costs and loan defaults. Creating and keeping relationships with clients is 
costly due to high selection and monitoring costs (Diamond, 1984; Petersen & Rajan, 
1994). Since the business model of most MFIs is one of relationship banking with close 
contact between the loan officer and the client (Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2007; 
Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014; Siwale & Ritchie, 2012), the low defaults 
reported in the industry are a result of the large investments in the screening and 
monitoring of clients. Puri et al. (2017) find that relationship banking methods result in 
lower defaults because of better selection and monitoring of borrowers. Implicitly, the 
selection and monitoring costs in relationship banking are negatively related to the loan 
defaults.  
 Moreover, the history of microfinance paints a picture of a trade-off between high 
operating costs and low loan defaults. Modern microfinance emerged in the 1970s as a 
solution to problems associated with development finance institutions (DFIs), which 
were funded by governments and agencies to provide credit to farmers and other poor 
people (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 1999). About four decades after the DFI 
initiatives were launched in the 1930s (Hulme & Mosley, 1996), many studies (e.g., 
World Bank, 1975; Sanderatne, 1978; Adams & Graham, 1981) showed that the 
financial performance of these DFIs had turned out to be unsatisfactory.  
 For instance, Adams, Graham, and von Pischke (1984, p. 1) described the 
performance of DFIs as “disappointing,” while Thillairajah (1994) claimed that DFIs in 
Africa had a 100 percent failure rate! It was shown that high rates of default were a 
major problem since arrears rates ranged from 55 percent (e.g., in Ghana) to 95 percent 
(e.g., in Nigeria) (Sanderatne, 1978). In short, the average default rate in state-funded 
credit programs was more than 50 percent (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 1999).  
 Microfinance sprang up with innovations to overcome three main problems faced 
by DFIs. Obviously, one problem was the high default rates; the other two were lack of 
access to credit for poor people, especially women, and challenges related to screening 
borrowers without collateral (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). MFIs started to provide small 
amounts of credit to poor people and microenterprises that were excluded from 
mainstream banking services (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Since its inception, 
microfinance has been praised worldwide for achieving its primary goal of financial 




being a sustainable business model where customers generally repay their loans 
(Morduch, 1999).  
 To overcome screening and repayment problems, new loan products such as lending 
with joint liability and short-term step-wise loans (progressive lending) were introduced 
following the advent of the microfinance industry (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; 
Hulme & Mosley, 1996). These innovations improved repayment rates substantially. 
Today, the microfinance industry reports lower default rates than many traditional 
banking markets (Rosenberg et al., 2009; Sievers & Vandenberg, 2007). The average 
repayment rate in microfinance is about 97 percent (Cull et al., 2009), which is indeed 
impressive considering that these are uncollateralized loans given to economically poor 
people operating businesses in informal markets in emerging economies.  
 However, in attempts to improve repayment rates, it seems that MFIs have relegated 
their operational efficiency to the background. This is because, while default rates in 
microfinance are under control, operating costs remain high. As we mentioned in the 
Introduction, access to capital for micro-enterprises was a major focus of microfinance. 
Micro-enterprises at the bottom of the pyramid in the informal sector are normally 
profitable (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010); hence, they are generally willing to pay high 
interest (Lucas, 1990). Due to the high demand for capital of micro-businesses, MFIs 
focused on lending at the expense of their operational efficiency; after all, the cost of 
lending can be passed on to the borrower. 
 Thus, from an efficiency perspective, microfinance is a high-cost business 
(Gonzalez, 2007; Hardy et al., 2003). Mersland and Strøm (2009) report an operating 
cost to loan portfolio ratio of approximately 31 percent, which is 20 times higher than 
what is normal in the most efficient banking markets, like those in the Nordic countries 
(Berg, Førsund, Hjalmarsson, & Suominen, 1993). Of course, the high cost ratios in 
microfinance can partly be explained by the small loans (Helms & Reille, 2004) and the 
poor institutional frameworks where MFIs operate (Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002). But, 
in addition, we argue that too much focus on risk could be another contributing factor. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between non-performing loans and cost efficiency 
of microfinance institutions.  
  
 However, the theoretical arguments of Hughes and Mester (1993) and Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) as well as many empirical studies using mainstream banking data 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between operating costs and loan defaults. 
In particular, using U.S. commercial banking data from 1985 to 1994, Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) find that when non-performing loans increase exogenously (due to 
external shocks), operating costs also increase. Their results also show that an increase 
in operating costs due to poor management practices eventually leads to higher loan 
defaults. Similarly, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) find that inefficient banks are more 
prone to risk-taking compared to efficient banks. Berger and DeYoung (1997) further 
report that banks that skimp on selection costs in the name of cost efficiency end up 
having higher non-performing loans and higher operating costs in the long run. When a 




low-quality loans are made, which often surface in the future as non-performing loans. 
To control these, banks  have to incur costs. 
 Applying the approach of Berger and DeYoung (1997) in the context of European 
commercial banking, Williams (2004) confirms that poorly managed banks make low-
quality loans, which result in higher non-performing loans. He also finds an 
insignificant positive correlation between operating costs and non-performing loans 
with respect to the bad luck and skimping hypotheses of Berger and DeYoung (1997). 
In the same spirit, Fiordelisi et al. (2011) confirm the “bad management” hypothesis of 
Berger and DeYoung (1997). That is, inefficient European banks tend to have more 
problem loans. Similarly, using data from Malaysia and Singapore, Karim, Chan, and 
Hassan (2010) document findings that support those of Berger and DeYoung (1997). 
 As mentioned earlier, this positive relationship between operating costs and non-
performing loans may also be expected in microfinance because of its banking logic 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Specifically, external 
shocks such as floods, droughts, crop losses, and infectious diseases affecting the 
productivity of farmers in rural areas where the majority of the MFIs’ clients live 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010) could increase the non-performing loans of MFIs. 
Moreover, based on the skimping and bad management hypotheses of Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), some MFIs may be struggling with non-performing loans today due 
to a failure to conduct strict screening and monitoring in the past. Obviously, these are 
MFIs that do not practice relationship banking. Thus, extra efforts are needed today to 
control the increasing risk. Therefore, we formulate a rival hypothesis to H1 as follows. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between non-performing loans and cost efficiency 
of microfinance institutions.  
 
 Taken together, the negative (H1) and positive (H2) hypotheses do not rule out a 
nonlinear relationship between non-performing loans and cost efficiency of MFIs. This 
is because MFIs vary in a wide range of dimensions, including management practice, 
geographical focus, lending method, and organizational form (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010). Some MFIs may be efficient in controlling both operating costs and non-
performing loans, other MFIs may be concerned with defaults and hence practice 
relationship banking in order to enhance asset quality, which comes with high selection 
and monitoring costs, while still other MFIs may be poorly managed and hence incur 
high operating costs and high non-performing loans.  
 Geographically, MFIs serve different groups of clients. Some target only rural 
clients, others focus only on urban clients, while still others serve both urban and rural 
clients (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). This suggests that costs and risk may vary among 
MFIs with different geographical foci. For instance, the bad luck hypothesis of Berger 
and DeYoung (1997) may be more pronounced among MFIs with a purely rural focus.  
 Furthermore, based on the skimping hypothesis, it is possible that some MFIs may 
look efficient today in order to attract funding from investors and donors, but this 
strategy may have long-term consequences on asset quality and monitoring costs. 
Additionally, while some MFIs (e.g., the famous Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and 
BancoSol in Bolivia) focus on granting loans to groups, other MFIs practice only the 




believed to be correlated with lower costs and lower risk (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010; Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). This suggests that costs and risk may also differ 
between group-lending and individual-lending MFIs.  
 Finally, MFIs are incorporated as either shareholder-owned (banks and nonbank 
financial institutions) or non-profit organizations (e.g., non-governmental 
organizations) (Mersland, 2009). Owners have incentives to monitor the institution to 
ensure that excessive risks are not taken by management. Galema, Lensink, and 
Mersland (2012) find that excessive risk-taking is more likely in MFIs without owners 
than in shareholder MFIs. Overall, the above discussions imply different relationships 
between operating costs and non-performing loans among different MFIs. Thus, in the 
empirical analysis, it will not be surprising to find evidence supporting the two 
hypotheses (a nonlinear relationship).    
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of MFIs around the world. It is based on hand-
collected rating reports from five leading microfinance rating agencies (MicroRate, 
Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril). These rating agencies were originally 
approved by the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP), a 
microfinance branch of the World Bank. The rating reports contain information 
concerning the MFI and its governance, management, financial profile, and operations.  
 The sample does not include the largest MFIs, which are typically rated by traditional 
rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Nor does it include all the 
numerous small savings and loans cooperatives around the world or the many loan funds 
providing credit mainly as a social service for their beneficiaries. Overall, our sample 
consists of 607 rated MFIs operating in 87 countries (see Table 1), observed over an 
unbalanced period of 18 years (1998–2015), with a common aim of operating 
professional and sustainable services and attracting funding from investors and donors. 
Former versions of the dataset have been used in high impact studies like Hartarska and 
Mersland (2012) and Mersland and Strøm (2009). Additionally, we use data from the 


















Table 1: Distribution of number of microfinance institutions by country 
# Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs # Country 
No. of 
MFIs 
1 Albania 3 30 Mexico 31 59 Tajikistan 11 
2 Argentina 2 31 Moldova 2 60 Croatia 1 
3 Armenia 6 32 Morocco 8 61 Chad 3 
4 Benin 8 33 Nicaragua 14 62 Rwanda 12 
5 Bolivia 17 34 Pakistan 2 63 Zambia 3 
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 35 Paraguay 2 64 China 5 
7 Brazil 14 36 Peru 40 65 Serbia 2 
8 Bulgaria 3 37 Philippines 22 66 Ghana 5 
9 Burkina Faso 9 38 Romania 7 67 Malawi 2 
10 Cambodia 14 39 Russia 17 68 Gambia 1 
11 Chile 2 40 Senegal 12 69 Kosovo 5 
12 Colombia 14 41 South Africa 4 70 Congo 1 
13 Dominican Republic 7 42 Sri Lanka 2 71 Burundi 6 
14 Ecuador 20 43 Tanzania 8 72 Niger 8 
15 Egypt 6 44 Togo 5 73 Dem. Rep. Congo 1 
16 El Salvador 7 45 Trinidad and Tobago 1 74 Afghanistan 2 
17 Ethiopia 10 46 Tunisia 1 75 Costa Rica 3 
18 Georgia 8 47 Uganda 25 76 Lebanon 2 
19 Guatemala 8 48 Montenegro 2 77 Turkey 1 
20 Haiti 3 49 Cameroon 5 78 Palestine 3 
21 Honduras 13 50 Guinea 3 79 Comoros 1 
22 India 32 51 Timor 1 80 Italy 3 
23 Indonesia 4 52 Bangladesh 2 81 Samoa 1 
24 Jordan 3 53 Nepal 5 82 Sierra Leone 1 
25 Kazakhstan 8 54 Vietnam 4 83 South Sudan 1 
26 Kenya 18 55 Azerbaijan 9 84 United Kingdom 1 
27 Kyrgyz Republic 9 56 Mongolia 4 85 Yemen 1 
28 Madagascar 3 57 Nigeria 6 86 Angola 1 
29 Mali 11 58 Mozambique 1 87 Macedonia 1 
       Total 607 
 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the estimations. On 
average, operating costs amount to US$ 1.9 million, annual salary per employee is US$ 
7,607, and the ratio of non-labor operating expenses to net fixed capital is 3.1. In terms 
of client base, the average MFI has 20,897 active clients, the majority of whom are 
borrowers (18,058). The average MFI is about 11 years old with approximately US$ 15 
million total assets and 6 percent portfolio at risk.  
 Interestingly, group lending is not the dominant uncollateralized lending method. 
About 42 percent of the MFIs offer group loans and the remaining majority (58 percent) 
give individual loans. In terms of ownership, about 37 percent of the MFIs are 
shareholder-owned while the remaining 63 percent are non-shareholder-owned (i.e., 
they are mutual organizations organized as member-based cooperatives or non-




MFIs focus on urban areas as their main market, 18 percent target only rural areas, and 
the rest of the MFIs serve both urban and rural clients. Finally, the mean for gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity is US$ 6,533. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Operating cost (US$ 000) 1875.28 3239.78 30.10 29940.00 3120 
Number of clients 20896.71 34990.92 205.00 249531.00 2624 
Number of borrowers 18058.14 30338.63 204.00 238140.00 2959 
Wage per staff (US$) 7607.00 6510.01 152.46 84317.66 2754 
Physical capital  3.06 4.03 0.03 39.99 2966 
Year  9.20 3.29 1.00 18.00 3296 
GDP per capita (US$) 6533.41 5007.46 703.39 26429.35 3244 
Portfolio at risk (%) 6.06 7.50 0.10 48.90 2777 
MFI age (years) 10.76 6.33 2.00 33.00 3078 
Total assets (US$ 000) 14944.97 33153.54 50.00 365256.99 3219 
Shareholder MFI 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 3049 
Group lending 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 2842 
Urban market 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 2641 




Cost efficiency is measured in terms of how close an MFI’s costs are to those of a best 
practice MFI, assuming both produce similar output under identical production settings 
(Fries & Taci, 2005; Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011). Cost efficiency concerns 
cost savings achieved when the MFI is efficient in terms of resource allocation and 
technical capabilities. Because cost functions cannot be observed directly, inefficiencies 
are normally compared to an efficient cost frontier (Hermes et al., 2011). In general, 
cost efficiency is investigated by employing either data envelopment analysis (DEA) or 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The latter technique is applied in this paper because 
it takes into account both measurement errors and random effects (Hermes et al., 2011; 
Silva et al., 2017) . DEA on the other hand is not able to decompose the residual into 
the statistical noise and the inefficiency effect. Moreover, compared to DEA, SFA offers 
an opportunity to uniquely specify the empirical model in order to test a particular 
hypothesis (Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar, & Heshmati, 1996). SFA has been used 
previously in other microfinance studies (e.g., Hartarska et al., 2013; Hartarska and 
Mersland, 2012; Hermes et al., 2011).  
 Specifically, this paper uses Battese and Coelli (1995) one-step SFA, which has been 
applied to MFIs by Hermes et al. (2011). One main advantage of the Battese and Coelli 
(BC) model over the traditional two-step SFA proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1977) is that the BC model estimates both the cost frontier and the inefficiency 
equation at the same time. Moreover, Wang and Schmidt (2002) show that the two-step 




efficiency term is independent and identically truncated and normally distributed in the 
first step, while in the second step the efficiency terms are assumed to be normally 
distributed and dependent on the explanatory variables. 
 To specify the cost function, we follow the Sealey and Lindley (1977) model, which 
has been applied in microfinance studies, including Hermes et al. (2011) and Hartarska 
and Mersland (2012). The model views MFIs as financial intermediaries in channeling 
funds from depositors, lenders, and donors to borrowers. The translog cost function is 
specified in equation (2), following  Hermes et al.’s (2011) and Hartarska and 
Mersland’s (2012) specifications, with a few modifications to suit this study’s purpose. 
For instance, we do not include interest expense as in Hermes et al. (2011) or price of 
financial capital as in Hartarska and Mersland (2012) because we are concerned only 
with operating costs. The translog specification, which we apply, is common in cost-
efficiency studies (Greene, 1980) because of its flexibility in functional form (Karim et 
al., 2010).  
 
ln (𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛽3 ln(𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑗) 
+𝛽4𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗
2 ) + 𝛽5 ln (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗
2 ) + 𝛽6 ln (𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑗
2 )
+ 𝛽7 𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗)𝑥 𝑙𝑛(𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑛(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗)𝑥 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗)
+ 𝛽9 𝑙𝑛(𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑗)𝑥 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽11 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗)                     
+  𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑗                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
 In equation (2), OC is the total operating costs of MFI i at time t located in country 
j, Wage represents annual price per unit of labor, and physical is the price of physical 
capital, calculated as operating costs minus personnel costs divided by fixed assets 
(Hartarska & Mersland, 2012). Clients is an output measure representing the number of 
active clients (both borrowers and savers); alternatively, we use the number of 
borrowers as an output measure, following Hartarska & Mersland (2012). ln denotes 
natural logarithm. Year and GDP are control variables. Year ranges from 1 to 18 
(representing 1998 to 2015 ) and it controls for changes in technology over time (Battese 
& Coelli, 1995) and GDP represents GDP per capita (Fries & Taci, 2005), adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, and it controls for country differences. 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗 is the inefficiency 
component, assumed to have a truncated-normal distribution that is independently but 
not identically distributed over different MFIs. 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑗 is a random error term. 
 As the aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between non-performing 
loans and efficiency, we now turn to the main empirical model: the inefficiency 
equation (3). In equation (3), the inefficiency component (from the cost frontier) is the 
dependent variable and the indicator of loan defaults is the independent variable. The 
model also includes MFI-level control variables, which may influence inefficiency. 
Thus, the mean inefficiency is modeled as a function of MFI-level covariates as follows. 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1(𝑃𝐴𝑅30𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛿2 (𝑃𝐴𝑅30𝑖𝑡𝑗
2 ) + 𝛿3(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛿4(𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛿5(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑗)              
+ 𝛿6(𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛿7(𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑗) + 𝛿8𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗)+ 𝑖𝑡𝑗                            (3) 
 
 In equation (3), 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑗 is the inefficiency distribution of the i
th MFI at time t in country 




the MFI is inefficient. PAR30 is the portfolio at risk (>30 days). The most common 
measure of default in banking is the non-performing loan rate defined as the proportion 
of the loan portfolio that is more than 90 days overdue (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1997). In 
the microfinance industry, a shorter period (30 days) is often used since loans are mostly 
short-term in nature and, as a result, non-performing loans are commonly referred to as 
portfolio at risk more than 30 days overdue (PAR30). Thus, in this paper, we use PAR30 
and non-performing loans interchangeably.  
  PAR30 has been used in other studies such as Caudill et al. (2009), Mersland and 
Strøm (2009), and Kar (2012). A higher loan portfolio quality signifies a smaller 
portfolio at risk. Since the dependent variable represents inefficiency, the negative 
coefficient of this variable means that an MFI becomes efficient as the number of non-
performing loans increases.  
 Following Hermes et al. (2011), we include MFI age and lending method (group 
loans). In addition, we control for MFIs’ ownership structure (shareholder-owned 
firms) (Fries & Taci, 2005), geographical markets (only urban  and only rural), and size. 
Thus, heteroscedasticity in the variance of the inefficiency is explained not only by 
defaults but also by other covariates It has been suggested that it is costly to offer 
individual loans, compared to group loans (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999); thus technical 
inefficiency may vary between providers of group and individual loans. With respect to 
MFI age (or experience), learning curve theory suggests that MFIs’ efficiency improves 
over time (Caudill et al., 2009), which implies fewer technical inefficiencies over time. 
In the empirical analysis, non-shareholder-owned MFIs (mutual ownership), individual-
lending MFIs, and MFIs that serve both urban and rural clients are the reference 
categories for ownership, lending method, and geographical market, respectively.  
 MFI size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Economies of scale are 
usually correlated with size, as Hartarska et al. (2013) have confirmed in microfinance. 
This suggests that the variance in the inefficiency component could be heteroscedastic 
due to size effects. 
 Finally, as a robustness check, we employ Greene’s (2005) true fixed-effects SFA 
model, in addition to the random-effects BC model11, to control for heterogeneity across 
MFIs. The fixed-effects model allows for a separation of time-varying inefficiency from 












11 We acknowledge that operating costs and loan defaults are simultaneously determined (i.e., there is a reversed 
causality between the two). However, the use of the one-step SFA approach in this study makes this endogeneity 





4. Results and Discussions 
Table 3 reports the results of the cost function (Panel A) and those relating to the 
inefficiency equation (Panel B). Model (1) contains the estimates of Battese and Coelli’s 
(1995) model while models (2) and (3) report those based on Greene’s (2005) model. 
In both methods, we assume the inefficiency term has a truncated-normal distribution. 
 
Table 3: The cost function, and the link between non-performing loans and 
inefficiency of MFIs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Cost frontier equation    
Y (output is the number of clients) -0.1440 0.0469  
 (0.1750) (0.1356)  
Y (output is the number of borrowers)   0.0559 
   (0.1348) 
Y^2 0.0242*** 0.0170*** 0.0150*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Price of labor 0.2868 0.0792 0.0674 
 (0.3136) (0.2930) (0.3052) 
Price of labor^2 0.0021 0.0110 0.0049 
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0165) 
Price of physical capital -0.5002*** -0.2437 -0.1979 
 (0.1845) (0.1683) (0.1584) 
Price of physical capital^2 -0.0180** 0.0211*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0073) 
Price of labor ∗ Price of physical capital 0.0289* -0.0011 0.0019 
 (0.0173) (0.0162) (0.0160) 
Y∗ Price of labor 0.0287* 0.0134 0.0094 
 (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
Y∗ Price of physical capital 0.0386*** 0.0341*** 0.0238** 
 (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
Year  0.0103** 0.1308*** 0.1552*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0059) 
GDP per capita 0.1514*** -0.1044 -0.0797 
 (0.0199) (0.0921) (0.0953) 
Constant  6.1449*** 9.5468 9.8502 
 (1.8525) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
    











Table 3 continued.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel B: Inefficiency equation    
Portfolio at risk -0.0837*** -0.2886** -0.2231** 
 (0.0313) (0.1153) (0.1136) 
Portfolio at risk^2 0.0021** 0.0090*** 0.0070** 
 (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0028) 
MFI age  0.1085*** 0.1192*** 0.0429 
 (0.0165) (0.0348) (0.0356) 
Shareholder MFI 0.8973*** -7.0146 -17.8349 
 (0.1963) (24.3242) (32.5952) 
Group loans -0.6957*** -0.8152 -0.8895** 
 (0.2116) (0.5163) (0.4247) 
Urban market -0.3038 -3.1463 -3.3499** 
 (0.1873) (2.0537) (1.5529) 
Rural market -16.0346 -28.3245 -56.7368 
 (0.0000) (14.2843) (0.0000) 
MFI size 1.7070*** -0.0567 -0.1620 
 (0.1010) (0.1952) (0.1891) 
Constant -28.9294*** -3.7865 -0.7260 
 (1.6391) (3.2722) (3.1385) 
Observations 1,577 1,483 1,595 
Number of MFIs 400 306 330 
Wald chi-square 3433.32*** 11371.01*** 10168.22*** 
Log likelihood -842.27 225.24 137.63 






Notes: This table reports panel stochastic frontier analysis estimates of Battese and Coelli’s (1995) random-effects 
time-varying inefficiency-effects model (1) and Greene’s (2005) true fixed-effects model (models (2) and (3)). In 
Panel A (the cost function), Operating costs is the dependent variable and output is measured in terms of number 
of active clients (borrowers and savers) and number of active borrowers (for simplicity, Y is used to denote output 
measure, especially when interacting it with input price). The inputs are Price of labor – annual salary per 
employee, and Price of physical capital, measured as non-labor expenses divided by net fixed assets. Control 
variables are Year, a categorical variable, which runs from 1 to 11, and accounts for technological changes over 
time, and GDP per capita, the annual gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing power parity (constant 
2011). Standard errors are in parentheses. In Panel B (inefficiency equation), inefficiency is the dependent 
variable, generated simultaneously from the cost frontier (Panel A). Portfolio at risk (PaR30) is the proportion of 
loan portfolio that is in arrears over 30 days, MFI age is the number of years the institution has been operating as 
a microfinance organization, Shareholder MFI = 1 if shareholder-owned firm and = 0 if non-shareholder-owned 
firm, Group = 1 if solidarity group loans and = 0 if individual loans, Urban market = 1 if urban market is 
emphasized and = 0 if otherwise, Rural market = 1 if rural market is emphasized and = 0 if otherwise and, finally, 
MFI size is measured in terms of total assets. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively  
 
 If a variable has a positive coefficient in Panel A (of Table 3), it means an outward 
departure from the cost frontier – suggesting higher costs. In general, the true fixed-
effects estimates are similar to those based on the random-effects estimator with few 
exceptions. The quadratic terms of both output measures are significant in all models, 
suggesting that serving a larger number of clients increases the operating costs of MFIs. 




relating to borrowers and depositors are normally smaller in volume. The price of 
physical capital plus its quadratic term are negatively related to cost in model (1); 
however, in models (2) and (3), the quadratic term is positively related to costs, as 
expected.  
 In model (1), the interaction between labor and physical capital, as well as the 
interaction between price of labor and number of total clients, are positively related to 
cost. Similarly, the interactions between each output measure (number of clients and 
borrowers) and price of physical capital have positive correlations with cost in all 
models, suggesting a departure from the cost frontier. Year has positive effects on cost, 
suggesting that operational costs in MFIs are “sticky”. One explanation is that 
technological changes over time are costly for MFIs to implement. Indeed, Hermes et 
al. (2011) find a positive long-term effect of technological changes on MFIs’ cost. 
Finally, in model (1), GDP per capita relates positively to operating costs, indicating 
that MFIs operating in more developed economies have higher operating costs. This 
finding is consistent with that of Grigorian and Manole (2002).  
 Panel B (of Table 3) contains estimates of the inefficiency equation, the most 
important part of the empirical investigation. In this panel, the dependent variable is the 
inefficiency term (obtained simultaneously from the cost frontier; Panel A). The results 
show in all models that, indeed, there is a significant relationship between non-
performing loans and cost efficiency in microfinance. The significant negative effect of 
PAR30 on cost inefficiency indicates that an increase in non-performing loans improves 
the efficiency of MFIs. In other words, as asset quality is enhanced, the efficiency of 
MFIs deteriorates. The finding implies that MFIs with low default rates and high 
operating costs may benefit from relaxing extra monitoring efforts. This finding 
supports our claimed trade-off proposition and the relationship banking theory; hence, 
hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 The significant positive effect of the quadratic term of PAR30 on inefficiency shows 
that a further rise in non-performing loans worsens the efficiency of MFIs. To put it 
differently, as asset quality declines, so does the cost efficiency of MFIs. The finding 
implies that MFIs with high default rates exert extra efforts to control non-performing 
loans. However, the extra efforts, like monitoring and negotiation of possible repayment 
plans, cause the overall operating costs of the institution to shoot up (Berger & 
DeYoung, 1997); hence, cost efficiency deteriorates. This finding supports hypothesis 
2.  
  Given that both hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported, the relationship between non-
performing loans and cost efficiency is nonlinear12 (U-shaped). This means that there is 
an optimal point of PAR30 above which cost efficiency declines. We could not pin down 
that point because there seems to be no general optimal point of PAR30 fitting all types 
of MFIs. While the majority of MFIs have PAR30 below 10 percent of the portfolio 
value, there are some that have PAR30 ranging from 10 to 50 percent. Therefore, we 
leave this threshold for practitioners to assess for themselves.  
 
12 In unreported robustness checks, we confirmed the nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between cost efficiency 
and non-performing loans in simple pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions. Also, the U-shaped relationship 
exists when loan portfolio is used as an output measure in the stochastic frontier analysis. We chose number of 




 Concerning the control variables in Panel B, we observe, in models (1) and (2), that 
older MFIs are cost inefficient compared to younger MFIs, similar to Hermes et al.’s 
(2011) finding. Perhaps younger MFIs are more able to keep abreast of current 
efficiency and technology practices compared to older MFIs, which may have to learn 
them by trial and error. A possible explanation is that the lack of learning effects among 
MFIs is a result of subsidies (Caudill et al., 2009). For example, about 70 percent of the 
MFIs in our sample hold subsidized debt. In any case, “sticky” operating costs are a 
major challenge in the industry and future research should definitely investigate why 
there are no cost-learning effects among MFIs globally.  
 Similarly, in model (1), shareholder-owned MFIs are more cost inefficient compared 
to non-shareholder-owned MFIs and this departs from the transformation debate that 
shareholder-owned firms are more operationally efficient than non-shareholder-owned 
firms (D’Espallier et al., 2017). In untabulated regressions, we checked whether 
shareholder MFIs are indeed inefficient compared to non-shareholder MFIs by 
replacing the Shareholder MFI variable with Bank, Nonbank and NGO   as controls for 
MFI type (co-operative is the base category). The results showed that nonbank  and 
NGO MFIs are significantly and positively associated with higher cost inefficiencies 
compared to co-operative MFIs. The overall impression in our sample is that 
shareholder-owned MFIs are probably not different from non-shareholder MFIs in 
terms of cost efficiency. This suggests that both groups of MFIs probably apply similar 
business models.  
 We further observe (in models (1) and (3))  that, as expected, group lending reduces 
MFIs’ inefficiency compared to individual lending (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999) and 
MFIs focusing only on urban clients are more efficient compared to those serving both 
urban and rural clients (model (3)). Finally, and similarly to Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012), we find that MFI size increases cost inefficiency (model (1)), suggesting 
diseconomies of scale.   
 Overall, we find a nonlinear relationship between non-performing loans and cost 
efficiency in microfinance, contrary to the linear relationship reported in traditional 
banking studies (e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2000; Fiordelisi et 
al., 2011). The U-shaped relationship indicates that, at some point, an increase in non-
performing loans improves cost efficiency but a further increase (beyond that point) 




In this paper, we examine the relationship between non-performing loans and cost 
efficiency of microfinance institutions (MFIs). While there is a significant body of 
banking literature on the aforesaid relationship (e.g., Berger & DeYoung, 1997; 
Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2011), studies using microfinance data are, to the best 
of our knowledge, nonexistent. This is unfortunate since high operating costs are 
hampering the microfinance industry and these could be related to historical reasons 
where MFIs were too concerned about repayment performance and not concerned 
enough about operational costs. As a solution to high default rates among government 
banks tasked with agricultural lending, modern microfinance emerged in the 1970s 




(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Microfinance pioneers shifted the lending focus to 
non-farm businesses, which are less vulnerable to weather shocks, and this strategy 
resulted in massive improvements in repayment rates (Cull et al., 2009).  
 However, focusing on access to capital and not on the price of capital has resulted in 
huge operating costs in the global microfinance industry today. MFIs paid little attention 
to their cost efficiency because the cost of lending can always be passed on to 
borrowers, who are normally profitable and willing to pay high interest (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010). We therefore study a possible trade-off between (low) default rates 
and (high) operating costs in the global microfinance industry. After all, modern 
microfinance has been successful in achieving high loan asset quality (Cull et al., 2009; 
Hulme & Mosley, 1996), but not cost efficiency.  
 Our motivation in investigating the claimed trade-off is linked to the high lending 
rates in the microfinance industry. The high operating costs force MFIs to increase their 
interest rates (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Hardy et al., 2003), which harms the good 
reputation of microfinance (Bateman, 2010). Thus, reducing operating costs could mean 
reducing interest rates, which could bring some relief to the poor borrower. Moreover, 
an overemphasis on repayment performance may render MFIs unwilling to serve some 
of their target clientele – the most vulnerable ones (Amin et al., 2003; Pearlman, 2012).  
 Using a large global sample of MFIs, we find that the relationship between non-
performing loans and cost efficiency is nonlinear (U-shaped), contrary to the evidence 
for a positive linear relationship reported in commercial banking studies. In particular, 
we find that an initial increase in non-performing loans improves cost efficiency while 
a subsequent increase worsens it. Our finding is consistent with two streams of research. 
The first is relationship banking, which suggests that creating and maintaining ties with 
clients is costly (Diamond, 1984; Petersen & Rajan, 1994) but that it enhances asset 
quality (Puri et al., 2017). The second stream relates to the theoretical arguments of 
Hughes and Mester (1993) and Berger and DeYoung (1997) that efficiency and loan 
defaults are positively related. For instance, exogenous events cause loan defaults, 
which warrant extra monitoring costs. On the other hand, poorly managed institutions 
end up having a large stock of non-performing loans.  
 Our finding is relevant to practice. Each MFI needs to strike a reasonable balance 
between its operational efficiency and risk. MFIs operating with too low credit risk 
could find it operationally useful to streamline their selection, monitoring, and 
collection activities or increase risk a bit by relaxing efforts devoted to these activities. 
This would allow them to serve more vulnerable clients, thereby enhancing their social 
outreach and at the same time remaining operationally sustainable. On the other hand, 
MFIs struggling with high non-performing loans could benefit from installing more 
strict screening, monitoring, and collection procedures. The challenge however is how 
to do strict client selection without screening out the poorest clients. This calls for a 
selection model that maximizes both institutional and client benefits. This is an avenue 
for future research. 
 It would also be interesting to rigorously investigate why learning effects are lacking 
among MFIs around the world. Is it that younger MFIs have up-to-date owners and the 
older ones are dependent on donors? Another important avenue for future research is an 
investigation into the cost drivers of an MFI. To date, there has been limited research 




driver of operating costs in microfinance and how can digitalization help reduce such 
costs are questions that need to be addressed. 
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